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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of the relationship between the New Zealand 
Department of Conservation and the local Maori groups involved in the management of 
Tongariro National Park, during a historical Waitangi Tribunal inquiry into the park 
area. The relationship between Maori and the New Zealand government, as with 
indigenous groups and governments in other settler societies, is profoundly affected by 
historical events and the contemporary understandings of those events. I identify key 
strengths and weaknesses in the relationship at Tongariro National Park, and investigate 
their historical origins. 
I argue that the local relationship between the Department of Conservation and Maori is 
hampered by the different expectations for the relationship each party brings to the 
negotiating table. These differing expectations stretch back to the establishment of the 
park in the late nineteenth century, and were enshrined during the early twentieth ' 
century in the legislation, policy and public attitudes that structure the national park 
institution. The relationship's strengths included the goodwill with which both parties 
usually engaged with each other, the longevity of key relationships, and the political 
nous of local Maori leaders. These features date back to the 1970s and 1980s when the 
introduction of public consultation in park decision making led to the development of 
personal relationships between park management staff and ·Maori. 
Claimant and Crown interpretations of the park's history were strongly shaped by the 
. . 
incentive structures of the inquiry process, leading to emphasis on certain events and 
aspects of the historical relationship that, in my analysis, were not always the most 
significant. Tribunal inquiries tend to b·e strongly adversarial, and the inquiry over 
. , 
Tongariro ·National Park put stress on personal relationships in the area. The usual 
patterns of interaction between Maori and the Department of Conservation were 
disrupted during and after the hearings. This may be only a short-term effect, but is 
. 
. . 
--noteworthy as one of the goals of the Treaty settlement process is to support ongoing 
' 
relationships between Maori and the New Zealand government, and little work has been 
done irito the impact of the inquiry process on relationships "on the ground." 
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Notes on language 
The macron above vowels in Maori words indicates a long vowel sound. Maori vowels 
are pronounced as follows: 'a' as in father, 'e' as in kept, 'i' as in kiwi, 'o' as in fort, 'u' 
as in tune. 'Wh' is usually pronounced as an 'f' sound, and 'ng' is pronounced as in 
song. The Maori language seldom uses affix plurals, so whether or not a Maori word is 
singular or plural must be read from the context. 
Maori words are italicised at first mention, and thenceforth written in plain text, except 
in cases where the first mention appears in a direct quote, where the formatting is left as 
it is in the original. There is a glossary at the very end of the thesis for easy reference. 
After careful thought I decided to chiefly use 'New Zealand' rather than 'Aotearoa,' or 
'Aotearoa New Zealand' in the body of this thesis. 'Aotearoa New Zealand' is too 
unwieldy for repeated use, and though Aotearoa is a much more beautiful name than 
New Zealand, and a Maori name much more appropriate than a Dutch one, it is difficult 
to modify 'Aotearoa' when writing in English. There is no easy way to describe the 
people of Aotearoa or the phenomena relating to Aotearoa, using the word Aotearoa, as 
one can write 'New Zealander' or 'New Zealand weather.' There is also ongoing 
dispute as to whether Aotearoa is a suitable name for the whole country when it was 
originally used to describe only the North Island, and the South Island has other names 
(Te Wai Pounamu and Te Wahi Pounamu are the most commonly used). 
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Introduction 
On 23 September 1887, a deed was drawn up in the court at Taup6 in 
which, on behalf of his tribe, Te Heuheu Tukino IV (Horonuku) gifted 
the summits ofTongariro, Ngauruhoe and part ofRuapehu to the Crown, 
thus initiating a process which led to the creation of New Zealand's first 
national park. Although the park was modelled on a concept imported 
from the United States of America, -where the world's first national park 
had been created at Yellowstone, Wyoming, in 1872, it was unique in that 
its nucleus was the gift of an indigenous people. Thus a major new 
dimension was added to the national park ideal with the gift of the sacred 
volcanic summits creating a three-way bond between land, Maori and 
Pakeha.1 
So begins the 2006-2016 management plan for Tongariro National Park (Tongariro), a 
79,598 hectare area of mountainous and volcanic land in the central North Island of 
Aotearoa New Zealand. The idea of the "three-way bond between land, Maori and 
Pakeha" (New Zealanders of European ancestry) comes from a statement made by the 
great-grandson ofHoronuku in 1987, in a book published as part of the centennial 
celebrations for the park.2 Tongariro is a celebrated place, a World Heritage site listed 
for its natural and cultural values, touted as the '~first national park to be established in 
New Zealand," and the "first park in th,e world to be gifted by a country's indigenous 
people. "3 In the same ye~r as the above quoted management plan was released, . 
-, 
however, a series of hearings began into the history of the park, in which the local 
indigenous people contested, among .other things, whether there had been an intended 
gift at all. 
These hearings were part of a Waitangi Tribunal inquiry. The Waitangi Tribunal is a 
Commiss1on of Inq~iry ·established to i~vestigate Maori claims that the Crown has 
. ' 
breached the Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840 between a representative of the British 
Crown and many Maori chiefs across New Zealand. If the Tribunal judges a claim to be 
well-founded, it will make recommendations for redress to· the government, which then 
. . . 
··enters settlement negotiations with the claimant groups. Claims are usually grouped by 
• 
district and heard together in large inquiries. The Tribunal's inquiry into the area in and 
1 Department of Conservation Tongariro Taupo Conservancy, Tongariro National Park Management 
Plan I Te Kaupapa Whakahaere Mo Te Papa Rehia O Tongariro, 2006-2016, (Turangi: , Department of 
Conservation Tongariro Taupo Conservancy, October 2006), 20. · 
2 Sir Hepi Te Heuheu,,foreword to Craig Potton, Tongariro: A. Sacred Gift (Auckland and Nelson: 
Landsdowne Press and Craig Potton, 1987), 8. _ 
3 
_"Tongariro -Facts," Department of Conservation, http://www.doc.govt.nz/parks-and-recreatJ.on/national-
parks/tongariro/features/tongariro-facts/. 
" 
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around Tongariro (the National Park inquiry) covered such issues as the acquisition and 
, , 
creation of the national park and its subsequent management, as well as land alienation 
and public works in the area. 
The park is owned and run by the New Zealand Government, through its Department of 
Conservation (DOC), and though there are various means of Maori involvement in 
management decisions, the main process is one of consultation, in which DOC seeks 
Maori opinion on issues thought to be of concern to them, and take those opinions into 
account. Both the design and the practice of this management relationship have been 
criticised heavily by the Maori claimants in the course of the inquiry. 
Research questions 
My primary research questions in this thesis were: 
1. What are the problems and strengths of the Maori-DOC relationship at 
Tongariro; and 
2. How did they arise? 
These are important questions to ask if we are interested in making relationships more 
successful. Identifying problems and strengths and investigating how they came about 
provides information about how prohlems can be avoided or minimised and how 
strengths can be achieved and supported. It is an important time to ask these questions 
in New Zealand. Several recent Waitangi Tribunal inquiries have included national park 
lands, and the settlements that will follow from 'them are likely to cause a substantial 
restructure of management relationships. This is an opportunity to improve 
relationships. 
These questions are also more widely relevant, across countries where there are settler 
and indigenous groups attempting to w.ork together in park management. The historical 
theme of dispossession and marginalisation of indigenous groups by colonising groups 
. 
. 
is similar across countries. The political battles to reclaim land and self-determination 
are also alike. The participants involved in relationships at Tongariro communicate with 
people involved in park 1nanagement in other places around the world, and see 
themselves as part of a larger network of park management. There has been travel and 
. 
. 
exchange between those involved in the relationship at Tongariro and people involved 
in parks in Australia, Canada and the United States, to name just a few relevant 
countries. 
2 
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My two main questions and the sources I used to investigate them raised supplementary 
questions. In order to identify the problems and strengths of management relationships 
it was important to further question the nature of a "problem" and the nature of a 
"strength." Both need to be understood in relation to a concept of success: a problem 
hinders progress towards success, a strength assists progress. In order to understand 
what constitutes success in relationships I investigated the following two questions in 
some detail: 
a. What are the objectives of these relationships, and 
b. How important is it that people involved in the relationship agree on those 
objectives? 
The timing of my research, during a W aitangi Tribunal inquiry, and the fact that I used 
many of the documents created for the inquiry as sources, required me to consider: 
c. What effect has the inquiry process had on the relationship, and 
d. What effect did the inquiry have on each party's characterisation of the 
relationship? 
This final question was intended to contextualise the information-I received, because an 
understanding of the highly politicised_ context within which the statements about the 
relationship were made is necessary for a good understanding of the statements . 
themselves. The question was not intended in ·order to second-guess the information I 
received about relationships. With sq little data unaffected by the claims context it was 
unrealistic to specuJate on what thy c;haracterisations of the relationships might have 
looked like if not for the claim. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of eight chapters and a conclusion. In the first chapter I introduce the 
New Zealand context and review the literature on government-Maori relationships in 
conservation. In the second chapter I address the questions about the objectives of 
relationships and how important it is that they- are shared. In chapter three I outline the 
framew9rk for analysing these relationships and identify the key problems and strengths 
3 
., 
of the Maori-DOC relationship at Tongariro. I draw on New Zealand and international 
co-management ( or collaborative management) literature for this analysis.4 
In chapter four I address the subject of Tribunal inquiries, specifically the way it affects 
ongoing relationships and the way its processes shape the submissions presented to it in 
evidence. This is in order to understand the highly political process in which the parties 
were engaged at the time of my research. It is also a necessary background chapter as it 
describes the incentives and conventions which shape the submissions I use as data. 
The final four chapters address periods of Tongariro' s history. Each gives a very brief 
overview of New Zealand race-relations during the period, and how they affected 
relationships in the Tongariro area. I then tum to the submissions and my interview 
answers to discuss the way the period has been described by the Crown and claimant 
parties in the inquiry. Chapter five examines the creation phase, from the first 
suggestions for a national park in the 1870s to the formal declaration of the park in 
1907. Chapter six discusses the development of the national park institution from 1907 
to the 1970s. Chapter seven discusses the period from the 1970s to the beginning of the 
National Park inquiry hearings in 2006, during which time the policy of consultation 
with Maori was developed. These chapters examine the key role that history, and 
understandings of history, play in today's relationships, and the way the Tribunal 
process privileges particular kinds of narratives about that relationship. In chapter eight 
I return to the time of the National Park inquiry hearings and slightly beyond, in 2006-8. 
Using the Waitangi Tribunal submissions and my interview data, I address the way the 
inquiry process shaped the debate about contemporary relationship issues at Tongariro. 
In the conclusion I argue that DOC and Maori held different ideas about the meanings 
and objectives of their interaction, and these different expectations about their 
relationship were not managed well. The consultative model of relationships in place at 
Tongariro and other national parks at the time of my research did not meet Maori 
expectations for their relationship with DOC, and the opportunities for power-sharing 
over smaller projects and areas were increasingly limited. These problems in the design 
of relationships go back to the early years of the twentieth century when the key 
features and meanings of the national park institution evolved, almost entirely without 
4 
"Collaborative management" and "co-management" are sometimes defined differently, but as I mostly 
use the terms to define literatures, rather than management situations, I use them broadly and 
interchangeably to cover all the writing which refers to some level of sharing in management decision.-
making. See p30 for a fuller discussion of co-management definitions. · 
4 
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Maori input. The key strengths of relationships at Tongariro were their longevity, the 
goodwill which generally characterised the1n, and the ability of Maori to successfully 
challenge DOC through means such as the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal. These are 
all aspects of the relationship since the 1970s and 80s. These years saw important 
changes in legislation and in Pakeha attitudes, though the problem of differing 
expectations remained throughout. 
Theoretical and Methodological Approach 
For the first part of my question I used a framework derived from 1nanagement literature 
and supplemented by the literature on collaborative management, in order to analyse the 
relationship and identify its key features. In the belief that the best information about the 
nature and condition of the relationship would come from the people involved, I 
focused heavily on the attitudes and understandings of practitioners in the park 
management relationship. A large number of my sources were drawn from the 
submissions to the National Park inquiry, which were mainly written in 2006, and the 
transcripts of the inquiry hearings, which were held during 2006 and 2007. I also 
interviewed many of the key participants in the consultation processes of park 
management during and soon after the hearings period. Other key sources included 
policy documents, and minutes of park:-related meetings. 
The second part of my question, on how the k~y features oLthe park relationship 
evolved, is historical. The history chapters trace the key elements of the park · 
relationship at the time of the hearings, back into its past, in the manner of a genealogy. 
The history ·of Tongariro, and the ~ay that history is interpreted by those involved in 
park management, are vital ,to understanding today's relationships. Past events and 
practices created th~ institutions within ~hich these relationships operate, and parties' 
attitudes towards each other are usually shaped by their previous interactions and their 
understandings of their history. A historical approach is doubly important in this case 
study as Tongariro was the subject of a historical claim and, at the time of my research, 
. . . 
· the main. players in park management and local Maori affairs were embroiled in a 
• 
process of discussion' and debate on the history of the park's c~eation and management 
stretching back to the mid-1800s. 
Historian Klaus Neumann argues that a genealogical approach to history can be useful 
in terms of changing policy in the present: 
" 
5 
A genealogical approach could help us to develop strategies for moving 
out of the present - by identifying trends that have historically run counter 
to dominant elements of the status quo ... A genealogical approach could 
invoke history to argue for a policy change, and it could at the same time 
demonstrate how current references to the past tap into patriotic 
sentiment and function to justify the status quo.5 
National parks are often acclaimed as places sacred to the nation, and their 
establishment an act of great foresight by politicians and lobbyists of the past. These 
narratives of protection and foresight have a tendency to disinherit Maori from a 
connection or right to those places distinct from the rights of' all New Zealanders.' 
Looking more closely into the birth and development of national parks in New Zealand 
makes it clear that although the desire to protect these places for future generations was 
one motivation in the establishment and management of Tongariro, it was not the only 
motivation, and many of the government's management measures over the years have 
had detrimental effects on the qualities DOC now seeks to preserve. 
Reflecting the importance of the park's history to today's relationship, there are four 
historical chapters, each dealing with a distinctly different period in the park's history. 
Each of these periods was also treated very differently in the inquiry, with much 
attention and research focused on the establishment of the park, and relatively little 
attention devoted to the years between 1907 and 1970 during which there was little 
interaction between park managers and Maori. 6 The period since 1970 was heavily 
referred to in individual submissions, but only a single scoping report investigated the 
relationship in that period, and concluded that there were too few problems in the 
relationship to warrant further research. The time of the inquiry, though not long enough 
to constitute a historical "period," was a unique time in the park's history and required a 
separate chapter. The data I used for the history chapters included archival sources, the 
historical reports submitted to the National Park and related Waitangi Tribunal 
inquiries, Crown and claimant submissions, my interview data, and published works. 
A case study approach is essential for a nuanced study of relationships. Relationships 
are idiosyncratic and complicated, and they are always changing. They_ are best 
understood in the context of their history and contemporary political situation, and with 
first-hand knowledge of the individuals involved. The attendant risk of this deeper 
5 Klaus Neumann, "The Cornelia Rau case: a historical perspective," (talk given in the History 
Department, University of Melbourne, May 1 2, 2005) , http ://www.apo.org.au/commentary/comelia-rau-
case-historical-perspective. 
6 This is with the exception of a large research report on the development of hydroelectric scheme 
harnessing water from the mountains. 
· 
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contextual and historical inquiry is that any findings might be limited in their relevance 
to Tongariro itself. There are two key ways in which a particularised study can be more 
widely useful: either as a result of the typicality of the case, such that the study's 
findings are applicable to many other similar places; or due to the extraordinariness of 
the case, such that the findings are of note in and of themselves.7 Tongariro is an 
extraordinary place. It is one of the oldest national parks in the world, a World Heritage 
Site recognised for its physical landscape and cultural associations, and it has a unique 
history. There are two particular reasons why Tongariro makes a rich and useful case 
study of cross-cultural relationships. One is that it was initiated by an unusual action - a 
gift, the cultural meanings of which are contested. The second is that Tongariro has 
· recently been generating a large body of data about the different ways that the parties 
understand their obligations to one another. 
The title of the thesis is derived from the Australian academic Greg Dening' s 'islands 
and beaches' metaphor, which he described as follows: 
'Islands and Beaches' is a metaphor that helps my understanding. It is not 
a model that makes behavior predictable. 'Islands and beaches' is a 
metaphor for the different ways in which human beings construct their 
worlds and for the boundaries that they ~onstru,ct between Jhem. It is a 
natural metaphor for the oceanic world of the Pacific where islands are 
everywhere and beaches mus~ be crossed to enter them or leave them, to 
make them or change them. But the islands and beaches I speak of are 
less physical than cultural. They are the islands men and women make by • 
. the reality they attribute to their categories, their roles, their institutions, 
.and the beaches they put around them with their definitions of 'we' and 
'they'.8 . 
His "beach~s" are both boundary spaces and sites of interaction, similar to literary 
theorist Mary Louise Pratt's idea of "contact zones" as" ... social spaces where cultures 
. . . 
meet, clash, and grappl~. with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical 
relations of power. .·."9 More specifically, the title borrows from Dening's idea of 
"crossing the beach" as a metap~or for cultural and institutional ·change. I use this 
metaphor for illustrative rather than analytic p~rposes. The.national park institution in 
New Zealand, as I will explain, is so1J1ething of a Pakeha 'island,' formed at a time 
· when Maori interests, and voices were given little attention by the government. Though 
Maori interests and voices are now a much larger part of the way the park is run, they 
are still essentially sidelined in the decision-making process of national park . 
7 Robert Stake, The A,:J of Case Study Research (London:, Sage .Publications, 1995), 4-7. 
8 Greg Derring, Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas 177 4-1880 (Carlton, 
Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 3. 
9 Mary Louise Pratt, "Arts of the Contact Zone," Profession (1991): 34 .. 
., 
7 
management. The Waitangi Tribunal, on the other hand, is a carefully constructed 
"beach," where two cultures meet and debate the meaning of their past and the shape of 
their future. The National Park inquiry is a crossing, a cultural exchange that will 
reshape the park. 10 
The title also plays on the name of the Tongariro Alpine Crossing (formerly the 
Tongariro Crossing), the popular day walk which is a part of what makes these 
mountains an international tourist attraction. 11 In peak season froin December to March, 
thousands of travellers cross the mountains every day. The crossings this thesis is 
concerned with, however, are the metaphorical crossings made by the Department of 
Conservation and Maori, as they negotiate over the management of the mountains. 
Contribution to the field 
What 'the field' is for this study is not a straightforward question. For my investigation 
into the strengths and weaknesses of the relationship at Tongariro, I looked to the 
literature concerned with the question of how to provide for successful collaborative 
management ( or co-management) of natural resources. The voices of practitioners are 
often absent from the discussion in the co-management literature about how 
relationships should work. I hope to offer some clarity on the ways in which 
practitioners see these relationships, and the ways they want the relationships to change. 
The co-management literature is also often synchronic, concerned with contemporary 
issues, and takes insufficient account of the way relationships between government and 
indigenous peoples are profoundly affected by historic events and understandings. 
The historical chapters borrow from and contribute to the growing work on 
environmental and race-relations history in New Zealand. As of yet there are few works 
which address the overlap areas of conservation and race-relations history, outside the 
reports produced for Waitangi Tribu~al inquiries. In contrast, the literature on the 
Waitangi Tribunal is one of the more developed in New Zealand historiography. 
. 
. Historians tend to focus on the published historical reports of the Waitangi Tribunal and 
debate whether or not these reports meet, or intend to meet, the standard5 of academic 
10 Both the park and the Tribunal could be usefully described as 'social spaces' for the purpose of this 
thesis . Most of the interactions regarding the management of the park take place outside the park bounds, 
and though the Waitangi Tribunal has a headquarters in Wellington, its hearings take place in diverse sites 
all over the country, from marae (Maori conimunity meeting places) to school halls. The phrase 'the 
Tribunal ' is used to describe the people who comprise it more often than it is used to describe a place. 11 In 2007 the Tongariro Crossing was renamed the Tongariro Alpine Crossing as part of an attempt to 
dissuade visitors from attempting the walk without the appropriate clothing, footwear and emergency 
supplies for mountain conditions. 
· 
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history. My key sources were the submissions made by Crown and claimant and 
lawyers and non-expert witnesses. These are politically motivated statements and are 
very useful for understanding the perspectives and interests of key participants in the 
inquiry. Very few historians have used the non-expert or lawyer-led submissions as 
data, whi-ch is surprising, as they are a rich source of group and individual perspectives 
on the Maori-government relationship and its history. The submissions, particularly the 
group submissions, are influenced by the way the Tribunal is designed and the 
procedure by which it operates. I will discuss the kinds of narrative and characterisation 
that are encouraged by the Tribunal process in the historical chapters of this thesis. 
There are difficult generalisations involved in seeking "Maori" and "government" 
perspectives. The opinions and understandings of government agents and Maori 
individuals involved in park management relationships are as many and varied as the 
personalities of the individuals themselves. There are Maori who work at DOC, making 
dichotomisation problematic. During my fieldwork period about ten percent ofDOC's 
full time staff were Maori. 12 In some ways the W aitangi Tribunal process sorts out these 
technical difficulties: claimant and Crown individuals are sorted into camps by the very 
structure of the claim, and the official written statements of claimants and Crown 
witnesses are clearly labelled as to which party they fall into. Any Maori, and only 
Maori, can bring forward a claim, and the claims must be against the Crown. But this 
clouds the complexity of relationships. There are Maori among departmental staff, and 
there has been one Maori Conservation Minister: Sandra Lee, from 1999 to 2002. A 
Pakeha Member of Parliament in the late nineteenth century and his land agent brother, 
who were instrumental in some of the alleged Treaty breaches under investigation in the 
inquiry, are ancestors of some of the claimants. The differences between Maori and 
Pakeha are real, but they are seldom simple. Part of my aim in this study is to expose 
. . 
some of the problems created by the rigid binary of "Maori" and "the Crown" in the 
National Park inquiry, particularly the way it obscures some important issues in the 
relationship, such as the role of Maori staff at the Department of Conservation, the 
-attitudes of the Pakeha public and the influence of national park interest groups. 
This analysis will add to the-fledgling literature on collaboration between the state and 
Maori in conservation efforts. It is au important time to be looking at these ·questions in 
New Zealand, where the government is coming under increased pressure to introduce 
12 Department of Conservation, Annual Report for the y ear ended 3 0 June 2 008, (V{ ellington: Department 
of Conservation, 2008), table 4, 69. 
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co-management in national parks. As I will argue, with reference to Tongariro's history, 
the design of institutions_ is a key factor in the success of the relationships that take 
place within them and in regard to them. Before co-management of national parks is 
established in New Zealand it is timely to look at the sorts of problems that face 
collaborative efforts, as well as how they succeed, how those strengths and weaknesses 
have evolved, and the way the Waitangi Tribunal process filters and angles these 
debates. My analysis of Tongariro offers insights into all these s-qbjects. 
10 
Chapter One: DOC-Maori Relationships 
Relationships between governments and minority indigenous populations tend to be 
fraught. Attempts to work together are often hampered by the continuing effects of 
historical wrongs done to indigenous people, and the resentments engendered by those 
events. How to negotiate these history-laden relationships is a question being struggled 
with in most places where indigenous groups still exist as political entities after 
colonisation. The very nature of the relationship between settler governments and 
indigenous people is contested. There is much political and intellectual debate over 
which specific rights belong to indigenous groups, what resulting responsibilities accrue 
to settler governments, and why. There are varying definitions of what it means to be 
indigenous, whether it means the group with the first recorded ties to a particular piece 
of land, or the group in occupation at the time of colonisation, and how closely it is 
linked to minority status. 1 
Land and natural resources are often at the hub of conflicts. This is partly a contest over 
the power to own and control these places, and to harness the ecol}.omic opportunities 
that the environment generates. It also reflects much deeper issues regarding indigenous 
and settler peoples' rights and duties with regard to the land and each other. This thesis 
looks at a very particular kind of place: a national park. The"national park institution is a 
global one, with its own International Union for the Cons~rvation of Nature (IUCN) 
category. The IUCN definition for national parks is: 
· ... large natural or near natural areas set aside to protect large-scale 
ecological processes, along with the complement of species and 
· ecosystems characteristic of the area, which also provide a foundation for 
environnientally and culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, 
· educational, recreational and visitor opportunities.2 
This definj.tion has changed since the first IUCN categories were designed, a small 
example of the continuous evolution of the concept of a national park since Yellowstone 
NationarPark was established in 1872. The d,esignation of a national park was, at its 
genesis, a grand name for grand places, a statement of national pride and a_gesture to 
1 Jeremy Waldron debates some of these questions with particular reference to New Zealand in Jeremy 
Waldron, 11 Indigeneity7 First Peoples and Last Occupancy," New Zealand Journal of Public and 
International Law l, no. 1 (2003). 
2 1
_'Cat'egory Il National Park/ International Union for Conservation of Nature, 
http:/ /www.iucn.org/aboutf work/programmes/pa/pa _products/wcpa categories/pa categoryii/. 
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'the people' that such places would be kept for all to enjoy. The asset to the nation 
' > provided by tourists coming to see these grand places was also part of the original 
motivations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As the national park 
institution has changed over the last century it has gathered further meanings, such as a 
scientific learning ground, a sanctuary for the protection of native species and 
environmental processes, and a place where infrastructural development should be 
limited. 
In New Zealand, a country which prides and promotes itself on its 'clean and green' 
environmental image, national parks are both important assets in the country's tourism 
earnings and icons of national identity. National parks are sometimes referred to as the 
'jewels of the conservation estate,' the country's most beautiful places, reserved for 'the 
people' now and to come. 3 There is a historic link between parks and mountainous areas 
in New Zealand, partly because of the grandeur of the scenery, and partly because 
mountain lands were not suitable for farming or agriculture, and thus could not be put to 
more 'productive' use. To Maori many mountains are tupuna (ancestors), and therefore 
tapu, or sacred. The key mountain of a tribal area is recited as a part of the introductory 
pepeha (saying) which Maori use to identify themselves. Places like this, which are of 
great cultural value to settler and indigenous groups alike, bring to the forefront these 
issues of rights and duties towards each other and the land. 
Since 1987 DOC has been the government agency charged with managing national 
parks. It cannot, in any meaningful way, be said that there is a unitary relationship 
between an entity "DOC," and an entity "Maori." Both these entities are complicated. 
DOC is split into regional conservancies, anc;l each conservancy has a substantial degree 
of autonomy from headquarters.4 Although DOC has a guiding Act of Parliament, and 
freely available national and conservancy level policy documents outlining its 
philosophy, intention, and rules of behaviour, its work is carried out by individuals, who 
have their own personal philosophies, intentions and behavioural patterns that also 
. 
. 
affect their actions. The idea of a single Maoridom is even more precarious. Maori are 
3 Some examples follow, all elicited by a proposal by the National-led Government in 2010 to allow for 
limited mining in some national park areas. The proposal was eventually abandoned due to the level of 
public opposition. Jane Clifton, "The Big Dig," New Zealand Listener 3653 (2010), 
http: //www.listener.co .nz/current-affairs/po1itics/the-big-dig/. John Minto, "Keep Mining out of 
Conservation Estate," Fro ntl ine(2010) , http ://www. stuff. co .nz/business/b lo gs/frontline/3458018/Keep-
mining-ou t-o f-conserva tion-esta te. "Saving the Nation," Otago Daily Times(2010) , 
http: //www.odt.co.nz/opinion/editorial/98762/saving-nation?page=0%2CO. 
4 Brief of Evidence of Doris Johnston, Acting General Manager (Policy), on behalf of the Department of 
Conservation, Wai 1130, #H2, November 10, 2006, paragraphs 10-13, 7-8. · 
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not organised into a fully representative body at a national level. There are various pan-
Maori authorities, prominent amongst which are the New Zealand Maori Council, the 
Federation of Maori Authorities, and the Maori Women's Welfare League, but though 
they play important roles at the national level, none are fully representative. 5 Maori 
representation tends to be stronger at the level of iwi and hapu (usually translated as 
"tribes" and "sub-tribes," though this is problematic), 6 which has been encouraged by 
government policies and the Treaty settlement process. 7 The representative bodies at 
-· 
hapu, and especially iwi level have also met criticism for representing only a minority 
of Maori in their area. 8 There are urban Maori authorities and other groups that 
challenge the more 'traditional' iwi- and hapu-based structures of Maori political 
· organisation. DOC' s consultation processes tend to be between conservancy 
management staff and iwi and hapu representatives or groups, and it is more meaningful 
to say there are relationships between these smaller groups. 
A second complicating factor is the notion of a "relationship." This is an immensely 
broad and flexible concept. The Oxford dictionary defines relationships as: 
1 the way in which two or more people or things are connected, or the 
state of being connected. ➔ the way in which two or more people or 
groups regard and behave towards each other.9 
Any connection involving mutual regard and behaviour between two or more 
individuals or groups, can be said to be a relationship. The distinction between group 
and individual relationships is important to clarify. Given that a group does not possess 
conscio11;sness and therefore cannot "regard" things, a group relationship is an abstract 
idea, a generalisatio·n about a set of individual, personal relationships. Group 
relationships are in everyd~y conversational currency, however. "The DOC-Maori 
relationship" is a phrase that would not seem odd or obscure to New Zealanders (though 
5 K. Gover and N. Baird, "Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner," The Universzty of Toronto Law Journal 
52, no. 1 (2002): 44-5. 
6 Angela Ballara suggests "peoples" for iwi and "clans" ·(based on descent from a common ancestor) for 
hapu, might be better translations, as they avoid the more rigidly defined terms of tribe and sub-tribe. 
· Membership of an iwi, especially, is based on choice as well as ancestry. See Angela Ballara, Jwi: The 
Dynamics of Maori Tribal Organisationfrom C.1769 to C.1945 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
1998), 17, 25-35. 
7 Gover and Baird, "Identifying the Maori Treaty Partner," 45 , 49-52. 
8 For example Rog.er Maaka argues that the traditional descent -based tribe as the proper vehicle for 
modem Maori representation is a meaningful ideology for only an educated Maori political elite .. Roger 
C. A. Maaka, "The New Tribe: Conflicts and Continuities in the Social Organization of Urban Maori," 
The Contemporary Pacific 6, no. 2 (1994), 
http://scholarspace.manoahawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/ l O 125/1298 8/v6n2-3 l l-33 6 .pdf.txt?sequence=2. 
9 
~atherine Seanes arid Angus Stevenson, eds., Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press,2004). 
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it might elicit a few strong opinions), despite the fact that it must refer to countless 
' • interconnections, made up of the attitudes with which members of DOC and members 
of Maori groups regard each other, and the exchanges between them, across the entire 
country. 
There are other important distinctions to make within the broader concept of 
"relationships." The distinction between "regarding" and "behaving" is one: the 
attitudes held by a person or group can be seen separately from their behaviour towards 
each other. Another distinction is between formal interaction, which is organised and 
takes place between individuals officially selected as representatives of Maori and 
DOC, and informal interaction, which occurs without organisation, sometimes outside 
of work hours. Informal interaction is less studied, although it can influence decision-
making. A fourth distinction is the "paper" relationship - the expressions of intent in 
statutes and policy documents, against the relationship in practice, the actions and 
interactions of individuals in the daily processes of management. This is a distinction 
that many claimants have drawn attention to in the course of the National Park inquiry. 
They allege that the relationship 'on the ground' does not live up to the lofty 
proclamations in policy documents. 
In this particular kind of relationship, a park management relationship, there is another 
important dimension that cannot be ignored, and that is the relationship between people 
and the land. My primary focus is the relationship between DOC and Maori, but this 
relationship cannot be properly understood without knowing something about the way 
each party attaches to the land, and the ways they believe the land should be managed. 
There is a truth to Sir Hepi Te Heuheu's desc:ription of a 'three-way bond between land, 
Maori and Pakeha.' Though I focus on the relationships between people, the 
relationships between people and the land are always present in the background. 
In this thesis I look at all these aspects of relationships, using a framework borrowed 
from a pair of writers in the literature on management and leadership: Lee Bolman and 
Terrence Deal. I concentrate on DOC's Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy, where 
Tongariro is located, and the conservancy staff's liaisons with the two iwi Ngati 
Tuwharetoa and Ngati Rangi. I will, however; draw some cautious conclusions about 
relationships between DOC and Maori more widely. Although relationships vary in 
their local political and environmental contexts, and the personalities of the inqividuals 
involved, they operate in very similar regulatory environments, under the same 
14 
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legislation, general policies and departmental operating system. Maori across the 
country have suffered similar effects of social and economic marginalisation through 
colonisation, and their grievances, though different, are similar in kind. I argue that the 
issues created by this regulatory environment and these histories are some of the most 
important obstacles to successful relationships, and careful generalisations can therefore 
be useful. 
Tongariro and the National Park inquiry 
Tongariro sits just to the southwest of Lake Taupo, in the centre of the North Island of 
New Zealand. Three volcanic mountains, Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe and Tongariro (Mt 
. Tongariro ), are encompassed by the 79,598 hectare park zone. It is usually referred to as 
New Zealand's oldest national park, and the fourth oldest in the world, though these 
claims rely on a genesis date of 1887, when a deed of conveyance was signed by 
Horonuku Te Heuheu Tukino IV (Horonuku), the then paramount chief of the iwi Ngati 
Tuwharetoa (Tuwharetoa). This deed transferred the legal ownership of 2,640 hectares 
to the government of New Zealand, for the purposes of a national park. These blocks 
were comprised of two circles each with a radius of one mile around the peaks of 
Tongariro and Ngauruhoe, and most of a circle of one and a half mile radius arou!1d the 
peak of Ruapehu. The Tongariro National Park Act was passed in 1894, and the park 
was officially proclaimed.in The New Zealand Gazette in 1907.10 
During my ·research period, a hundred years on from the park's declaration, Tongariro 
was the ~ubject of a Waitangi Tribunal inquiry, one arm of which was brought forward 
by the great-:grandson of Horonuku·: Sir Hepi Te Heuheu Tukino VII (Sir Hepi). Two 
major iwi ·have interests in the Tongariro area: Tuwharetoa in the north; and the 
.. 
Whanganui confederation in the southwest. Tuwharetoa and N gati Rangi ( a Whanganui 
iwi) were the dominant claimants in the National Park inquiry, although the inquiry was 
} 
made up of more than forty separ~te claims. Most of the claimants belonged to or 
represented Whanganui and Tuwharetoa groups. Their claims were bunched into 
_eighteen ~lusters and heard togethe~ as th~ National Park inquiry. 11 
10 The Egmont National Park Act was passed in 1900, which would make it the oldest national park in 
New Zealand ifTongariro's· 1887 genesis date wasn't recognised. Jacinta Ruru draws attention to the 
forgotten delays in Tongariro's establishment in Jacinta Ruru, "Indigenous Peoples' Ownership and 
Management of Mountains: The Aotearoa/New Zealand Experience," Indigenous Law Journal 3(2004): 
111-38,23. - -
11 Each claim has a 'Wai number.' The National Park claim number is Wai 1130. 
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Among other things, the Tuwharetoa claimants contested the meaning of the 1887 
conveyance, and the natµre of the responsibilities the government of New Zealand 
undertook in its acceptance of the so-called 'gift' of the mountain peaks. Other Maori 
groups and individuals have made claims in reference to lands in the National Park 
inquiry district (which extends beyond the bounds of the park itself), some of which 
contend that their rights in the area were ignored in the 'gift' event, and the subsequent 
purchasing and proclaiming of lands surrounding the peaks. 12 The claims against the 
New Zealand government, or, more precisely, "the Crown," also include the way the 
park has been managed since its creation, and the role, or lack of role, Maori have had 
in the decisions made over the mountains. One of the key demands made by the Maori 
claimants is for a stronger, better-structured role in park management. 
The People of the Park 
N gati Tuwharetoa 
Ko Tongariro te maunga 
Ko Taupi5nuiatia te moana 
Ko Tuwharetoa te iwi 
Ko Te Heuheu te tangata 
This is a pepeha ofNgati Tuwharetoa. It identifies Tongariro as their key mountain, 
Lake Taupo as their water body, Tuwharetoa as their iwi, and Te Heuheu as their chief. 
Ngati Tuwharetoa, or just Tuwharetoa, is a large and relatively powerful iwi based in 
the central North Island around Lake Taupo. In the 2006 census 34,674 people 
identified as N gati Tuwharetoa, making them the sixth most populous iwi in the 
country. 13 The iwi authority is the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board (the Trust Board), 
which was established in 1926 and is located-in Turangi. Its chairman is Tumu Te 
Heuheu, who is the Ariki, or the paramount chief, of Tuwharetoa. The Trust Board's 
members are elected for three year terms by their beneficiaries, in this case all members 
of Tuwharetoa who choose to vote. 
Tuwharetoa is composed of many different hapu. Te Kahui Mangai Directory of Iwi and 
Maori Organisations (Te Kahui Mangai Directory), administered by Te Puni Kokiri, the 
Ministry for Maori Development, lists fifty-six hapu. Several of these hapu made 
submissions in the inquiry. The relationship hetween the Trust Board and these hapu is 
often complex. One example of this -from the National Park inquiry was a group 
12 See Appendix D: Map of the Inquiry District. 
13 Statistics New Zealand website, accessed 15 March 2011 , http: //www.stats.govt.nz/. · 
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associated closely with the mountain lands, Ngati Hikairo, which was split in the 
inquiry, with one group affiliating as a hapu ofNgati Tuwharetoa and another group 
standing as an iwi in its own right. Much of the consultation between the Tongariro-
Taupo Conservancy and Tuwharetoa was with the Trust Board, and informally with the 
groups they are linked to through individual departmental staff. 
Whanganui 
Mai i te kahui maunga ki Tangaroa, ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au. 
This is a frequently quoted Whanganui pepeha. It can be translated as: From the 
gathered mountains to the sea, I am the river, and the river is me. The Whanganui tribes 
. are a loose confederation of iwi and hapu based along the Whanganui River, which runs 
northwest from Tongariro to Taumarunui, then turns and heads southwest to meet the 
sea at the coastal city ofWhanganui. Te Kahui Mangai states that the wider Whanganui 
group'~ ... includes, but is not limited to: Te Atihaunui a Paparangi ... Ngati Haua, Ngati 
Rangi and Tamahaki." Most of the Whanganui River lay outside the Tongariro-Taupo 
conservancy, but the upper river runs along the west of the national park, and its fount is 
on Tongariro mountain, so the Whanganui groups of the upper river have interests in 
land which fell within the conservancy, and all Whanganui iwi have interests in the 
waterway to its source. N gati Rangi, based around the southwest of Ruapehu, had the 
closest relationship with the Tongariro-Taupo conservancy. 
There are no census data available for N gati Rangi as a discrete tribe. The Tongariro-
Taupo conservancy liaised with the Ngati Rangi Trust, and with people at marae (Maori 
community meeting places), primarily organised through individuals who have worked 
for, or closely with DOC. In the inquiry several other Whanganui groups in the region 
criticised DOC for not liaising with them to the sam:e degree as DOC liaised with N gati 
Rangi. Of these, Ngati Tamahaki had a close relationship with the then Taranaki-
Whanganui conservancy, but felt .ignored by the Tongariro-Taupo staff. N gati 
Tamakana, Uenuku, and other groups with close f~mily ties to Ngati Rangi lodged 
claims accusing DOC of failing to consult with them. The tribal politics of these groups 
is complex. Some inquiry time was devoted solely to the topic of who certain groups 
were and how they related to their close neighbours. In their submissions, individual 
claimants from these groups often described feeling that others disputed their .identity. 
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The Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy 
The Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy came into being when DOC was established in 
1987, and was merged with the Whanganui-Taranaki Conservancy (creating the 
Whanganui-Taranaki-Tongariro Conservancy) in 2010, after my fieldwork ended. At 
the time of my research the Conservancy was one of fourteen regional divisions of 
DOC, an area based around the water catchment leading into Lake Taupo. Each 
conservancy was headed by a Conservator, who answered to either the North Island or 
South Island General Manager, who answered to the Director-General. Below the 
Conservators on this "delivery line," are area managers, of which there were three in the 
Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy, one in charge of the Whakapapa area, which included 
Tongariro, one in charge of the Turangi/Taupo area in the north, and a Fisheries 
Manager, who looked after the fisheries in Lake Taupo. Staff in these managerial roles 
were all closely involved in liaison with Maori. 
Director-General 
I 
I I I --. I I 
General Manager General Managers General Manager 
I 
General Manager General Manager Research Operations (North People and Genera l Manager Tu.aw.a.k.i K._ahui Corporate Marketing and Development and lsiand and South Organisat ion Policy Services Improvement Communications Island) Development 
I 
I I I 
Service Roles Conservators Support Ro les 
--. 
I I I 
·-
Service Roles Area Managers Support Roles 
T 
I T I 
Service Roles Rangers Support Ro les 
Figure 1: DOC organisationaJ chart. 14 
Other key roles in the liaison with Maori were the community. liaison manager, who 
supported the Conservator and area managers, and the Pou Kura Taiao, which DOC 
translates as "Indigenous Conservation Ethics Manager." 15 There was one Pou Kura 
Ku ra 1a.i:;Lo 
14 The model for this chart was sourced on the DOC website, accessed 10 August~ 2008, 
http ://www.doc.govt.nz/temp1ates/page.aspx?id=42579. DOC's structure has since changed~ but is shown 
here as it stood at the time of my research. 
15 Interview with Whanganui Pou Kura Taiao, October 23, 200 
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Taiao position in the Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy. Each of the three consecutive staff 
who held this position was a member of Tuwharetoa. 
The policy framework for park relationships 
The language used to describe relationships in government policies and in wider 
political discourse draws very heavily from interpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi, so 
it will be useful to briefly describe it here and explain how it is used in government 
policy. As the people at Tongariro were swept up in the Tribunal inquiry process at the 
time of my research the Tribunal process and its place in the wider Treaty settlement 
process will also be outlined here. 
The Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty ofWaitangi (the Treaty) has a central position in the organisation of, and 
debates about, Maori-government relationships. The Treaty, signed in 1840, is a short 
document: a preamble and three articles, of which there is one Maori version and 
several in English. Many, but not all, Maori chieftains across the country put their 
names or marks to the document. Although kept alive in Maori tradition, especially in 
the northern North Island, the Treaty had a long fallow period in :eakeha and 
government attention, before bursting back into political life in the 1970s. In the early 
twenty-first century it is widely cited as the 'founding document' of New Zealand, the 
basis for allowing Pakeha settlement in the country, and the creation of a national 
government. 16 There is a significant, lively and largely Pakeha minority, however, who 
do not accept the le~timacy of the !~eaty, and regard it as out-of-date and irrelevant to 
current ev.eO:ts. 17 
In English the Treaty claims British sovereignty and guarantees tribes the "full 
possession'~ of their lands, forests, fisheries and other properties, as long as they wish to 
retai!l them. In the Maori version,. the word kawanatanga (kawana is a transliteration of 
"governor;' and tanga is a nominalising suffix). is used instead of "sovereignty," and 
' 
tino rang~tiratanga ( absolute chieftainship) is guaranteed over their land, villages and 
all treasured possessions. 18 These differences 'in the versions make it a difficult 
document to use as a guide for action, and as a result the idea of "Treaty principles" has 
16 The phrase 'founding document' pervades both academic and policy discourse. 
17 See Giselle Byrnes, ~''Relic of 1840" or ''Founding Document", the Treaty, the Tribunal and Concepts 
of Time" Kotuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences Online(2006), 
http://WWW.rsnz.org/publish/kotuitui/2006/01.php. 
18 See Appendix A for the full texts. 
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been adopted in legislation and policy. The principles of the Treaty have been left 
deliberately vague by the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal, which are the bodies that 
have the mandate to identify them. The Tribunal has defended its choice to leave the 
principles open-ended, saying the Treaty must be allowed to evolve to remain relevant 
to changing conditions. 19 
The Treaty is not enforceable in New Zealand law, except where it is referred to in 
specific statutes. References to the Treaty and its principles are common in legislation 
passed since the mid-1980s, and ubiquitous in documents produced by the public 
service. Conservation policy is one of the areas in which the Treaty and Maori issues are 
paid particular attention, partly due to historical factors described in the later chapters of 
this thesis. These factors led to the inclusion of a section in the Conservation Act 1987 
stating that "[t]his Act shall so be interpreted and administered as to give effect to the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi."20 
The Treaty settlement process 
The first statute to include the Treaty in New Zealand domestic law was the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975, which established the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal has 
jurisdiction to define the principles of the Treaty, investigate breaches of those 
principles in claims brought before it, and make recommendations for settlement to the 
governn1ent. Settlements are then negotiated between tribal representatives and the 
Office of Treaty Settlements, a branch of the Ministry of Justice. Treaty settlements 
usually involve a combination of cash and property compensation to tribes, and the 
redesign or establishment of partnership institutions and protocols between the iwi or 
hapu and government bodies.21 Relationships between Maori and the government across 
the country are being reshaped as Treaty settlements progress. 
Many, but by no means all, of the grievances Maori hold against the government 
concern events in the nineteenth century. There was a period of warfare in New Zealand 
in the 1860s and after the violence subsided the governm~nt made substantial land 
confiscations. A huge amount of Maori land was transferred into government and settler 
ownership over the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth. This transfer was facilitated by the .operations of the Native Land Court, 
19 Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui-Waitara Report , Wai 6, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1983), 
paragraphs 10.1-10.3. 
2
° Conservation Act 1987, section 4. ? I 
. 
. 
-
- Office of Treaty Settlements website, accessed December 10, 2010, http: //www.ots.govt.nz1. 
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which allocated the title for land from collective ownership into the hands of groups of 
individual owners. 22 The wars, confiscations, and operations of the Native Land Court 
and its agents, are keenly remembered by the tribes affected. Environmental degradation 
and the resultant loss of traditional food, craft and medicinal resources has been a 
recurring feature of claims. Another major source of grievance is the takings of Maori 
land for public works throughout the twentieth century, especially those takings which 
were not returned after the land was no longer being used for the intended purpose. 
Treaty settlements usually involve statutory changes, in which existing institutions are 
reorganised, and funding is provided for the economic and political development of 
tribes. Co-management of contested resources is increasingly being established as part 
of settlement deals, the largest of which is a multi-party co-management arrangement 
over a section of the Waikato River established in 2008. 23 There have been small scale 
co-management arrangements, involving joint DOC-Maori decision making bodies set 
up between DOC staff and representatives of local iwi or hapu in a few scattered 
pockets of the conservation estate, such as Lake W aihora in the South Island, which was 
established as part of the Ngai Tahu Treaty settlement in 1998. DOC and Ngati Awa, 
from the eastern Bay of Plenty, have a joint management committee called Te Tapatoru 
a Toi, formed as part of the Ngati Awa settlement in 2005, which manages three, sites of 
importance to the iwi. 24 Some shared responsibility arrangements also exist over 
particular resources. DOC and N gati Wai, in the far north, have a protocol for the use 
and disposal of whale remains. Management of the kiekie, a plant that is used in 
weaving .and other crafts, growing in Morere Scenic Reserve, on the east coast of the 
North Island, has been largely devo·lved to local iwi Ngati Rakaipaaka.25 The completed 
settlements over regions including national parks have not, as yet, led to co-
22 From 1865 to 1873 the number of owners on the title was limited to ten. After 1873 any number of 
owners could be listed. · 
23 Linkhom, Craig, 'Valuing tikanga - sharing po~ er through co-management' , paper written for the 
Post Treaty Settlements Website, a joint venture between the Institute of Policy Studies and Te Kawa a 
Maui, Victoria University•ofWellington, 2001. http://posttreatysettlements.org.nz/valuing-tikanga-
sharing-power-through-co-management/. 
24 Moutohbra (Whale Island) Wildlife Management Reserve, Ohope Scenic Reserve and Tauwhare Pa 
Scenic Reserve. See the DOC website at http://www.doc.govt.nz/getting-involved/sponsorships-and-
partnerships/regional-sponsorships-and-partnerships/te-tapatoiu-a-toi/ for details. . 
25
· See Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei.· A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and 
Policy Affecting Maor( Culture and Identity, Te Taumata l'uarua, vol. 1, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal 
2011),. 300-303; also Brad Coombes, "Postcolonial Conservation and Kiekie Harvests at Morere New 
Zealand-Abstracting Indigenous Knowledge from Indigenous Polities," Geographical Research 45, no. 2 
(2007). 
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management, but proposals for co-management are being discussed in three claims 
involving national park lands, including Tongariro.26 
Legislation and policy 
DOC's guiding legislation is the Conservation Act 1987, which was one of the first 
pieces of legislation to mention the Treaty. The precise wording of section four, which 
stipulates that that the provisions of the Act "be so interpreted and administered as to 
give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" was and remains one of the 
strongest directives for the enforcement of the Treaty in New Zealand law. 27 The 
uncertainty over the definition of Treaty principles, however, makes that enforcement 
more complicated. Although almost all government bodies interpret the principles as at 
least involving a duty to consult, the courts have ruled that this duty is not absolute. 28 
The stipulation in the Conservation Act to give effect to Treaty principles also only 
applies as long as those principles are not clearly inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Act in question. 29 
The Conservation General Policy, DOC' s overarching national policy document, lists 
five Treaty principles that were nominated by the government in 1989. They are the 
principles of government, self-management, equality, reasonable co-operation and 
redress. The Conservation General Policy does not elaborate on what they mean except 
to say that those principles.will be applied differently, taking into account the statutory 
conservation framework and the significance of the resource in question to Maori. 30 
Mention of 'partnerships' riddles conservation policy documents as well as wider 
discussion relating to the DOC-Maori relationship. Partnership is defined in DOC's 
national policy documents as "[ t ]he relationship between individuals or groups that is 
characterised by mutual cooperation and responsibility for the achievement of a specific 
26 The National Park Inquiry (Tongariro), Te Urewera District Inquiry (Te -Urewera National Park) and 
the Whanganui Lands Inquiry, as well as the ongoing negotiations in 'the wake of the Whanganui River 
Inquiry and Report (Whanganui River National Park) . 
27 Ruru, "Indigenous Peoples' Ownership and Management of Mountains," 120. 
28 Merata Kawharu, "Rangatiratanga and Social Policy," in Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the 
Treaty of Waitangi , ed. Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu, and David Williams (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2005) , 106. For detail, see Janine Hayward, "Appendix: The Principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi," in Rangahaua Whanui National.Overview Report, ed. Alap. Ward (Wellington: Waitangi 
Tribunal, 1997), 4 79-83. 
29 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of Conservation [1995], 3 New Zealand Law 
Reports 553 . 
30 Department of Conservation, Conservation General Policy, (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 
2005), 15 . 
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goal."31 DOC's 'Partnerships Toolbox.' also known as Te Kete Taonga Whakakotahi , 
which was in draft form when the claim was being heard, removes some of this clarity 
by saying partnerships lie on a continuum, and "[a] reasonable and practicable degree of 
tangata whenua involvement in any particular case may range from consultation to the 
exercise of full control."32 
The legislation and national policy, therefore, leave DOC with a substantial degree of 
licence to interpret the nature of their responsibility to Maori, though it is required to 
take action of some form. In response, DOC has implemented a number of initiatives to 
involve Maori. There is a strategic branch, the Kahui Kura Taiao, which concentrates on 
Maori issues, and one or two Pou Kura Taiao in each of the conservancies. The roles of 
the Pou Kura Taiao are to "represent, advise, manage and support the Conservator and 
Conservancy relationships with iwi," as well as to implement the initiatives of the 
Kahui Kura Taiao. 33 The Pou Kura Taiao tend to spend a lot of time out of the office 
attending iwi and hapu events.34 
DOC also runs a number of initiatives with Maori across the country. The Nga Whenua 
Rahui committee (which is part of the Kahui Kura Taiao) administers the Matauranga 
Maori fund, to protect Maori knowledge; and the Nga Whenua Rahui fund, providing 
financial and technical assistance to est~blish Maori-managed reserves on Maori land. 
Treaty settlements have led to some special arrangements between DOC and particular 
tribes, such as the joint management of Lake Waihora with N gai Tahu in the South 
Island. 
Maori also have seats on key conservation bodies which give advice to DOC, such as 
. 
Conservation Boards. Conservation Boards are independent statutory bodies that are 
funded through DOC. There is one for each conservancy, and their role is to help write 
and monitor local DOC policy, to advise DOC and the New Zealand Conservation 
Authority, and to represent the community in general.35 They have up to twelve 
members, nominated by the community and appointed by the Minister of Conservation 
. ., 
with regard to their interests or expertise in con_servation, natural sciences, cultural 
31 Department of Conservation, General Policy for National Parks, (Wellington: Department of 
Conservation, 2005), 67. 
32 Department of Conservation, Draft of Te Kete Taonga Whakakotahi: A Conservation Partnerships 
Toolbox, Document #H2(a), Wai 1130, received by the Waitangi Tribunal November 10, 2006 . . 
33 DOC website, accessed 15 May 2010, http://www.doc.govt.nz/about-doc/role/maori/kahui-kura-taiao/. 
34 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Pou Kura Taiao, March 2, 2007. 
35 
"Conservation board information," http://www.doc.govt.nz/templates/page.aspx?id=390l4 accessed 
March 13 , 2007, http ://www.doc.govt.nz/templates/page.aspx?id=390l4; Ruru, "Indigenous Peoples ' 
Ownership and Management of Mountains," 127, 135. 
23 
.. 
heritage, recreation, tourism, the local community and Maori perspectives. This is not a 
, , 
statutory requirement to appoint Maori to all boards, though in practice there has been 
substantial Maori membership. 36 
There was a statutory provision for a descendent of Horonuku Te Heuheu to sit on the 
Tongariro-Taupo Conservation Board. This goes back to a condition made by Horonuku 
at the time of the transfer of the mountain tops from Tiiwharetoa to the Crown in 
1887.37 No other iwi or hapu in the conservancy had a statutory seat on the board. There 
are also statutory provisions for tangata whenua to sit on the boards relating to Egmont 
and Aoraki National Parks, as a result of Treaty settlements in those areas. 
Maori are also represented on the New Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), which 
is an independent statutory body appointed by the Minister of Conservation, and funded 
through DOC. The NZCA reviews and approves all DOC's policy documents, including 
Conservation Management Strategies and National Park Management Plans. It has 
thirteen members, two appointed on advice from the Minister of Maori Affairs. One of 
those members is nominated by the tribal council ofNgai Tahu (Te Runanga o Ngai 
Tahu), as a result of their settlement deal. 
Tongariro is a World Heritage site, listed as an associative cultural landscape, which is a 
place considered valuable "by virtue of the powerful religious, artistic or cultural 
associations of the natural element rather than material cultural evidence. "38 The World 
Heritage Convention is designed to encourage the identification and protection of sites 
around the world deemed to be of "outstanding value to humanity. "39 World Heritage 
listing has connected Tongariro to a wider network of protected areas across the world. 
From 2004-2007 the Ariki (Paramount Chief) ofNgati Tuwharetoa, Tumu Te Heuheu,40 
was a member of the World Heritage Committee,41 and from 2006-2007 he was the: 
chair. Tongariro has hosted workshops and gatherings of World Heritage managers. 42 
36 Most boards have more than one Maori member. In her evidence Doris Johnston said that in 2006 31 % 
of board members across the country were Maori, Brief of Evidence of Doris Johnston, #H2 , paragraph 
44 , 15. 
37 Robyn Anderson, Tongariro National Park: An overview report on the relationship 'between Maori and 
th e Crown in the establishment of the Tongariro National Park, Wai 130, #A9, commissioned by the 
Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 2005 , 67. 
38 UNESCO website, accessed 3 May 2008 , http://whc.unesco.org/en/culturallandscape/#1. 
39 UNESCO website, accessed 3 May 2008 , .http: //whc.unesco.org/en/about/. 
40 Sir Tumu Te Heuheu was knighted in 2009. 
4 1 The World Heritage Committee is a body made up of 21 representatives from State Party signatories. It 
is responsible for the implementation of the Convention. 
42 World Heritage Managers Workshop , October 26-30, 2000; First Pacific World Heritage workshop 
February 2007. 
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The impact of World Heritage listing on the management policy of sites in New 
Zealand seems to be more symbolic than material, however. There is nothing in New 
Zealand legislation that designates specific rules for World Heritage site management. 
Tongariro's listing as a cultural landscape has been cited by DOC as a focus for 
increasing Maori involvement: 
New Zealand's three World Heritage sites are on land already managed 
for conservation purposes .... Each is recognised for its outstanding 
natural character and one (Tongariro) is also recognised as an outstanding 
cultural landscape. This cultural association and New Zealand's Treaty 
obligations to Maori have provided a focus for increasing the 
involvement of Maori in the work of the World Heritage Convention.43 
.World Heritage listing, or more specifically the threat of its removal, was used as a 
political tool in the management of an impending lahar (mudslide from a crater lake) on 
Ruapehu, which is described in chapter seven. In terms of strategic planning, and in 
day-to-day decisions, however, World Heritage listing seems to have little or no effect 
on the way the park is run, or on the role of Maori in its management. 
Conservancy policies 
The locally-devised Conservation Management Strategy (CMS), written by the 
Conservation Board in collaboration with the DOC conservancy office is the main 
guiding document for the conservancy. The CMS sets out the principles of the Treaty 
that the conservancy will follow, and the more _specific objectives derived from those 
principles. In brief, the. nine principles covered are the right of the Crown to govern; the 
right of Maori to exercise authority over their own affairs; the right of Maori to 
. . 
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and resources; equality; the right of 
Maori to exercise customary guardianship over culturally significant resources; good 
faith relationships; a~tive protection of Maori interests in resources; the duty of the 
Crown to be informed on Maori opinion and the duty to redress past injustices and 
prevent new ones from occurring}4 These principles were negotiated extensively with 
Maori after Tuwharetoa brought a claim (Y'! ai 480) to the Tribunal in 1995. Tuwharetoa 
alleged that the principles listed in the CMS at that time failed to meet the standards 
' 
required by section 4 of the Conservation Act, and constituted a breach of the Treaty. To 
avoid an· inquiry DOC agreed to renegotiate the principles with Tuwharetoa. 
43 Department of Conservation, Periodic Reporting on the.Application of the World Heritage Convention , 
(2002), 6, http: //whc.unesco.org/archive/periodicreporting/cycleO 1/sectionl /nz.pdf .. 
44 Department-of Conservation Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy, Tongariro/Taupo Conservation 
Management Strategy 2002-2012, (Department of Conservation:: Turangi, 2002), section 3.7.4, 105-7. 
. . ' : 
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The document which most immediately guides the management of the park is the 
Tongariro National Park Management Plan. The management plan lists eleven 
principles reflecting the "core values of the park," each written in English and in the 
Maori language (Te Reo Maori).45 Six of these include references to Maori. One refers · 
to the 1887 'gift': 
The mountain peaks are a taonga, a gift to the people of New Zealand 
from the Tuwharetoa people. They must be managed in a way which 
acknowledges and respects their mana [dignity/status] and mauri [life 
force]. World Heritage status recognises the park's cultural heritage: co-
operative conservation management must protect them. That early gift by 
the people ofTuwharetoa reinforces a sentiment felt by many New 
Zealanders towards their protected places and in particular the peaks and 
landscape ofTongariro National Park, which are so much a part of New 
Zealanders' lives. 46 
Other principles recognise World Heritage obligations for the park's natural and cultural 
listing, and the directive in the Conservation Act to give effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. There is also a principle 'to provide for co-operative conservation 
management': 
The Department of Conservation cannot manage public conservation 
lands without a relationship with tangata whenua. The relationship 
between the Crown and iwi will be exercised within the park through co-
operative conservation ma1:1agement. The implementation of He Kaupapa 
Rangatira, a framework and protocol for giving practical expression to 
the partnership with iwi, will ensure that iwi and hapu have an evolving 
and ongoing role in the management of the park. Be it in decision-making 
processes for use of cultural materials, the reintroduction of previously-
present bird species, the consideration of concessions which may impact 
on cultural values or the development ·of further park guidelines or 
strategies, iwi will be involved.47 
The other two park management principles that mention Maori include the goal of 
protecting the 'ancestral, historical, cultural and archaeological' heritage of the par~, 
and the goal to cater for the values of 'park partners,' including voluntary organisations, 
research institutes and Maori.48 The Management Plan also reproduces the same list of 
Treaty Principles as appears in the CMS. Though there was some criticism of the 
conservancy' s policies in the National Park inquiry, claimants mainly .objected to the 
practice of the relationship. 
45 DOC Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy, Tongariro National Park Management Plan, 39. 
46 Ibid., 40 . 
47 Ibid. , 41. 
48 Ibid. , 42 , 43. 
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The·Relationship in Practice 
In practice, in the conservancy, consultation with Maori works at formal levels, through 
organised meetings and solicited submissions; and at informal levels in the friendships 
between individuals. Formal consultation occurs with the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust 
Board (the Trust Board) at liaison committee meetings, and at the meetings between the 
fisheries managers and the Trust Board. Consultation with hapu occurs at scheduled 
meetings on marae, and via emails to Maori authorities and representatives. The 
conservation board is supposed to function as one method of consultation with 'the 
community' (including Maori) but the effectiveness of this appears to vary depending 
on the particular individuals on the board, both Maori and Pakeha. 49 Conservation board 
members are not, by statute, supposed to represent particular groups, but to function as 
individuals in a body broadly representative of the wider community. Pou Kura Taiao 
also have a formal role. The Tongariro-Taupo Pou Kura Taiao at the time of my 
research described his responsibility as being "to develop positive relationships between 
DOC and iwi kainga."50 
One of the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy managers described the formal consultation 
system in this way: 
We meet and discuss interests,. share information. I'd probably say there 
were three levels of consultation: the management plans - big things; 
major developments, for example ski developments at Whakapapa; a 
.whole cluster of things all under concessions. For these we do have some 
protocols with Tuwharetoa, but not with others. These are for scientific · 
research permits, guiding, filming applications and so on. 51 
Another manager described three avenues for consultation with N gati Tuwharetoa: the 
Paramount Chief, the Trust_ ~oard, and hapu. This manager explained that there are 
about thirty hapu, some of them more obvious than others, and there are new groups 
emerging and breaking off from other· groups ·an the time. 52 
49 A Departmental review of conservation boards ~as conducted in 2007 that made this finding, among 
others. The"Tongariro-Taupo Conservation Board was not one of the case studies, but several board 
· members made observations in interviews that accordect with the findings of the review. Carla Wilson, 
"Role and Effectiveness of Conservation Boards as a Community Voice in Conservation Management," 
in Science for Conservation Series, no.273 (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2007), 28; 
Interview with Conservation Board Member 5, May 3, 2007; Interview with Conservation Board Member 
6, May 18, 2007. 
50 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Pou Kura Taiao, March 2, 2007. Iwi kainga literally means "home 
people ." It is used in the same sense as tangata whenua. , 
51 Interview with DOC Manager 5, March 15, 2007. 
52 Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, in interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator and DOC Manager 2, 
January 18, 2007. 
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Managing relationships with these sometimes shifting identity groups, which often do 
not have clear representatives, is something with which DOC struggles. 
KM - So who are the contact people? How are they found, or chosen? 
DOC manager - Well really from what I understand we work with the 
Trust chairperson but we realised that doesn't always work. But we don't 
know who has the official mandate. 53 
In another interview two DOC managers discussed the 'in-house' disagreements that 
arose between hapu, agreeing that DOC could not take the role of deciding who is right, 
and as a result is obliged to consult with every group or person who claimed tangata 
whenua status. Technically it is the Pou Kura Taiao' s role to advise in these situations. 
One person, with their own whanau, hapu and iwi affiliations, cannot be an effective 
judge or mediator of every dispute in an entire conservancy, however. In an interview 
two DOC managers, one senior and one supporting, suggested it is difficult for a Pou 
Kura Taiao to adjudicate matters outside of their own hapu. 54 
The role of the two trust boards can also be problematic. One manager said that the 
Ngati Rangi Trust Board was 'not working very well' at the time of our interview, and 
another described the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board as not being fully accepted by the 
hapu it is supposed to represent. 55 In an individual submission to the inquiry the 
secretary of the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board described his frustration at the board 
being treated as a "one stop shop" when in many cases it was more appropriate for DOC 
to consult directly with particular hapu or marae. 56 A former secretary expressed his 
opinion that the board was making a transition-into being a purely financial body, and 
that better representative institutions were in development. 57 
Alongside the formal processes of consultation, much informal consultation goes on in 
relationships between individuals: the managers in the Conservancy and particular tribal 
members whom they know well. One of the area managers mentioned two particular 
Maori individuals, one from Tuwharetoa and one from Ngati Rangi. 
We have [Tuwharetoa individual ' s name] , of course, he makes contact 
really natural, but it ' s not formally organised.58 · 
53 Interview with DOC manager 5. 
54 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
55 Interview with DOC Manager 5; Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. · 
56 Brief of Evidence of Te Hokowhitu A Rakeipoho Taiaroa, Wai 1130, #G4S . October 4, 2006, 
paragraph 10, 2-3. 
57 Stephen Asher in Draft Transcript of National Park Inquiry Hearing 7, Wai 1130 #4.1.11 , (Papakai 
Marae, 11-13, 16-20 October 2006), 11-2. 
58 Interview with DOC manager 5. 
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Well I contact [Ngati Rangi individual's name] all the time, informally. 
And he does all the concession application comments.59 
It is these informal relationships where much of the interaction takes place, or at least 
begins. Through these personal relationships DOC staff are invited to gatherings such as 
tangi (funeral ceremonies that are typically larger and longer than Pakeha funerals) , 
where many matters are discussed and decided upon. 60 They also act informally as 
brokers, talking to other tribal members about issues raised in conversations with DOC 
staff, and vice versa. 61 
The importance of these relationships between individuals makes relationships quite 
vulnerable to the movements of those individuals. One of the few instances of ongoing 
joint decision making between DOC and Maori in the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy 
was the Karioi Rahui, a management agreement between DOC and N gati Rangi over a 
5,300 hectare section of forest bordering the park on the southwest. In early 2007 this 
project was described as being "in a stuttery phase," because one of the six members of 
the management board had died, and another had moved on. 62 In the inquiry the 
turnover of DOC staff was criticised as it meant that new staff had to constantly be 
"trained" to know about the local people and local issues. 63 
The Karioi Rahui is guided by a memorandum of agreement, signed in 1996, which lays 
out the goals of the agreement to protect water quality, indigenous species, their beech-
podocarp forest habitat, and "the traditional conservation ethic ofNgati Rangi iwi."64 
There is also a protocol b~tween DOC and Ngati Turangitukua, a hapu ofNgati 
Tuwharetoa,·resulting from the Tur~ngi Township settlement.65 Other groups sought 
similar arrangements but these did not progress. This will be discussed further in 
. 
chapter three . 
59 Ibid. 
60 Interview with three members ofNgati Rangi, July 7, 2007. 
61 Interview with Conservation Board Member 3, March 28 , 2007. 
62 Interview with DOC manager 5. -
63 Brief of Evidence of Keith William Paetaha Wood, Wai 1130, #A64, February 10, 2006, paragraph 63 , 
13. _ , 
64 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Conservation, Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy, 
and theNgati Rangi Trust, December 5, 1996, Paragraph 13(a)-(d), 6. 
65 Ngati Turangitukua Claims Settlement Act, 1999, section 17. 
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The literature on co-management in New Zealand 
Co-management literature has been described as "untidy."66 This is a product of the 
wide range of co-management situations in existence, as well as the multitude of 
disciplines that have an interest in how they function. Geographers, historians, 
anthropologists and legal scholars are just a few of the kinds of writers who contribute 
to the literature. Among these writers there is little agreement about what co-
management aims to achieve, whether it works, and how best to analyse it or measure 
its success. Over this and the following two chapters I draw out some of the threads of 
these writers' arguments and approaches. 
There is no generally accepted definition of co-management in the international 
literature focusing on relationships between governments and indigenous or local 
peoples in natural resource management. 67 The various definitions usually refer to a 
relationship between a state agency and a local community or organisation over the 
management of natural resources, and often but not always describe co-management as 
involving formal institutional structures. One of the broad and commonly used 
definitions is anthropologist Evelyn Pinkerton's: "[p Jower-sharing in the exercise of 
resource management between a government agency and a community organization or 
stakeholders."68 In the international literature the term co-management is used to cover 
a range of different measures, from consultation of the community group by the state 
party, to situations involving legal power-sharing over the resource. 69 
In -New Zealand the term "co-management" is-generally used to refer to stricter, 
institutionalised systems of power-sharing. Brad Coombes, a New Zealand geographer, 
defines co-management as institutional structures for power sharing and dialogue 
among resource users and managers, who negotiate among themselves an equitable 
66 C. Ansell and A. Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 18, no . 4 (2008) : 2. 
67 Jules Pretty and David Smith, "Social Capital in Biodiversity Conservation and Management," 
Conservation Biology 18, no. 3 (2004): 634. 
· . 
68 Evelyn Pinkerton, "Translating Legal Rights into Management Practice: Overcoming Barriers to the 
Exercise of Co-Management" Human Organization 51 , no. 4 (1992): 331. Pinkerton' s definition is cited, 
for example, in P.O'B. Lyver, "Co-Managing Environmental Research: Lessons from Two Cross-Cultural 
Research Partnerships in New Zealand," Environmental Conservation 32, no. 4 (2005); and in Derek 
Armitage, Fikret Berkes, and Nancy Doubleday, "Introduction," in Adaptive Co-Management: 
Collaboration, Learning and Multi-Level Governance, ed. Derek ·Armitage, Fikret Berkes, and Nancy 
Doubleday (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 3. 
69 See, for example, Fikret Berkes, Peter George and Richard J. Preston, "Co-management: the evolution 
of theory and practice of the joint administration of living resources," Alternatives, 1991 , 18, no. 2 (1991): 12- 18. 
. 
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sharing of power, responsibilities and benefits. ' 0 There are few instances of co-
management, thus defined, in New Zealand, and New Zealand writers have tended to 
look at the prospects and prerequisites for future establishment of co-management 
arrangements, rather than assessment of the existing regimes. 71 Some of these scholars, 
however, have made observations on what collaboration can achieve, the obstacles that 
face it, and what factors are necessary for its success. These will be briefly reviewed 
here, in order to introduce the New Zealand context, before I look more closely into 
how these relationships can best be understood and analysed. 
In 1997 Todd Taiepa and others wrote an article on co-management in New Zealand 
protected areas. They argued that there was a need for Maori and Pakeha to work 
together on the pressing enviromnental problems of predators and habitat deterioration 
in New Zealand, as both groups are politically and economically powerful sections of 
New Zealand society, and both had histories of causing damage to the environment. 
They also argued that collaboration was not just an important practical measure but "a 
" 
fundamental constitutional requirement of the Treaty ofWaitangi."72 A third argument 
for co-management they raised is that it is likely to produce better environmental 
management on the basis that "[ t ]he local tribal social structures and detailed knowledge 
of the local environment held by indigenous peoples make them natural 'grass roots' 
organizations to become effective co-managers ... " although they acknowledged that the 
research on the effective~ess of co-managemen_t was thin at their time of writing.73 
The Taiepa team commented on why rhey thought co-management had not yet been 
implemented. They argued that then~ was no "top down" legislative barrier to 
establishing co-management, but that there were other obstacles hampering its 
70 Brad L. Coombes and Stephanie Hill, ""Na Whenua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C._Te Partner" Prospects for 
Comanagement of Te Urewera National Park," Society & Natural Resources 18 (2005): 136. The second 
part of Coombes and Hill's definition follows Alfonso Peter Castro and Erik Nielsen, "Indigenous People ~ 
and Co-Management: Implications for Conflict Management," Environmental Science & Policy 4(2001): 
• • • 0 
230. 
71 See for example Todd Taiepa et al., "Co-Management of New Zealand's Conservation Estate by Maori 
· and Pakeha: A Re~iew,l!Environmental Conservation 24, no. 3 (1997); ~oombes and Hill, "' 'Na 
WheJiua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C. Te Partner";" Brad Coombes, "Contested Conservation L~gacies and the 
Co-Option· of Maori Resistance through Co-Management," Tihei Oreore: Monograph Series - Policy 
Seminars. l, no: 2 (2005); Jacinta Rum, "A Maori Right to Own and Manage National Parks?," Journal 
of South Pacific Law 12, no. 1 (2008); Gail Tipa, "Co-Management: An Indigenous Perspective," in 
Living Together: Towards Inclusive Communities, ed. Michelle Thompson-Fawcett and Claire Freeman 
(Dunedin: Ota go University Press). ~ 
72 Taiepa et al., "Co-management of New Zealand's Conservation Estate by Maori and Pakeha: A 
Review," 23 7. · 
73 Ibid., 237-238. 
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development. 74 These obstacles included differing philosophies (preservation versus 
sustainable use); a lack of working models; a lack of resources; a lack of trust on the 
part of conservation NGOs; and an institutional inertia and unwillingness, on the part of 
DOC, to share power. They argued that having a good communication process was very 
important and recommended holding marae discussions, to build trust and 
communication skills. The Taiepa team saw a need to establish guiding principles for 
the development of co-management structures, and nominated three such principles: the 
Treaty; the acceptance of both "western scientific knowledge" and "traditional 
ecological understanding;" and community empowerment.75 
Several of these points have been developed by later writers. Geographer Mark Prystupa 
also emphasised the reluctance of conservation non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), and the Pakeha public more generally, for the conservation estate to be used in 
the settlement of Treaty claims, as a key obstacle in the campaign to establish co-
management over the South Island lake Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in the mid 1990s. 76 
Although there is evidence that some of the key conservation lobby groups have 
changed their tune since then, the role of such interest groups and the wider public is a 
very important shaping force on the development and ongoing process of DOC-Maori 
relationships. 
More recently, geographer Gail Tipa has nominated a set of preconditions for the 
establishment of co-management in New Zealand. Like the Taiepa team, she noted the 
importance of both parties in making a commiti;nent to understanding each other's 
perspectives, the recognition of property rights, capacity-building and adequate 
resourcing. She also argued for a greater degree of conceptual clarity and agreement on 
a range of issues, such as the definition and structure of co-management, the nature of 
Treaty obligations, and the difference between Treaty and public participation 
obligations. 77 Tipa criticised the vagu_eness of the concept of co-management, pointing 
out that it can be used to describe many different levels of power-sharing and resource-
provision - and argued that "[t]he empowerment of indigenous communities ... requires 
74 Ibid. , 239-242. 
75 Ibid., 242-3. 
76 M.V. Prystupa, "Barriers and Strategies to the Development of Co-Management Regimes in New 
Zealand: The Case of Te Waihora," Human Organization 57, no. 2 (1998). 
77 Tipa, "Co-Management: An Indigenous Perspective," 167-8: Also Tipa, "Indigenous Communities and 
the Co-Management of Natural Resources: The Case of New Zealand Freshwater Management," (PhD 
thesis, University of Otago, 2003), 208. 
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the clear articulation of what, from an indigenous perspective, might constitute effective 
co-management." 78 
Concerns about the prospect of co-management in New Zealand national parks have 
also been raised by Brad Coombes and Stephanie Hill, who looked at Te Urewera 
National Park as a case study. Coombes and Hill argue that although co-management 
has positive potential, there needs to be a desire for it among indigenous people if it is 
to succeed. They suggest that it is unlikely to work if offered as "a token resolution of 
land grievances."79 The question of the underlying ownership of the land is a 
particularly contentious issue. At a conference in 2009 Jacinta Ruru, a legal academic 
who has written several articles on Maori rights in the conservation estate, said: 
I wonder if this is going to create a sustainable future, for us ... our future 
generations, if we can't go to that negotiation table and at least talk about 
this title being returned to iwi. And is it really something to fear?80 
Tipa, Ruru, Coombes and Hill all caution that co-management is not a panacea for 
Maori grievances, and that the historical issues between the government and Maori, 
need to be addressed before relationships can progress. 
Analysis of the relationships between DOC and Maori has also b.een undertaken by 
public service agencies and the Tribu1:al. In 1998 the Ministry for Maori Affairs (Te 
Puni Kokiri) conducted a review into the Department of Conservation's relationships 
with Maori. The review's main findings were that DOC had made a genuine effort to 
build good relationships with Maori, and had policies, strategies and operational 
process.es to support their efforts .. The review included a series of interviews with "key 
stakeholders," described as Maori who have "a key interest in conservation issues," 
many of_whom had ~egular contact with DOC. 81 The interviewees were from five 
different conservancies. The results. of those interviews were less positive, and indicated 
that DOC's success in building relationships was limited and varied between groups: 
78 Ibid., 156-60, 155. 
• 
79 Coombes and Hill, ""Na Whenua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C. Te Partner"," 135. 
80 Jacinta Ruru, "Maori owned parks: should iwi be given title to specific parks?" (paper presented at The 
Future of Public Conservation Lands and Waters, Otago University, Dunedin, 10 July 2009). 
81 Te Puni Kokiri, Monitoring and Evaluation Branch, Review of Department of Conservation Te Papa 
Atawhai Service Delivery to Maori: Key Stakeholder Interviews (Wellington: Te Puni Kokiri, 1998), 11. 
The overall review was more specific: "a sample of external Maori stakeholders who represented a wide 
range of groups and organisations including: iwi; land trusts; hapii; whanau; groups representing several 
iwi; _and groups· representing sector interests for a particular iwi or group of iwi. Te Puni Kokiri, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Branch, Review of the Department of Conservation Te Papa Atawhai: Service 
Delivery to Maori, (Wellington: Te Puni Kokiri, 1998), 9. 
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Two stakeholder groups have very good relationships with the 
Department. These stakeholders are also actively involved with the 
Department's policy and planning. However, in most instances 
interviewees viewed their relationship as poor, but improving over time. 
In cases where progress had been made, it was claimed that iwi and hapu 
had been proactive in approaching and seeking contact with the 
Department. 82 
The researchers recorded that many of their interviewees thought DOC had more land 
that it needed or could maintain, and that it was generally resistant to compromise with 
Maori interests in the conservation estate, especially at national office. Almost all of 
their interviewees wanted iwi and hapu to be more involved in the management of the 
conservation estate. The researchers also noted that progress of Treaty claims across the 
country was at the forefront of their interviewees' minds, writing "[i]t was almost 
impossible to talk to many of the interviewees about DOC without issues related to 
claims and settlements being raised. "83 The researchers argued that claims had shifted 
Maori aspirations from co-operative management of areas of the conservation estate 
with DOC, to ownership and independent control of the areas contested. 84 
Four years later, in 2002, Te Puni Kokiri conducted a follow-up review, which 
concluded that DOC had "made significant progress" in developing relationships with 
Maori, with new policies, Maori employment targets, and the implementation of a 
training programme in Treaty issues and Maori culture for new staff. Two of the areas 
they highlighted for future work were the incorporation of Maori perspectives in 
national policies and processes, and the strengthening of the "delivery line" of DOC's 
operations as a channel for Maori issues. 85 Stakeholder interviews were not undertaken 
as part of this second review. 
New Zealand writers have argued that Maori are seeking to achieve something beyond 
having their voice heard, or contributing towards better conservation management of the 
resources in question. There are historical justice and ownership issues that lie behind 
Maori desire for "greater involvement," which some writers allege DOC fails to 
properly acknowledge or address. My research supports these findings, and goes into 
detail about the different expectations DOC and Maori have for their relationships. I 
82 Te Puni Kokiri , Key Stakeholder Intervie:\tvs, 12. 
83 Ibid., 21. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Te Puni K6kiri , Monitoring and Evaluation.Branch, Follow up Review of the Department of 
Conservation's Relationships with Maori I Te Arotake o Muri mo Te Ahua o Te Hononga i Waenga o Te 
Papa Atawhai raua ko te Maori, (Wellington, Te Puni K6kiri , 2002) , 8. The "delivery line" is the chain of 
command from the Director-General, through the regional managers to conservators, are~ managers, and 
frontline staff. See Figure 1. 
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also expand upon the Taiepa team's observation of an 'institutional inertia' obstructing 
the development of relationships, and looks at some of the historical sources of that 
inertia. My research also looks into the question of how Tribunal claims are affecting 
relationships on the ground, which few researchers have examined so far. 
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Chapter Two: the Question of Success 
Behind the idea of problems and strengths is an idea of progress. A problem is an 
obstacle to progress, and a strength facilitates it. In order to understand what constitutes 
a problem and what constitutes a strength in co-management relationships it is therefore 
important to investigate the ideas around what these relationships are for, or how people 
envisage success. This chapter investigates the ideas about the objectives 'of co-
management that exist in international environmental agreements and the academic 
literature on collaborative management of natural resources, and which of them are 
favoured in New Zealand conservation policy and other statements about the 
relationship at Tongariro. I conclude that DOC and Maori have different ideas about the 
objectives of their relationship, and this chapter discusses those differences and how 
important they are. I propose a definition of success that can accommodate the fact that 
DOC and Maori have different goals, and I argue that having different objectives for the 
relationship is not a fatal blow for the prospects of working together, but it needs to be 
carefully negotiated. 
How to provide for success is a predominant question in the co-management literature. 
This implies that those writers have in mind a definition of "success," although they do 
not always make this definition clear. Writers who do make their definitions of success 
explicit tend to identify both resource protection and community empowerment as 
goals, and either emphasise the importance of one over the other, or stress both. 
Environmental management writer Peter Wilshusen and his colleagues have described a 
division of debate into "pro-people" and "pro-nature" camps, with little effort to find a 
"practical middle ground."1 The debate is more complex than this, however. Among·the 
arguments for community and indigenous peoples' involvement in management, in both 
policy and academia, there seem to be four broad subcategories, though they are mainly 
used in combination or confusion with each other. The ass1:1mptions behind each 
argument are different, and importantly so - how co-management is strilGtured and what 
people expect of it are largely dependent upon what the parties involved believe its 
objectives to be. 
1 P.R. Wilshusen et al. , "The Road Less Traveled: Towards Nature Protection with Social Justice " in 
Contested Nature: Promoting International Biodiversity with Social Justice in the Twen f:)1-First Century, 
ed. P.R. Wilshusen, et al. (New York: New York Press, 2003). 260. 
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It is important to make a brief note about the categories of 'local' and 'indigenous' 
peoples. Often, and particularly in international policy, these groups are lumped 
together in the phrase "local and indigenous people," implying they are distinct 
categories with, nevertheless, identical rights or needs. 2 Most international agreements 
do not provide a clear definition of either local or indigenous peoples, or the difference 
between them. There are political implications to the use of language here. The words, 
and the definitions which go with them, carry particular inferences about why these 
-
groups should be involved in management, and what kind of rights and responsibilities 
they possess. Anthropologist Mac Chapin gave an example of the effects of language 
use in an article written as a "challenge to conservationists" in 2004: 
... the terms "indigenous" and "traditional" have largely dropped out of 
the discourse of the large conservationist NGOs-replaced mainly by 
"marginalized" or "poor." (The more neutral terms "rural" and "local" 
have also spread more widely in the literature and are commonly used by 
both sides.) This linguistic shift robs the dignity of indigenous peoples. 
Who is interested in saving the culture of marginalized people? What is 
the value of the traditional ecological knowledge of the poor? People who 
are viewed as having no distinctive culture, assets, or historic claims to 
the land they occupy end up being, in a very real sense, a people with no 
value.3 
The elision of differences between local people and indigenous p-eople has also been 
criticised by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs ( an international 
NGO which advocates on behalf on indigenous peoples. On their website they note 
"Indigenous peoples can ... not sufficiently be addresses [sic] as part of a common 
group of poor and vulnerable peoples and/or as 'local and indigenous communities' ."4 
Ashish Kothari, a scholar employed by the World Conservation Union, acknowledged 
these politics, without actually separating the two categories, in an article appearing in 
Parks (a journal de~igned for park managers across the world), in 2006: 
For the sake of convenience and without prejudice to the_ importance of 
recognising the special status of indigenous peoples, the term 
·. 
2 Some examples of international environmental policies that use 'indigenous and local' as a single 
category are Ramsar Resolution VII.8, and the associ"ated Annex: http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-
documents-resol-resolution-vii-8/main/ramsar/l-31-107%5E20736 4000 . 0 ); the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, preamble and article 8(j): http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/; ... The IUCN runs a 
"Theme on Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities, Equity and Protected Areas" (TICELP A), and 
recognises a kind of protected area known as an Indigenous and Community Conserved Area (ICCA): 
which are run by either loc·a1 or indigenous groups. 
3 Mac Chapin, "A Ch~llenge to Conservationists," Worldwatch November/December 2004, ')7. 
4 International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs website, http://www.iwgia.org/environment-and-
development/sustairiable-development, viewed 23 October 2012. 
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'communities' is used to denote both indigenous peoples and other long-
established local communities.5 
Because I am analysing a range of policies (international environmental policies and 
New Zealand conservation policies), and academic writings ( on co-management and on 
indigenous rights and relationships to do with the environment) that use different 
definitions of varying sophistication to describe "local" and "indigenous" people it is 
not helpful to offer precise definitions here, but it is useful to note that indigenous 
people seem to be viewed as a subcategory of local people, in that the arguments that 
apply to locals also apply to indigenous peoples, but the arguments that apply to 
indigenous people do not always apply to locals. 6 'Locals' or, interchangeably, 'the 
community,' for the purposes of this review, could be broadly defined as the people 
living in the area on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. 'Indigenous peoples' could 
be described very loosely as people with a continuing historical connection to the land. 
In the following review I use "locals" or "the community" for arguments that apply to 
both groups, and "indigenous" for the arguments that only apply to indigenous people. 
The four arguments 
One argument for involving local people is that it is necessary for better management, 
either because those locals are politically active and may disrupt management if they are 
; 
not brought on board as allies, or because conservation is a huge task and many hands 
are needed in order to achieve it. A second argument in favour of greater local 
involvement is that locals have special knowledge of the environment, born of close and 
often lengthy experience, and can enhance conservation by contributing their expertise. 
A third argues that governments have a moral -~bligation to include locals in the 
management of resources, whether or not their involvement leads to better conservation, 
and resource protection should be balanced with their interests. Finally there is an 
argument that focuses solely on rights, mainly pertaining to indigenous peoples rather 
than locals, and argues that these take precedence over conservation management, 
which is sometimes claimed to be a po0rly conceived and e.Xclusive system in the first 
place. The four arguments are summarised below: 
5 Ashish Kothari, "Community Conserved Areas," Parks, 16, no. 1, (2006) : footnote 2, 3. 6 This nesting is explicit in some policies, e.g. Agenda 21 , 25.14(c) : " . .. local populations, including 
women, youth, children and indigenous people .. . " and the Rio Declaration, principle 22 : "Indigenous 
people and their communities and other local communities . .. " 
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1. Necessity: resource protection cannot be achieved without community 
involvement 
a. because locals will be disruptive ( accidentally or otherwise) if not 
informed and brought on board; and/or 
- b. because conservation is a large and complex task, and requires a large 
and diverse body of people to achieve it. 
2. Enhancement: participation leads to better resource protection because local 
people have special skills and/or knowledge. This argument is sometimes 
extended to argue for full devolution to locals on the basis that locals are the best 
managers of the resource. 
3. Protection and participation: a balance should be negotiated between resource 
protection and community involvement, whether or not involvement leads to 
better resource protection. 
4. Indigenous rights: indigenous people have rights to exercise control over the 
resource. (Protection of the resource is secondary, irrelevant, or considered an 
ideologically flawed concept). 
In practice these arguments tend to be tangled together. Most collaborative initiatives 
-
draw on more than one of these arguments. They may officially state they have. 
objectives which in practice they do not follow. Different parties in the collaboration 
may be pursuing different objectives. Additionally it is often hard to tell which of these 
ideas is being invoked. The distinction between the first and third arguments can be 
particularly hard to gauge. An uncertainty as to whether community participation is 
being sought out of a sense of necessity, or the recognition of a right to participate, 
however, is an uncertainty about the nature of the relationship, so it remains an 
important difference, if one that is often difficult to' determine. 
The uses of these arguments are now reviewed in tum, with particular attention to how 
they are used and criticised in the New Zealand context. This review also looks at the 
ideas of success contained in international agreements regarding indigenous people and 
environmental management. New Zealand is a signatory to several international 
conservation agreements, many of which have addressed the importance of involving 
indigenous., local and tribal people in the management of natural resources. Although 
most agreements are non-binding on the state party signatories, they are part of a moral 
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pressure exerted by the international community on national politicians. 7 The historian 
, , Ken Coates has argued that although events in New Zealand have determined the 
precise shape of New Zealand policies regarding Maori, the pressure to establish those 
policies has predominantly come from overseas. 8 New Zealand signed the Convention 
on Biodiversity and the Framework Convention on Climate Change, both binding 
agreements. New Zealand also signed the non-binding agreements Agenda 21, a plan 
for sustainable development; the Forest Principles, a set of codes for the management of 
forests , and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. All of these 
agreements made reference to indigenous people, most relying on the necessity and 
enhancement arguments for indigenous involvement. New Zealand more recently 
signed up to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
contains several clauses advancing a rights-based argument for indigenous control over 
their traditional resources and territories. 9 
In New Zealand the enhancement argument is used much less often than it is in 
international literature, especially in government policy. DOC tends to rely on the 
necessity and protection and participation arguments in its action policies, though it 
frames them as Treaty obligations. Maori, on the other hand, heavily emphasise rights 
arguments. They also make use of enhancement arguments, but these are usually 
supplementary to or entwined with the main argument that they have a special right to 
be involved in land management. 
1. Necessity 
This perspective, in which participation is a necessary tool in order to achieve 
conservation goals, has been identified by several writers as the main reason public 
agencies seek community participation. These writers identify changing politics, and an 
increasingly well-informed and active public, ready to rebel against imposed decisions 
with which they disagree, as prompting this change. 10 The shift to a participatory style 
of management is interpreted as necessary, as the old, exclusionary style no longer 
7 Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, "International Human Rights and Their Impact on Domestic Law on 
Indigenous Peoples ' Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand," in Indigenous Peoples ' Righ ts in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand, ed. Paul Haveman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 245 . 8 Ken Coates, "International Perspectives on Relations with Indigenous Peoples," in Ken S. Coates and 
Paul McHugh, Living Relationships, Ko kiri Ngiitahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millenium (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998), 23. 
9 Articles 18, 24, 26, 29, 31 and 32 in particular. 
10 Julia M. Wondolleck and Steven L. Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work: Lessons from Innovation in 
Natural Resource Management (Washington DC: Island Press, 2000), 8-9 . 
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works. 11 Relationships, in this perspective, are a strategic necessity, a way of 
maintaining the old goal of resource protection, in a new world. Community groups are 
potential allies or potential saboteurs, with a latent power of protest that the public 
agency attempts to defuse. The benefits for the community that come from involvement 
are sometimes noted but are not the key concern: 
Collaboration can lead to better decisions that are more likely to be 
implemented and, at the same time, better prepare agencies and 
communities for future challenges. Building bridges between agencies, 
organizations, and individuals in environmental management is not an 
end in itself. Rather, it is a means to several ends: building understanding, 
building support, and building capacity. 12 
In international conservation policy statements it is often simply stated that participation 
is necessary for better resource protection, without explaining why this is so. This 
statement from Agenda 21, an agreement outlining a plan for sustainable development, 
is an example: 
Critical to the effective implementation of the objectives, policies and 
mechanisms agreed to by Governments in all programme areas of 
Agenda 21 will be the commitment and genuine involvement of all social 
groups. 13 
In New Zealand conservation policy this perspective, and the theory behind it, ~s 
clearer: 
Effective conservation is dependent on the level of support and 
. understanding of all New Zealanders. They are engaged as individuals, in 
their communities, as neighbours, in iwi and hapii, in conservation and 
recreation groups, as well as farmers, foresters, fishers, scientists, 
businesspeople, and people working in local government and other public 
·agencies. The conservation task is large. Effective partnerships between 
the Department, people and organisations can enhance the achievement 
of conservation· outcomes by all parties.14 
Conservati.on is seen as a big job, which needs as many hands as possible. The policy 
also make_s clear that relationships between DOC and wider community are specifically 
intended to "enhance conservation," rather than being intripsically worthwhile. 15 
11 Fikret Berkes, "Rethinking Community-Based Conservation," Conservation Biology 18, no. _3 (2004): 
622. 
12 Wondolleck and Ya_ffee, Making Collaboration Work,23. 
l3 Agenda 21, 23; 1. 
14 DOC, Conservatio·n General Policy, 18. 
15 Ibid. 
.. 
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These ideas are mirrored in the Tongariro National Park Management Plan, which also 
, , 
states that encouraging compliance with park rules is another objective of community 
engagement: 
For a Government department working on behalf of the community, good 
communication and relations are vital. Community members and tangata 
whenua assist the department in many ways in the management of the 
park, including contributing volunteer work or resources through 
sponsorship and providing advice and guidance on conservation matters. 
The park is a complex area to administer and community support is 
important to ensure that compliance with policies and regulations is 
achieved. Good community relations will also assist the department in 
gaining community trust and responding, where appropriate, to the 
aspirations of the community. 16 
This quote is also a good example of the multiple arguments that are used in the 
justification of community involvement in conservation management. The community 
is seen here as a potential source of labour and funding, a potential source of expertise, a 
potential obstacle, and a group that the agency is bound to represent. 
The argument for participation for better resource protection is, at its core, a 'biocentric' 
or 'pro-nature' perspective, and relies on the premise that increased participation, does, 
in fact, lead to better resource protection. This implicit premise is attended to more 
closely in the academic literature on collaborative management. The ecologist Fikret 
Eerkes and his colleagues, for example, argue that conservation does not exist as a 
separate concern from social issues. They describe a "socioecological system" in which 
it does not make sense to exclude the community from the environment in which they 
live or otherwise operate. 17 According to these writers, developments in ecology have 
questioned former assumptions about the concept of equilibrium and simple cause-and-
effect analyses of environmental change. A greater understanding of the complexity of 
ecological systems has led to a demand for more sophisticated management responses, 
at multiple levels. This has made the job of environmental management more difficult, 
requiring more input from more indiv-{duals to address the challenges.18 Some co-
management writers argue that it is impossible for a single agency to adequately handle 
the challenges of modem environmental management, and partnerships vyith multiple 
agencies and groups are essential. 19 
16 DOC Tongariro-Taup6 Conservancy, Tongariro National Park Management Plan, 84. 
17 Eerkes, "Rethinking Community-Based Conservation/ 623. 
18 Fikret Eerkes, Johan Colding, and Carl Folke, eds. , Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building 
Resilience for Complexity and Change (Cambridge.: Cambridge University Press,2003 ), 1. 
19 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 21. 
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The perspective that community participation is necessary for resource protection 
attracts criticism from two angles. Some writers in the co-management literature 
question the validity of the assumption that the participation of the wider community in 
resource management always leads to better resource protection. Others argue that 
participation is a right independent from its connection to better conservation outcomes. 
In the former camp, writers disagree with the premise that greater collaboration leads to 
better conservation outcomes, and argue instead that it is costly in terms of resources, 
and allows obstructive interest groups to stymie progress: 
Collaborative processes tend to be intense and time consuming. 
Negotiations attract those with vested interests, particularly business 
interests that tend to dominate the process. Those without special 
expertise may find themselves at a disadvantage, and those who cannot 
commit to the considerable time entailed are excluded.20 
Others have claimed that there is insufficient evidence as to the benefits of co-
management. Some argue that although co-management can produce benefits to 
resource management, it does not always do so, and it is important to isolate the 
variables which assist or obstruct these positive effects.21 
Among those who see participation as a right independent of cq_nservation outcomes, 
the participation for better resource protection argument is criticised as representing a 
cold-hearted approach to the rights and interests of indigenous or local people as merely 
problems to be managed away. Anthropologist Peter Brosius summed up part of the 
message that indigenous groups brought to the 2003 World Parks Congress like this: 
Their message was that indigenous and local communities must represent 
· something other than a "transaction cost," [ and] that threat assessments 
that classify th~ir landuse practices as disturbances are unacceptable ... 22 
In New Zealand, c_o-management writers have argued that the pro-nature perspective 
takes inadequate account of the historical justice issues between the government and 
Maori. Brad Coombes and Stephanie Hill have noted that there-is a tendency to assume 
that adjusting the management of a res?urce in line with community opinion is 
sufficient provision of justice for those previously excluded.23 Coombes and Hill argue 
that when better environmental management is the primary focus of co-management 
20 Michael McClosk:y, "Local Communities and the Management of Public Forests," Ecology Law 
Quarterly 25(1999): 628. · 
21 Berkes, "Rethinking Community-Based Conservation/' 624. 
22 J. Peter Brosius, "Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas at the World Parks Congress," Conservation 
Biology 18,-no. 3 (2004): 611. 
23 Coombes and Hill, ""Na Whenua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C. Te Partner"," 138. 
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there is little space for questioning the status of the land, or the potential return of title 
to the descendents of its original inhabitants. 24 
In the National Park inquiry Maori very seldom used this argument to advocate for 
greater involvement. One claimant suggested that if DOC was better about including 
Maori in environmental management then DOC's job would be easier: 
In my view the objectives of the National Park should be to focus on the 
environment but the environment as I've said should include the social 
environment of the tangata whenua. If that was the case, there would be 
fewer obstacles and in fact DoC would receive better support due to the 
inclusion of hapu in the direct management of the park.25 
Elsewhere in his submission, however, this claimant made it clear he believed the key 
argument for his hapu's involvement in management was their special connection to the 
land: 
The hapu are part of the Park and I do not understand why we are not part 
of the management process. We are definitely part of the life blood of the 
land and it is extremely narrow minded to exclude hapu for the 
management and running of the park and not in its best interests.26 
A very strong feature of claimant submissions was that simply being consulted for the 
benefit of conservation management failed to fulfil their expectations for recognition 
and involve1nent. 
2. Enhancement 
In this view, community participation brings useful skills and knowledge into the 
management system. Local and indigenous people are seen to possess what is variously 
referred to as local knowledge, traditional eco_logical knowledge, or indigenous 
knowledge ( and various further pennutations ), and the access to this knowledge that is 
gained from the inclusion of local groups is thought to provide conservation benefits. 
This perspective is prevalent in international policy. It is the starting point for 
indigenous involvement in the Convention for Biological Diver_sity, a binding 
agreement that New Zealand has signed. Article 8(j) states that a signatory will, "as far 
as possible and as appropriate": 
24 Ibid. 
[s]ubject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and.practices of indigenous and local 
25 Brief of Evidence of Graeme Everton, Wai 1130, #G36, September 29, 2006, paragraph 40, 10. 26 
· Ibid. , paragraph 36, 9. 
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communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their 
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of 
such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices.27 
The Rio Declaration, a set of principles for sustainable development, also identifies 
indigenous people's special knowledge as the reason for their important role in 
environmental management and development. Its twenty-second principle states: 
"[i]ndigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital 
role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and 
traditional practices. "28 
The possibility that the integration of indigenous knowledge into management would 
not lead to better environmental protection is sometimes raised as a criticism of these 
arguments. These writers would have it that local knowledge should, at the very least, 
be subject to 'proper' scientific testing, before it is used in management. 
We take strong issue with [the] suggestion that the "primary goal" of any 
study that involves the application or collection of LEK [local ecological 
knowledge] should be to "empower communities." ... [T]he purpose of 
collecting LEK is not to satisfy political agendas or appease the 
politically correct, socioeconomic rhetoric that continues to plague 
discussions of LEK. The purpose of collecting LEK in a wildlife 
management ·context is to seek out and apply any sources of reliable data, 
including information collected independently froll! western science, to · 
help make more informed wildlife management decisions.29 
Another criticism of the way that indigenous knowledge is used in policy is that those 
policies tend to assume that the people who possess traditional ecological knowledge 
are willing and happy to sµare it. Some writers are concerned about exploitation of 
indigenous peoples forttheir knowledge or labour, ·and demand that full, prior and 
informed consent of indigenous peo'ple is received whenever their knowledge is used~ 
" 
The argument for involvement 4ue to special knowledge also occasionally attracts 
criticism.for being paternalistic, or forcing in_digenous people into a niche in which they 
, 
. must ca~y out "traditional" practices, thus artificially freezing cultural behaviour by 
· disallowing adaptation and evolution. Lastly, this approac];i has been criticised for 
27 Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/?a=cbd-08. 
28 Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 14, 
1992, http://www.un~p.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articlei&= 1163. 
29 Grant Gilchrist and Mark L. Mallory, "Comparing Expert-Based Science with Local Ecological 
Knowledge:-What Ate We Afraid Of?," Ecology and Society 12, no. 1 (2007), 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/resp1/. 
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picking and choosing the aspects of indigenous knowledge to privilege and romanticise, 
while ignoring wider knowledge systems, and the status of indigenous people as 
political agents with their own separate interests. 30 
In New Zealand environmental policy, the argument for involvement from special 
knowledge is not used as often as it is in international conservation policy, or in 
countries such as Australia, where the value of indigenous knowledge is noted in the 
key environmental protection legislation. 31 Management policies in New Zealand tend 
to reference the Maori environmental ethic of kaitiakitanga, but the policies are vague 
about how this ethic will be used or protected. The definition of kaitiakitanga is 
contested, especially regarding its use in government policy documents. Loosely, it 
refers to a duty of care by tang a ta whenua for their surrounding environment, based on 
ideas of reciprocal and kinship relationships between people and the other things of the 
world. The Waitangi Tribunal, in its report on the Indigenous Flora and Fauna and 
Cultural and Intellectual Property inquiry (the Flora and Fauna inquiry), defined 
kaitiakitanga as follows: 
Kaitiakitanga is the obligation, arising from the kin relationship, to 
nurture or care for a person or thing. It has a spiritual aspect, 
encompassing not only an obligation to care for and nurture not only 
physical well-being but also mauri .... In the human realm, those who 
have mana ( or, to use treaty;terminology, rangatiratanga) must exercise 
it in accordance with the values of kaitiakitanga - to act unselfishly, with 
right mind and heart, and with proper procedure. Mana and kaitiakitanga 
go together as right and responsibility, and that kaitiakitanga 
responsibility can be understood not only as a cultural principle but as a 
system of law. Finally, where kaitiaki obligations exist, they do so in 
relation to taonga - that is, to anything that is treasured. Taonga include 
tangible things such as land, waters, plants, wildlife, and cultural works; 
and intangible things such as language, identity, and culture, including 
matauranga Maori itself. 32 
Kaitiakitanga is complex, encompassing rights and responsibilities towards heritage, as 
well as expertise, and is not usually appealed to in the same way as appeals for the value 
of traditional ecological knowledge elsewhere. For example, in DOC's key conservation 
policy document, kaitiakitanga is framed more as a duty than as a form of expertise: 
Effective partnerships with tangata whenua can achieve enhanced 
conservation of natural resources and historical and cultural heritage. 
30 J.P. Brosius, "What Counts as Local Knowledge in Global Environmental Assessments and 
Conventions? ," in Bridging scales and knowledge systems: concepts and applications in ecosystem 
assessment (Biblioteca Alexandrina, Alexandria, Egypt 2004), 11. 
31 The Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 Section 3(g). 32 Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei, Te Taumata Tuarua, vol. 1, Wai 262, (Wellington: Waitangi 
Tribunal, 2011 ), 17. 
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Tangata whenua responsibilities to this heritage are embodied in the ethic 
of kaitiakitanga. Kaitiakitanga is a spiritual and environmental ethos that 
governs tangata whenua responsibilities for the care and protection of 
mauri, the dynamic life principle that underpins all heritage. 
Kaitiakitanga includes components of protection, guardianship, 
stewardship and customary use. It is exercised by tangata whenua in 
relation to ancestral lands, water, sites, resources and other taonga. The 
focus of kaitiakitanga is manaaki (care) and rahui (protection).33 
'Matauranga Maori' is a more direct translation of 'traditional knowledge'. DOC 
administers a fund called the Matauranga Kura Taiao Fund, which is a contestable pool 
of money set up to help Maori to retain and develop knowledge for use in biodiversity 
management. 34 There is only one example of a Matauranga Kura Taiao project available 
on DOC's website. Maori expertise is partly recognised, but it is not a prevalent feature 
in policy justifications for relationships with tangata whenua. 
The researchers in the 1998 Te Puni Kokiri review noted that their "key stakeholder" 
interviewees complained that many DOC staff do not accept that Maori have a role to 
play in conservation. 35 The questions of whether DOC trusts Maori expertise, and 
whether Maori practices are sustainable were raised by claimants in the National Park 
. . inquiry: 
. 
DOC is focused on preservation (the glass house or fishbowl perception 
of conservation) but Ngati Rangi have a more hands on view. We see 
ourselves as an active part of the natural environment and seek to use the _ 
resources that are part of our culture. in a sustainable manner. We believe 
_ we can both preserve and use our resources. This has created some 
conflict with DOC policy ~nd every time I mention the word "cultural 
take" to DOC, I'm sure they start counting the Kereru [native wood 
pigeons]. 36 · 
Claimants in the National Park inquiry argued strongly that they have environmental 
management expertise and this knowledge should be respected by the government. The 
argument,- as previously mentioned,' however, was deeply entwined with the argument 
that they have special rights to the land, and a special connectioh: 
Our people still have strong relationships with our rivers and lakes, 
especially the Rangitikei, Whangaehu, and Lake Rotoaira. Our old 
people still say we are "river people" .... I know our hapu ofNgati 
33 Conse·rvation General Policy, 15. 
34 See the DdC website at: http: //www.doc.govt.nz/getting-involved/volunteer-join-or-start-a-
project/start-or-fund-a-project/funding/for-landowners/nga-whenua-rahui/matauranga-kura-taiao-fund/. 
The fund is linked to New Zealand's responsibilities under the CBD. 
35 Te Puni Kokiri, Key Stakeholder Interviews, 14. , . . 
36 Brief of Evidence of Keith Paetaha Wood, #A64, paragraph 66, 14. Kereru are a native wood-pigeon, 
and a traditional food source of many iwi and hapu. They have endangered status under New Zealand 
law. 
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W aewae would like to see our waterways salvaged from decline. Our 
people want to be included in decision-making. We think our local 
knowledge of these waterways is invaluable to the National Park and all 
local councils, but we seem to be excluded from this process.37 
The N gati Rangi closing submissions argue that their expertise is not the most important 
reason they should be included: 
It is not necessary for Maori to prove that they are the better managers or 
that their rules and practices in times past must necessarily continue to 
apply unchanged into the future. 38 
They pin their arguments squarely on the Crown's responsibilities under the Treaty to 
protect N gati Rangi' s exercise of local authority. 39 The claimants often argued that they 
should be involved because they have special knowledge, but this argument was usually 
supplementary to the argument that they have a right to be involved. 
The argument that locals should be involved in management due to their special 
expertise, is sometimes extended to argue that management should be fully devolved to 
locals as they would manage the resource better than the government does. Political 
scientist and co-management writer Sara Singleton described the arguments for 
devolution in natural resource management as follows: 
... the rationale for political devolution arises largely from the idea that 
local people and localgoveinments are expected to have a clearer 
understanding of local socio-economic and cultural circumstances and are 
thus better equipped to devise fine-tuned regulatory solutions to 
environmental problems.40 
Devolution is sometimes criticised as representing an abandonment of responsibility on 
the part of governments, and for failing to represent the interests of the wider public in 
h • · 41 t e resource 1n question. 
Arguments for devolution do not appear in New Zealand policy with regard to the 
conservation estate, unsurprisingly, as _such arguments challenge government authority 
and expertise. An argument for devolution on the basis of superior management skills 
has sometimes been raised by claimants in Tribunal inquiries, including the National 
Park inquiry. These arguments are usually historical in nature: that is, those proposing 
these arguments point to Crown failure to care for New Zealand's natural environment 
37 Brief of Evidence of Puruhi Smith, Wai 1130, #G3 l , September 28 , 2006, paragraphs 20-21 , 5. 
38 Closing Submissions on Behalf ofNgati Rangi, #3.3 .33 , paragraph 2.8 , 9. 
39 Ibid., paragraphs 2.4-2.7, 8-9. 
40 Sara Singleton, "Collaborative Environmental Planning in the American West: The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly," Environmental Politics 11 , no. 3 (2002): 57. 
41 Ibid., 70. 
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in the past, and argue that the superior record of Maori as land managers gives them a 
greater moral claim to manage parks. 
The settlers encouraged by Crown policy desecrated the land, got rid of 
the natural habitat, and then now DoC think they are the only ones that 
can fix it up ... 
Iwi need to control and manage the National Park, it's as simple as that. 
They say we don't have qualifications to do it, but it is a cultural lifestyle 
to leave things as natural as possible and this is something that is being 
recognized internationally as the way to relate to National Parks. We may 
have cut trees down but there was a cultural process to it which took time. 
Maori need to play a bigger role in the actual day to day running of 
national parks. Enough of this tokenism of the kind which puts one 
representative on Park Boards. We need about a 60% share in 
management, or at least no less than 51 % stake in the kinds of decisions 
b . d 42 e1ng ma e. 
This failure to care for the environment is often seen to be continuing: 
Because the Crown is still taking a passive "softly-softly" approach to the 
Didymo [also known as "rock snot": an unpleasant-looking algae that 
grows on river and lake rocks] debacle and are constantly ignoring any 
responsibility or obligation to actively safe guard our rohe [tribal area] 
from the invasive algae, I strongly believe that Ngati Hikairo must be the 
consent authority for our waterways within our rohe.43 
Claimants also used an argument for devolution for better resource protection py 
asserting a Maori view of the natural world, and claiming that government agencies are 
not capable of dealing with the range of issues in that framework. This was often 
phrased iri terms of the Maori kinship connection with the resources in question, and is 
a much _more complex argument than the ones based on skills gained from locality and 
length of connection to the land. This argument will be discussed in the section on 
rights. 
3. Protection -and Participatiqn 
Under th~ dual objectives of resource protection and community involvement, 
conservation may not necessarily be enhanced through co~unity participation (though 
this is.usually assumed or argued to supplement the argument) but, nevertheless, 
• community participcltion is a right that cannot be ignored. Conservation, as a public 
good, should be planned. and managed in consultation with the public, especially those 
with particular interest in the resource ( the "stakeholders") at different levels. It is not 
42 Brief of Evidence of Rangi Joseph Bristol, Wai 1130,.#D40, May 5, 2006, paragraph 30, .10, paragraph 
33, 11. 
43 Brief ofEvidence·ofTyronne Andrew Smith on behalf ofNgati Hikairo ki Tongariro, Wai 1130, #G24, 
September 28, 2005, paragraph 86, 24-5. 
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that resource protection policies are abandoned, but win-win situations are actively 
sought, and compromises_ made. The relationship, under these objectives, is one where 
the government has the final say, but actively tries to work community interests into the 
final decision. Different community groups are all equally important voices in the 
discussion process, and the state agency weighs up the opinions and makes what they 
judge to be the best decision, within the bounds of their guiding legislation and policy. 
In some ways this argument is just a difference in emphasis from participation as a 
necessity for resource protection, but it is an important difference for the nature of the 
relationship. 
This perspective, what Brechin et al might call "the practical middle ground" between 
the "pro-nature" and "pro-people" camps, is criticised from both sides of the debate.44 
The "pro-nature camp" sees community negotiation as a waste of time and energy when 
those resources should be devoted towards environmental management. Local groups, 
and particularly indigenous groups, however, see it as not going far enough towards 
power-sharing. Brosius noted that a key concern of the indigenous delegates to the 2003 
World Parks Congress was that their interests should not be diluted down to becoming 
simply one voice among many. 45 
New Zealand conservation policy, as _previously noted, frames its responsibilities to 
Maori chiefly in the form of Treaty obligations, which would seem to imply a different 
kind of right to involvement from other groups and individuals with interests in park 
management. The general policy document for national parks has consecutive sections 
addressing "Treaty of Waitangi responsibilities" and "Public Participation in National 
Parks." Although these different headings imply that Maori involvement and 
community involvement are different kinds of issue, the sections are almost identical 
except that where DOC is instructed it may behave in a certain way towards general 
public interest groups, it is instructed it should behave in that way towards Maori. 
Likewise, when DOC should (for example) consult "people and organisations interested 
in national parks" on matters of significance to them, it stipulates that it will consult 
with tangata whenua on matters of significance to them.46 The docume~t-explains that 
may indicates "policies intended to allow flexibility in decision-making," should 
44 Wilshusen, P .R., S.R. Brechin, C.L. Fortwangler, and PC West, "The Road Less Traveled: Towards 
Nature Protection with Social Justice," in P.R. Wilshusen, S.R. Brechin, C.L. Fortwangler and PC West 
(eds) , Contested Nature: Promoting In ternational Biodiversity with Social Justice in the Twenty-First 
Century, (New York: New York Press, 2003), 260. 
45 Brosius , "Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas at the World Parks Congress," 611. 
46 DOC, General Policy for National Parks, 19, 16. 
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indicates "policies that carry with them a strong expectation of outcome, without 
diminishing the constitutional role of the Minister and other decision-makers" and will 
is used for "policies where legislation provides no discretion for decision-making or a 
deliberate decision has been made by the Authority to direct decision-makers."47 DOC 
therefore has a stronger obligation towards Maori to fulfil the same set of policies that 
apply to the general public. Maori have what might be described as a 'first among 
equals' position as a stakeholder group. 
Many of the writers contributing to the New Zealand literature emphasise the distinction 
between Maori and other stakeholders. "General interest group" status is the lowest 
rung of a nine-rung participation ladder described by Jacinta Ruru (who adapted it from 
Tania Ruru who in tum adapted it from Sherry Amstein). Jacinta Ruru describes the 
"general interest group" category as follows: 
At this level Maori would be considered one of a number of interest 
groups. Their interests would be given no express mention or priority in 
legislation. Where considered relevant, Maori interests would be weighed 
against the interests of other groups in the administration and 
management process.48 
This status is six levels below that which Jacinta Ruru sees as involvement which would 
adequately reflect the Treaty principle of partnership.49 Ruru's scale is discussed more 
thoroughly in the following chapter. 50 · 
In 2007, a 'Staff member of the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy office wrote a sabbatical 
report on co-management in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, and among her 
observations on Tongarito she noted that "[i]wi don't appreciate being referred to as 
"stakeholders." They are tangata whenua-people of the land."51 In the Tuwharetoa 
closing submissions to the National Park inquiry the iwi argued that they, and other 
. 
47 Ibid., 14. 
• 
48 Jacinta Rum, "Legislative Provision for Tino Rangatiratanga: A National Park Case Study," The 
Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence (Special Issue: Te Purenga) 8, no. 2 (2005): 325. The ladder is 
adapted from Tania Rum, The Resource Management Act 1991 and Nga Iwi Maori. LL:M: Thesis, 
University ofOtago, 1997, 28-31, in turn adapted from Sherry Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen 
Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners J5, no. 4 (1969). See chapter three page 66 
for more detail on Arnstein's ladder. 
49 Jacinta Rum, "Legi~lative Provision for Tino Rangatiratanga," 333. 
50 See chapter three, page 68 . 
51 Nie· Etheridge, "Co:.Management between Government Conservation Agencies and Indigenous People 
in New Zealand, Australia & Canada," (Department of Conservation, 2007), 30. 
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Maori, had subordinate status on the Conservation Board compared to groups such as 
the Ruapehu ski club. 52 
The difference between the rights of Maori and those of the general public in New 
Zealand is a controversial topic in New Zealand. DOC tries to balance the expectations 
of Maori with the expectations of Pakeha who are often sensitive about the idea of 
Maori interests having higher priority in government decision making. Reference to the 
special relationship established by the Treaty, and the reference to the Treaty in the 
Conservation Act indicate that Maori rights have a completely separate source than do 
the rights of other groups interested in the park. However, as the general policy shows, 
the translation of these rights into policy is only subtly different from the rights of 
"public participation." Maori, on the other hand, have clearly rejected a status as being 
one stakeholder group among many. 
4. Rights 
Arguments for indigenous rights are occasionally mentioned in the international 
conservation agreements, but conservation protection remains paramount. The World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and IUCN, for example, support rights as long as they do not 
threaten protection objectives: 
... the rights of indigenous and other traditional peoples inhabiting 
protected areas m.ust be respected by promoting and allowing full 
participation in co-management of resources, and in a way that would not 
affect or undermine the objectives for the protected area as set out in its 
management plan. 53 
The arguments referencing indigenous rights are more often used to justify the return of 
land, or the handover of control to indigenous · management, than they are used to argue 
for shared 1nanage1nent. When they are used to justify co-management of one form ?r 
another, this is usually explained as a political trade-off, or presented as an admission 
that others also have some rights in the area. Co-management is set up as a compromise 
between conservation goals and the rights and interests of the indigenous groups. Stan 
Stevens provides a succinct summary of the positive and negative possibilities of these 
arrangements: 
52 Closing Submissions for Ngati Tuwharetoa, Wai 1130, #3.3.43 , June 7, 2007, paragraph 8.129, 203. 53 Javier Beltran, "Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and 
Case Studies," in Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines, ed. Adrian Phillips (World Commission on 
Protected Areas, IUCN, 2000), ix. 
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At best, co-management marries strong community-based indigenous 
resource management and conservation with government resources in 
alliances that safeguard and support indigenous rights, community-based 
conservation, and self-determination. More often, co-management 
arrangements may be unstable marriages of convenience - a level of 
government recognition of indigenous peoples that precludes simple 
expropriations of their lands to manage as protected areas but stops short 
of granting full recognition of their sovereignty, self-determination, land 
rights, and authority over natural resource management. 54 
Many writers note that when historical injustices remain unremedied, for the victims of 
those wrongs the desire for justice overshadows the questions of how, and how well, the 
land is managed. Marcus Colchester compiled a long list of ways in which indigenous 
peoples have been badly affected by the establishment of protected areas, a few of 
which are: 
• Denial of rights to land. 
• Denial of use of and access to natural resources. 
• Denial of political rights and the validity of customary 
institutions. 
• Disruption of customary systems of environment management. 
• Symbolic ties to environment broken. 
• Cultural identity weakened. 
• Intensified pressure on natural resources outside the protected 
areas.
55 
The grievances resulting from such injustices are paramount to the people affected. 
Brad Coombes wrote of his research in Te Urewera that the claims of Tuhoe were 
" ... substan_tially grounded in land loss rather than the appropriateness of Pakeha 
conservation approaches."56 The same sentiment was expressed in the closing 
submissions ofthe ·Tuwharetoa claimants in the National Park inquiry. The submission 
also claimed that the _Cro~p. had tried to justify the land taking by an appeal to the ideals 
of conservation, protecting lands for the public into the future, when in truth the real 
motivations were pecuniary. 57 
This a go~d example of the complex mixture of moral arguments used by indigenous 
peoples and their advocates in these debates. In his book Justice and the Maori (1997), 
· historian and political philosopher Andrew ~harp briefly analysed the Waitangi 
Tribunal's 1985 inquiry into the Manukau claim. This claim was brought forward by the 
54 Stan Stevens, "Part 2: Co-Management,'-' in Conservation through Cultural Survival: Indigenous 
Peoples and Protected Areas, ed. Stan Stevens (Washington DC: Island Press, 1997), 131. 
55 Marcus Colchester,~"Conservation Policy and Indigenous Peoples," Environmental Scienc.e & Policy 
7(2004): 147. 
56 Coombes, -" Contested Conservation Legacies," 4. 
57 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 7.23 , 108. 
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Tainui iwi over the Manukau harbour in South Auckland. Sharp identified five different 
kinds of argument raised _by the claimants as to their rights over the harbour, although 
he also noted that this was probably not a particularly exhaustive or adequate list. The 
Manukau claimants argued that they were legally entitled to what they claimed, because 
laws had been broken depriving Tainui claimants of their resources. The Treaty was 
brought into this argument as a legally binding document. Claimants also argued that 
they were morally entitled to what they claimed, either on the basis of their prior claims 
as indigenous people, or again with reference to the promises of the morally-binding 
Treaty of Waitangi. Thirdly, it was argued that Tainui deserved to have control of the 
harbour, because they had proved themselves to be better guardians (kaitiaki) of the 
environment. Fourthly they argued they needed control over the harbour, in order to live 
meaningful Ii ves ( and also that the harbour needed them, and that P akeha needed the 
healthy resource that would result from their careful guardianship). Lastly, Sharp 
identified an argument from duty- that Tainui had a cultural duty to fulfil their roles as 
d . 58 guar 1ans. 
Each of these arguments was drawn upon in the National Park inquiry, as was a sixth 
argument that invoked ideas of international best practice, a kind of comparative justice: 
Several international models of national park management which grant 
some form of indigenous involvement exist and it is submitted that while 
there are certainly complexities involved in any model of management 
where there are diametrically opposed values at stake, New Zealand 
remains well behind other nations that are striving to provide for a joint 
management model that takes into account the rights and needs of 
indigenous peoples.59 
· 
The Australian national parks ofUluru-Kata Tjuta and Kakadu were drawn upon as 
particular examples in this case. 60 In the U enuku ( a Whanganui group) closing 
submission Gwaii Haanas, in Canada, was used as an example, particularly its 
Watchman programme, which is run by the local indigenous people and funded by 
Parks Canada. 61 
The last three of the arguments identified by Sharp (that Maori are better managers, that 
they need to be involved for their own sake and that of the resource, and that they have 
a duty to be involved) tended to be rolled toget_her in arguments under the one umbrella 
58 Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The ·Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand 
since the 1970s, 2 ed. (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997), 31 . 
59 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43 , paragraph 8.120, 202. 
60 Ibid. , paragraphs 8.121-8.130, 202-3. 
61 Closing Submissions ofUenuku, Wai 1130, #3.3.37 , May 22, 2007, paragraphs 21 ,99:..110, 138-40. 
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ofkaitiakitanga. In the submissions to the National Park inquiry kaitiakitanga is usually 
directly referred to as a duty, but the exercise of this duty is implied to be a right that the 
government should protect. These submissions argue that it is necessary for the 
wellbeing of tangata whenua to be able to exercise this right, and that it is necessary for 
the wellbeing of the environment for tangata whenua to look after it in this culturally 
specific way. The mauri of a place needs to be protected by the kaitiaki (those who 
exercise kaitiakitanga). 
Many of the individual submissions argue that the natural environment would be 
improved if they had more opportunity to exercise kaitiakitanga. 
There needs to be mechanisms put in place to help Ngati Hikairo to build 
the capacity of the hapu in order to return the mauri, for if the mauri is 
strong, the people, flora and fauna, and the land will thrive. 62 
Some submissions argue that DOC would also benefit from the incorporation of Maori 
cultural knowledge into their management systems, and say that DOC fails to take this 
into account: 
If DoC improved or created relationships with the hapu and supported 
them undertaking their kaitiaki roles then that there would be many 
advantages not only for the Department and the hapu but overall for the 
whenua [land]within the National Park. However, it seems that the hapu 
are interpreted out of the values of the National Park (by DoC' s focus on 
· ) 63 conservation . 
Others focus on the exercise of kaitiakitanga as a right. Often it is referred to as a right 
and a responsibility simultaneously: . 
·Ngati Hikairo have a direct responsibility to preserve our cultural identity 
and to protect for the future, our heritage, which may be eroded by 
changes over time. As Ngati Hikairo are Kaitiaki who hold Mana-whenua 
[authority over land] over a majority of the Tongariro National Park, we 
see it as imperative that we are at the decision making table. Our status as 
· Ahi-Kaa [people of continued residence - literally "burning fires"], 
shows our resolve to continue the founding that was first -set by 
N gatoroirangi that our 'fires of occupation are a true continuation of our 
right.64 . 
·The concept is invoked as part of a request for. a role of guardianship or custodianship 
over the environment, which carries with it a certain status, c~rtain responsibilities and 
62 Brief of Evidence ofTyronne Smith, #G24, paragraph 89, 25. 
63 Brief of Evidence of Graeme Everton, #G36, paragraph 39, 9. 
64 Brief of Evidence of Tyronne Smith, #G24, paragraph.85 , 24. Ahi-kaa means the burning fires , which 
symbolise continued connection to the land. The term is also sometimes used, as it is here, to refer to the 
p_eop1e with ahi-kaa status . Ngatoroirangi was the Tuwharetoa ancestor who first came to the Tongariro 
area and climbed the mountain, claiming it for his descendants·. 
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certain rights. In the arguments for this role to be restored and supported, claimants 
argue that their social wellbeing and the wellbeing of the environment will be improved. 
The lack of opportunity and support for Maori to fulfil this role is considered an 
injustice, and the submissions present the Crown's own attempts at environmental 
custodianship as a failure. Kaitiakitanga is also sometimes argued as being a part of 
rangatiratanga; control of the natural environment of their traditional area is a part of 
Maori self-determination. 65 
In summary, DOC and Maori have very different underlying beliefs about the reasons 
that they should work together in conservation management. Although DOC appeals to 
Treaty rights and the usefulness of the management ethic of kaitiakitanga, in its 
statements for action it is clear that Maori are seen as another community group who 
have a slightly stronger right to participate in management than other groups, but do not 
have the status of experts or special rights holders. In contrast, Maori lean heavily on 
the argument that they have special rights to the resource, related to their knowledge, 
their prior occupation of the area, their kinship connection to the land and resources, 
their status as kaitiaki, and what they see as the promises to protect all these things 
contained in the Treaty of Waitangi. Given these differences it is important to question 
whether or not the groups engaged in a co-operative management situation need to have 
the same goals for their relationship. The next section addresses this question. 
How important is a shared vision for the relationship? 
Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, of the Harvard Negotiation Project, point out that the 
nature of the relationship itself is sometimes a point of difference between negotiating 
parties, and argue that this does not preclude the possibility of successful cooperation: 
Suppose that I want the office to behave like one big happy family, while 
my boss wants our relationship to be strictly business .... Or suppose one 
country is looking forward to a live-and-let-live relationship based 
primarily on trade and investment, whereas its neighbour would like to 
use its resources to influence the politics of an entire region. The test of a 
good relationship is whether it is able to deal successfully with such 
differences, including those about the kind of relationship the parties 
should have. It is this problem-solving aspect of a relationship that" we 
call a "working" relationship. 66 
65 Paul McHugh, The Maori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), 7. 
66 Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, Getting Together: Building Relationships as We Negotiate (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1989), 8. 
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Fisher and Brown argue that in any venture involving multiple parties it is best to see 
substantive issues, or outcomes, as separate from relationship issues, or process. 67 
Fisher and Brown also argue that defining a good relationship as one in which parties 
agree easily is as mistaken as defining a good road as one that is easy to build. Rather 
aptly in terms of the topic of this thesis, they go on to add: 
... a good road through mountains may be more valuable than one across 
a prairie. Similarly, a good relationship among parties with sharp 
differences may be more valuable than one among parties who find it 
easy to agree.68 
Although differing ideas about the nature of a relationship can be successfully 
· negotiated, it does form an extra layer of difficulty on a working relationship. At 
Tongariro the differences in goals with respect to the relationship are often an 
underlying or complicating factor in conflicts about how the park is managed. 
Fisher and Brown describe a successful working relationship as one which is "able to 
deal well with differences," and which "prqduces a solution that satisfies the competing 
interests as well as possible, with little waste, in a way that appears legitimate in the 
eyes of each of the parties."69 They do not go into detail about what they mean by 
"waste," but in the more famous book of the same series, Getting to Yes: Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving In, by Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton, they explain 
that many negotiations fail to reach agreement, or the best c1;greement that they could 
have reached, because the negotiators do not see all the opportunities available to 
them.70 The Getting to Yes writers advocate an attitude of inventiveness and generosity 
- both sides looking for an answer· that is attractive to both.71 Factors which make it 
. 
difficult for parties to experiment with solutions could therefore be seen as a weakness . 
Another potential area of wastefulness in a negotiation is time. Negotiations do take 
time, especially if there are complex issues to be resolved. There are necessary and 
unnecessary delays, however. The Getting to Yes authors argue that bargaining 
strategies based on the selection and defence of a predetermined position makes 
67 Ibid., 16-8. 
68 Ibid. , 5. 
69 Ib 'd ... 8 9 1 . ' X111, - . - ' . 
70 Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving 
In , 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 56-7. 
7I . Ibid. , 56-80. 
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negotiation slow and fractious , for example. 72 Unnecessary or overly lengthy 
bureaucratic processes are another potential source of avoidable delay. 
DOC and Maori have differing ideas about the purpose of their relationships and neither 
party is consistently clear about what kind of success they are trying to achieve. A more 
useful notion of success is one that is limited, as much as possible, to the workings of 
the collaboration itself. This focuses attention on the process, rather than the outcomes 
of co-management. The questions then become: what helps differing groups to work 
together productively, and what hinders them? The next chapter looks at how "process" 
might be defined and divided into categories for analysis, then identifies factors in each 
area which obstruct and assist the parties in their attempts to work together. 
72 Ibid., 6. 
58 
Chapter Three: Problems and Strengths 
The co-management literature is full of advice about how co-management can be made 
more successful, and what causes it to fail. This literature is tied closely to the literature 
on evaluating the success of co-management. Many writers base their evaluation 
frameworks around a set of social and environmental outcomes, which is problematic as 
it assumes that each initiative has the same, or very similar, goals and objectives. This 
chapter presents the existing frameworks for understanding and evaluating co-
management, focusing on the process of co-management and how to define this process 
· in a way that allows for the identification and analysis of problems and strengths. 
"Process" is usually a category in co-management frameworks, but it is seldom 
precisely defined, and there are a variety of approaches in the literature when it comes 
to measuring or evaluating it. This is perhaps understandable in an area which attracts 
the attention of scholars from many disciplinary backgrounds, from business studies to 
political science and anthropology. This brings a richness and diversity to the writing on 
co-management, but also makes the literature somewhat incoherent. There are two 
broad ideas in co-management writing about what "process" is: some writers use the 
concept to encompass all the actions and interactions undertaken by participants 
towards the goal of managing the resource, in~luding the structural arrangements within 
which they-work. 1 Others contrast process and structure, separating the actions of 
participants, and linkages between them, from the formal structure of co-management. 
In the former group the ideas for what is important for the success of co-management 
.. 
are broad.and encompassing, but the lack of furthe~ definition about what constitutes 
'process' makes it a difficult concept to use for analysis. Alexander Conley and 
Margaret Moote, for example, provide this list of "process criter~a" for the purpose of 
evaluating co-management, which they derived from a survey of co-management 
literature in 2003: 
• Broadly shared vision 
• Clear, feasible goals 
1 Alexander Conley and Margaret A. Moote, "Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management," 
Society & Natural Resources 16, no. 5 (2003). Other writers also use the categories of "process" and 
"outcomes," for example: J. Innes and D. Booher, "Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems: 
A Framework for Evaluating Collaborative Planning," American Planning Association. Journal of the 
American Planning Association 65, no. 4 (1999); R.D. Margerum, "Integrated Environmental 
Management: The Foundations for Successful Practice," Envir'Onmental Management 24, no:. 2 (1999). 
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• Diverse, inclusive participation 
• Participation by local government 
• Linkages to individuals and groups beyond primary participants 
• Open, accessible, and transparent process 
• Clear, written plan 
• Consensus-based decision making 
• Decisions regarded as just 
• Consistent with existing laws and policies.2 
These criteria are diverse. Principles such as being "consistent with existing laws and 
policies" and having a "clear written plan" are to do with design and planning; criteria 
such as having a "broadly shared vision" and decisions being regarded as just, are about 
the attitudes of the people involved, and the relationships between them. This broadness 
makes their notion of "process" difficult to use as an analytical tool. 
Other writers contrast "process" with "structure," where process is the set of 
interactions taken towards managing the resource, and structure is merely the formal 
organization guiding these interactions. Lars Carlsson and Fikret Berkes emphasise the 
nature of co-management as a continuously evolving governance system, a network 
composed of a variety of actors. 3 They contrast this with the 'typical' definition of co-
management as a formal decision-1naking structure. They argue that this formal 
structure is just one of the elements of these interactions. Carlsson and Berkes offer 
ways to map those interactions, such as identifying the boundaries of the system, the 
management tasks the people who fulfil those tasks and the linkages between those 
people.4 
Though this idea of co-management as a set of tasks and interactions is richer and more 
encompassing than the previous conception of co-management as a structural 
arrangement, it still misses out on some important dimensions of these relationships. 
Carlsson and Berkes do not consider the different meanings the participants may have 
around what constitutes management Qf the resource, or the nature of their relationships 
with each other. The rest of this chapter describes a framework which does include 
these factors, and uses it to identify the key problems and strengths of relationships at 
Tongariro. 
2 Conley and Moote, "Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management," 376. . 3 Lars Carlsson and Fikret Berkes, "Co-management: Concepts and Methodological Implications," 
Journal of Environmental Management 75(2005) : 70. 
4 Carlsson and Berkes, "Co-management," 66-70. 
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Process subdivided - the four frames 
Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, two influential writers in management literature, have 
noted the diversity of interpretations about what management is. Bolman and Deal 
identified four predominant "frames" by which people approach the analysis of 
organisations, which reflect disciplinary differences and also represent different aspects 
of what an organisation is. This "frame" based approach is useful here for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is a way of dividing the broad notion of the co-management "process" into 
categories for analysis. Secondly it is a helpful means of sorting and reviewing the 
interdisciplinary literature around co-management. 
· The first of Bolman and Deal' s frames is a structural frame, which sees an organisation 
as akin to a machine, or a factory. In this approach formal roles and rules are 
emphasised. Bolman and Deal suggest this is an approach characteristic of sociology 
and economics. The second is a political frame, as described by political scientists, 
which conceptualises an organisation as a competitive arena or jungle, where people 
pursue their personal agendas and vie for scarce resources. The third is a cultural frame, 
in which an organisation is a theatre, temple or carnival, full of myths and rituals. 
Bolman and Deal argue that this is an anthropological approach. In this frame people 
are motivated by inspiration, rather tha~ self-interest. The last is a human resource 
frame, where an organisation is like a family, the domain of psychologists. People are 
seen to be chiefly motivated by various personal needs and desires. 5 
This framework-of-frames is useful because it is simple, ·comprehensive, and creates 
categories f9r analysis without sacrificing the richness that results from an 
interdisciplinary literature. Bolman and Deal make it clear that all these perspectives are 
. . ' 
valid and represent reali_ties of management: institutional rules; political manoeuvrings; 
meaning-making processes and individual personalities all operate simultaneously. The 
• 
frames are not a set of hard divis~ons between separate aspects of management, but a set 
of four overlapping spheres of activity. Bolm~n and Deal suggest that it is important to 
. . 
_ keep all these aspects of managem~nt in ~ind when facing difficult situations. 6 
Although the four frames are designed for understanding organisations, rather than 
wider management networks including other organisations and community groups, the 
categories are equally applicable to the more ~omplex management systems involved in 
~ . . . 
5 Lee Bolman and Terrence Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, 4th ed. 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2008), 15-22. 
6 Bolman and Deal, Reframing Organizations, 21-2. 
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co-management of natural resources. A similar set of categories were identified in 
Making Collaboration Work (2000), by Julia Wondolleck and Steven Y affee, who 
surveyed collaborative initiatives across the United States. They described the obstacles 
that face these collaborative efforts as follows: 
Problems result from the institutional structure within which 
collaboration takes place, the ways that individuals and groups think 
about collaboration and each other, and the manner in which 
collaborative processes have been managed. These obstacles affect the 
willingness and capacity of people in all sectors to participate in 
collaborative activities. Some are easy to deal with, while others are 
. intrinsically difficult. All combine to make collaboration challenging, but 
not impossible when individuals work hard at overcoming the obstacles.7 
The structural, symbolic and human resource frames can be recognised here; the 
political frame is not obvious in this quote but in other parts of their book issues relating 
to power struggles and group agendas are clearly identified. 8 Another broad review of 
the literature on collaborative initiatives, by Chris Ansell and Alison Gash of the 
University of California at Berkeley, also identified similar categories. 9 Writers such as 
these in the co-management literature provide son1e useful sub-categories within the 
four frames identified by Bolman and Deal, and I use their work to adapt the frames to a 
co-management context. 
Though Bolman and Deal essentially portray the four frames as having equal 
importance, the human resource frame, which I prefer to call the people frame, is a 
different kind of frame from the other three. Structures, politics and attitudes are all 
played out in the way people behave, and I therefore see the people frame as central ( see 
figure 2). 
7 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 51 . 
8 Ibid., 65-6 , 167, 203-6. 
9 Ansell and Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," 1. 
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Figure 2: The four frames, with the people frame as central. Adapted from Bolman and Deal.10 
It could be argued that there are important external factors that do not fit into the four 
frames, for example the economic climate, the geography of the area and the history of 
interaction between the key groups. These aspects of a collaborat1ve initiative are 
important to understand, and I do address them in this thesis. However, they are also to 
a large degree beyond the influence of those immediately involved in co-management. 
The advant~ge of this framework is its focus on the collaborative initiative itself, and 
the featll:res of it that might realistically be altered to create a better relationship. 
Bolman and Deal' s frames are also a helpful means of organising the interdisciplinary 
. ' 
literature pn co-management into categories for rev_iew. Many writers fall recognisably 
into certain frames. ·of the New Zealand writers reviewed in chapter one, Mark 
Prystupa' s account of the campaign for co-management at Te Waihora is a political tale 
of competing agendas. Ruru's analysis of the legal framework operating in parks is a 
structural approach. In other places· she writes of the differing values and perspectives in 
rela:tion to these plac~s, providing a cultural interpretation of the situation. 
These approaches can also be seen in the international literature on co-management. 
Environmental scientist Richard Petersen and others made it clear they w~re using "a 
cultural lens" to ex.plore the impacts of conservation -on human communities: • 
10 Bolman and Deal, Reframing Organizations, 15-22. 
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Viewing conservation through cultural lenses helps illumine the fact that 
to resolve such conflicts we need to reveal the value-based assumptions .. 
that underlie perceptions and uses of the natural world. A cultural lens 
can also help us better understand the historical and cultural context 
within which power, both political and economic, is differentially 
distributed among conservation actors. I I 
Proceeding from the assumption that all these frames are useful, and highlight different 
kinds of problems and strengths that can arise in management relationships, the 
following literature review addresses each in tum. I discuss the problems and strengths 
other writers have identified in co-management arrangements, and review Tongariro's 
case in light of the wider literature. 
1. The Structural Frame 
Bolman and Deal describe the structural frame as a way of looking at management that 
emphasises the laws, rules and policies governing people's actions. 12 They explain that 
to those working within the structural frame the goal of management is to align these 
structures with the environment in which the organisation operates. Structures shape 
how we act, especially by setting the limitations of action. They provide guarantees and 
boundary lines. Bolman and Deal' s description of structure corresponds to definitions of 
formal institutions. Institutions have popularly been defined as "established norms, 
rules, and practices that guide and constrain human behavior and action." 13 Formal 
institutions are codified rules such as laws and written contracts, whereas informal 
institutions are based on convention, such as practices, attitudes and beliefs. 14 This 
section looks at formal institutional factors. What are referred to as informal institutions 
are discussed in the section on the symbolic frame. 
The i1nportance of institutional design is well r~cognised in the literature on 
collaborative management; in fact, a focus of recent writing has been to emphasise that 
it is not the only factor in operation. The early literature on collaboration was strongly 
focused on institutional arrangements. This followed an artic_le by ·oarrett Hardin in 
1968, in which he argued that resources in collective use ( (?Onuhon-pool resources), 
would inevitably be depleted or destroyed without some form of coercive intervention 
11 R.B. Peterson et al. , "Seeing (and Doing) <:;.onservation through Cultural Lenses," Environmental 
Management 45 , no. 1 (2010), unpaginated. 
12 Bolman and Deal, Reframing Organizations, 18. 
. 13 C. Prell et al. , "Competing Structures, Competing Views: The Role of Formal and Informal Social 
Structures in Shaping Stakeholder Perceptions," Ecology & Society 15, no. 4 (2010): unpaginated. 14 Ibid. 
64 
' 
to limit their use, such as privatisation or state regulation. 15 Hardin referred to national 
parks as one example: 
The National Parks present another instance of the working out of the 
tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, without limit. 
The parks themselves are limited in extent - there is only one Yosemite 
Valley - whereas population seems to grow without limit. The values that 
visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease 
to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone. 16 
This "tragedy of the commons" theory was influential in academia and policy, and 
provoked an entire literature on the management of the commons. Criticisms of 
Hardin's work point out his confusion of the legal concepts of 'res nullius' (unowned 
. resources) and 'res communes' (resources owned in common). Unowned resources are 
literally a free-for-all, but common pool resources usually have rules ofuse. 17 Other 
criticisms centre on Hardin's assumption that the solution to the tragedy of the 
commons is centralised control. 
Elinor Ostrom, in her book Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action, published in 1990, challenged Hardin's argument that centralised 
regulation was the best way of avoiding the loss of the commons. Ostrom contended 
that resource users themselves can, and do, organise co-operatively to manage common-
pool resources. 18 Ostrom outlined eight key features of institutional design, the 
implementation of which increase the likelihood of success, defined as the sustainability 
of resource·s and the sustainability of co-operative structures. 19 Her eight design 
principles are as follows: 
1. Boundaries of both the resource and the user/manager group need to be clearly 
detined; 
2. Rules of use and of maintenance· need to suit local conditions; 
3. All ·affected individuals should be involved in collective decision-making over 
those rules; 
4. Users or their delegates should be in charge of monitoring compliance; 
5. Sanctions should vary according to the severity of the rule-breaking; 
15 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968). 
16 Ibid. , 1244. 
17 S .V. Ciriacy-W antrup and Richard C. Bishop, "' Common Property' as a Concept in Natural Resources 
Policy," Natural Resol,frces Journal 15, (1975): 715, 716-} 21. . 
18 Elinor Ostrom; Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), xiv, 20-1 , 90. 
19
.Ibid. , see pxiv, pp20-21. 
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6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms should be cheap and readily-accessible; 
7. Rights of local us.ers to run these institutions need to be recognised at higher 
levels, and 
8. Large common-pool resources need to be run through a system of nested 
institutions at multiple levels.20 
These design principles are a comprehensive set of formal institutional success factors. 
Recent co-management literature has emphasised that formal structures are only one 
aspect of the ongoing negotiation process that more widely constitutes co-management, 
but the need for institutions that support this process is still recognised. 21 Ostrom and 
the followers of "new institutionalism" are prevalent in the co-management literature. 
Another key figure in the literature on collaboration is Sherry Arnstein, who published a 
famous article on the "ladder of participation" in 1969. Arnstein's ladder climbs from 
sham-participation at the lowest rung, where, although there may be meetings, citizen 
views are completely disregarded, to full citizen control at the highest, eighth step (see 
figure 3). 
20 Ibid. , pp90-102. 
2 1 For example: J. Altman and M. Cochrane, "Sustainable Development in the Indigenous-Owned 
Savanna: Innovative Institutional Design for Cooperative Wildlife Management/ Wildlife Research. 32, 
no. 5 (2005) . 
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-8. Citizen control (all power delegated) 
i J)elegatedpower (m ost power delegated) 
6. P artnership (sharedp ower) 
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-·· 
4.Co11s1tltation (inviting opinion) 
3 . Informing (one-way communication) 
-
2 . Therapy (trying to achie-vebuy .. in) 
1. ?v:Cauipulation (lip service) 
> 
-
Figure 3: Arnstein's Ladder of Participation.22 
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Arnstein's categories were intended to represent the real levels of influence community 
members haye in decisions, rather than particular structures for involvement. For 
example, in her exposition of the meanings of 'manipulation' she explained this 
. ' 
category could range from invitation to public meetings to a seat on a decision-making 
board, but ~hichever arrangement it was would be an entirely empty gesture, designed 
to create a_ fac;ade of involvement while in reality allowing members of the public no 
sway over decisions at all. 23 Many adaptations of the ladder characterise the rungs as 
structures, however. Jacinta Ruru, a New' Zealand legal academic, used an adaptation of 
Arnstein' s ladder originally designed by Tania Ruru in her master's thesis in law. Her 
adaptation translates Arnstein' s rungs into a New Zealand context, showing potential 
organisational structures for Maori involvement in national p3:rk management: 
' . . 22 The short descriptio~ in brackets are my own additions based on Amstein' s explications of each level 
of participation. Amstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," 217-23. · 
23 · Ibid. , 218. 
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Level One: General interest Group only 
Level Two: Special Interest Group 
Level Three: Discretionary Consultation/ Consideration 
Level Four: Mandatory Consultation/Consideration 
Level Five: One Maori Vote 
Level Six: Fifty Percent Representation 
Level Seven: Equal Status to national park management bodies 
Level Eight: Maori Veto subject to Judicial Review 
Level Nine: Maori Veto subject to Maori Review .24 
Jacinta Ruru used this scale to assess the legislative provisions for Maori involvement in 
national park management and found them inadequate. She identified the current 
legislative provisions system as falling short of level six, the best provisions for tino 
rangatiratanga in conservation management being the two seat Maori representation on 
the New Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), and on conservation boards whose 
jurisdictions fall entirely within the Ngai Tahu (a South Island iwi who have settled 
their major Treaty claim with the Crown).25 Ruru argued, however, that in order to meet 
Treaty obligations representation should be at Level Seven.26 This is a stage further than 
the structure of co-management prevalent in Australia and Canada, for example, which 
involves a singular board, half or more of the members of which are indigenous. 
Consultation has been criticised by many in the co-management literature as being a 
token form of involvement, which does not provide any guarantee that the opinions of 
those consulted will be incorporated into decisions. Amstein wrote this about 
consultation: 
Inviting citizens' opinions, like informing them, can be a legitimate step 
toward their full participation. But if consulting them is not combined 
with other modes of participation, this rung of the ladder is still a sham 
since it offers no assurance that citizen concerns and ideas will be taken 
· 27 into account. 
Many writers argue that when decision-making power rests firmly in the hands of one 
party, as it does at Tongariro, there is bound to be conflict. Barbara Gray, author of an 
24 This is a summary of the descriptions provided in Jacinta Ruru, ''.Legislative Provision for Tino 
Rangatiratanga," 325-6. 
25 Ibid. , 331. 
26 Ibid. , 333 . 
27 Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," 219. 
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influential early book on collaborative management, claimed that successful 
collaboration is unlikely in situations where one stakeholder can take unilateral action. 28 
Ansell and Gash explicitly excluded consultative frameworks from their survey of 
collaborative initiatives because they did not see consultation as a collective decision-
making process allowing for deliberation between the parties involved. 29 Wondolleck 
and Y affee argue that consultation is a poor decision-making framework for resolving 
management conflicts for the following reasons: 
... administrative decision making has taken the form of a top-down 
paternalistic process in which agencies listen to public concerns and 
generate decisions based on their sense of science and public interest. 
That model of decision making leaves little room for collaboration. The 
incentives it creates push groups to accentuate their differences rather 
than searching for common ground. It provides few opportunities for 
exploring-common interests or creative solutions.30 
A staff member of the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy office wrote a sabbatical report on 
co-management in New Zealand, Australia and Canada and observed: 
Iwi would like to have a stronger partnership with DoC. Ngati 
Tuwharetoa, Ngati Rangi and other iwi would consider joint management 
of the Tongariro National Park as part of the journey towards sole 
management. A place on the Conservation Board is not enough, as it does 
not reflect true partnership in their view. 31 ~ 
The claimant submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal advocated for new institutional 
structures. The closing submissions for Tuwharetoa argued that the iwi' s "ultimate 
right" was to share the governance and management responsibilities for the park. They 
describe9 the Te Heuheu seat on the Conservation Board as "a single honorary chair on 
a board with little input into the running of the Park," and said this was inadequate. 32 A 
. 
member ofNgati Rangi involved in the Karioi Rahui project said in his submission that: 
We want-all consultative pr9cesses with DOC to be the same as what they 
·are in the Karioi Rahui. We want to be part of the decision-making 
process at the ground floor. Local DOC management had _difficulty 
meeting our desire to have full active management once outside the 
Karioi Rahui project perimeters, and National DOC-staff would always 
be evasive whenever we· pushed· for greater participation. Often we were 
told that the Crown Law Office would_ not accept our proposals for 
greater participation. What we have with DOC at the moment is a 
28 Barbara Gray, Collaborating: Finding Common Ground fo r Multiparty Problems (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 1989), 255. 
29 Ansell and Gash, fl CqUaborative Governance in Theory .and Practice, fl 4. 
30 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 52. 
31 Etheridge, ''. Co-management," 31. 
32 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 8.129, 203. 
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relationship rather than a partnership, where DOC and the Crown still 
exercise absolute control. 33 
DOC does not have the ability to establish joint management boards over national 
parks, as the Conservator, Paul Green, explained in the inquiry: 
KF: ... what the Trust Board was seeking [in their 2003 submission 
regarding the then draft National Park Management Plan] was the 
creation of a joint management board between DoC and tangata whenua 
so that the park could be jointly managed in "a manner consistent with 
the ethos of the gift of Te Heuheu Tukino IV." Where did that idea of a 
joint management board get to? 
PG: The joint management board was not adopted, the principle was not 
adopted I guess because of it being in conflict with the legislation ... 34 
Green was not specific about which part of the legislation a joint management board 
would contravene. The Act does state that: 
The Department shall [subject to the legislation, general policy, 
conservation management strategy, and national park management plan] 
administer and manage all national parks in such a manner as to secure to 
the public the fullest proper use and enjoyment of the parks consistent 
with the preservation of their natural and historic features and the 
protection and wellbeing of their native plants and animals. 35 
The Act allows the Director-General to delegate powers, but only to DOC officers. 36 
The joint management arrangementsJhat currently exist over substantial areas of the 
conservation estate have been established by statute as part of settlement claims. 
Legal and departmental rules as to how relationships with community groups should be 
structured can be obstacles to productive relationships. Many writers note the 
importance of flexibility and a willingness and ability to innovate in collaboration. 37 A 
flexible approach to management allows for different interests to be accommodated and 
special exceptions to be made. The topic of relationship flexibility was raised in the 
National Park inquiry. Some claimants criticised the new system of standardising 
relationship agreements across New Zealand through the Crown Maori Relationship 
Instrument process. 
33 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, Wai 1130, #A64, February 10, 2006, paragraph 55 , 11. 
34 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, Wai 113.0, #4.1.12, (Ohakune RSA Working Men's Club, 
Ohakune, 27-30 November to 1 December 2006), 460. 
35 National Parks Act 1980, section 43. .· 
36 National Parks Act 1980, section 42(1) - (7). 
37 For example Vivianne Weitzner, "Strengthening Collaborative Management of Protected Areas: 
Learning from the Field," (Learning from Cooperative Managemen t, Haines Junction, Yukon April 24-
26, 2007) ; Innes and Booher, "Consensus Building and Complex Adaptive Systems," 419. Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 53-6, 87-98 . · 
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In 2004, Cabinet, the key decision-making body in the New Zealand government, issued 
a directive that the various agreements that Crown agencies were entering into with 
"Maori collectives" needed greater standardisation. In 2006 Te Puni Kokiri published a 
set of guidelines on 'Crown Maori Relationship Instruments' (CMRI), a collective label 
for Memoranda of Understanding and other formal protocols designed to guide 
relationships between government agencies and Maori. Since then such agreements 
have become subject to another layer of bureaucracy. When a government body and a 
Maori group wish to enter into a CMRI their draft agreement must go by the Chief 
Legal Officer of DOC and then be reviewed by the CMRI officials' group, made up of 
members of Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of Justice. The stated purposes of this 
· system are to increase the consistency of the agreements, to raise interdepartmental 
awareness of the models in operation, and to assist their design and development. 38 This 
process seems to have the, perhaps inadvertent, side effect of making it more difficult 
for locals to author their own agreements. 
The signing of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in the Tongariro-Taupe 
Conservancy tailed off in the years immediately preceding the claim, and in the course 
of the claim there were s,everal different explanations provided about the reasons for 
this. The Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, when questioned by Mark McGhie, the, lawyer 
for U enuku (a Whanganui group), said that his recent reticence about entering into 
MOUs was due to the changes to the draft agreements that were likely to ensue from the 
CMRI process: 
MM: Are you in favour o_f signing Mo Us with local tangata whenua? 
PG: MoUs are very useful for establishing the framework of your 
relationship ... They do take a large amount of time to negotiate. My 
experience is that words are very important-to all parties and so my 
reluctance that has been expressed somewhere in the evidence to proceed 
•with an MoU was flagging to the tangata whenua that ... I didn't have the 
authority to sign it as it was at that time without it going through a 
process which was highly likely to change the actual wording ... So that's 
what my advice was at that time. Was. it a good use of people's time 
when what was going t6 c·ome back was probably looking a little bit 
different to what they actually wanted.39 
Doris Johnston, the DOC policy manager at the time of the inquiry, was al~o questioned 
about M10Us, and she suggested that the amount of time involved in the approval 
' . 38 T,e Puni Kokiri:,- Cro~n-Maori Relationship Instrwnents: Guidelines and Advice for Government and 
S'.tate Sector Agencies~-(Wellington: Te Puni Kokiri, 2006), 4. 
39 
·Draft T~anscript of National Park Hearing 8, #4 .1.12, 4 72. 
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process for written agreements might favour proceeding with informal arrangements.40 
Tom Bennion, chief counsel for the claimants, pointed out that the Conservator 'had 
substantial licence to make independent decisions on other issues in his conservancy, 
sometimes involving large amounts of money, and raised the question as to why, in 
comparison, there was such a cautious approach to a mere MOU with a local Maori 
group. Johnston responded that the requirement was in order to ensure fairness of these 
agreements across the country.41 
Several claimants argued that the reluctance of DOC to enter into MOUs was more 
political than procedural, and more expedient than generous: 
We were entering into a relationship based upon a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Whanganui Conservancy and wanted something 
similar to happen [in the Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy]. 
Paul Green told us that it was impossible. Apparently, the political 
climate was not right. He informed us that no Memorandums of 
Understanding were to be entered into. This was like a kick in the teeth to 
42 
us. 
Another claimant argued that the fear of precedent-setting was at the heart of the 
involvement of National Office in vetting these local agreements: 
There is a willingness to make things work on the ground and to come up 
with workable solutions between Ngati Rangi and local DOC staff. 
However, as soon as those solutions get back to the Crown in Wellington, 
any proposaVsolution gets quashed for fear of creating a precedent.43 . 
Whether the CMRI process represents a well- or ill-intentioned approach to partnerships 
is a moot point, but in practice it seems to be making it difficult for those at the local 
level to manage their own relationships. 
Resourcing of relationships was another key issue raised in the inquiry. The amount of 
funding and support given to co-management arrangements can, to an extent, be seen as 
indicative of the level of commitment of governments to their policies in this area. 
Resourcing is recognised throughout the co-management literature as a key factor in 
achieving success. Wondolleck and Y affee noted that a lack of resources, in the form of 
time, money, or personnel, was the most frequently cited source of difficulty in 
collaboration in their survey of collaborative management arrangements in the United 
40 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing· 8, #4 .1.12, 409 . 
41 Ibid. 
42 Brief of evidence of Rangi Bristol, #D40, paragraph 14, 5-6. The same situation was also described in 
Brief of Evidence of Raymond Kairimu Rapana, Wai 1130, #D44, May 5, 2006. 
43 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 55, 11. 
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States.44 Paul Green estimated that thirty per cent more funding than the level being 
allocated to the conservancy at the time of the claim would be required to properly 
honour Maori participation. 45 
Wondolleck and Y affee also note that a lack of official resourcing makes it especially 
hard for poorly-financed groups to participate.46 This is a problem in New Zealand, 
where many iwi and hapu are under-resourced, and face demand for their opinions from 
many different local and central government agencies. It can be very difficult to find the 
time and personnel to read and respond to the many requests for feedback they receive. 
DOC funding policy does not allow for those consulted by DOC to be compensated for 
their time.47 In an interview the Conservator emphasised the necessity of increased 
funding in order for relationships to be successful: 
I have always maintained that any form of active co-management will 
take massive resources. And I don't say that in a negative way, because it 
could be really positive. But it could be anywhere between a 30% and a 
50% increase. And those costs are as valid as pest control or track 
maintenance. But it's a reality. And my worry is, my real worry.is that 
those things won't be recognised iri the outcomes [of the Tribunal claim]. 
And we will disappoint Maori and the New Zealand public by not being 
able to do what they want us to. If we're not given extra funding to do it 
we'll have to take money from other buqgets, and we'll be _criticised by 
the rest of New Zealanders. Because it's one thing to provide funding for 
redress, which has traditionally been the focus. It's far more complicated 
working out the ongoing funding requirements. And the same concern is 
reflected on iwi - I would really like that mentioned - there is concern 
. that both parties will have resources to carry on the relationships required 
and desired. 48 
The issue of funding is a perennial one for DOC, which has had its four-year budget cut 
by $58 million in 2009.49 Jobs have been cut since then and DOC has instructions from 
its minister to search for sponsorship from businesses to support its work. 50 It is difficult 
. . 
to imagine the Government being forthcoming with extra funding for DOC' s 
. . 
relationships with Maori in the near future. 
·· 
44 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 56-7. 
45 Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, in interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
46 W ondoHeck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 57. · 
47 Interview with.Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 2008. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Michelle Duff, "DOC head reassures on role of big business," December 10, 2010. 
http://www.stuff.co.~national/politics/4442580/DOC-head-reassures-on-role-of-big-business, accessed 
December 10, 2010. 
50 
"DOC cuts 100 office-based jobs" New Zealand Herald, June 24, 2011. 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=l&objecti'd=10734_218, accessed !une 2fl-, 2011. 
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In summary, there are serious problems with the current structural arrangements for 
relationships at Tongariro. Consultation as a framework does not meet Maori 
expectations for their relationship with DOC, and the making of new project-based 
partnerships is being obstructed by the CMRI process. According to some claimant 
submissions, local DOC staff are willing to enter into shared management agreements 
but are unable to act on their willingness, due to restrictions placed on their decision-
making at higher levels. The funding available for both parties to .participate in 
collaboration ( and even consultation) is insufficient. The root causes of these issues go 
back to the different perspectives on the purposes of the relationship. Maori, who see 
their involvement as a right due to them, and as a way of adding value to park 
management, expect to have their opinions valued and their time compensated. Policy 
makers at DOC, who fundamentally sees Maori involvement as a subcategory of 
community involvement, think that offering Maori the opportunity to have their 
opinions heard is an adequate form of participation. Local DOC staff seem to be more 
open to fuller power-sharing, but are unable to initiate new relationship structures. 
2. The Political Frame 
Bolman and Deal describe the political frame as one in which: 
[p ]arochial interests compete for power and scarce resources .... 
Bargaining, negotiation, coercion, and compromise are a normal part of 
everyday life. Coalitions form around specific interests and change as 
issues come and go. Problems arise when power is concentrated in the 
wrong places or is so broadly dispersed that nothing gets done. Solutions 
arise from political skill and acumen. 51 
The relevant kind of power in the context of park management can be separated into 
two kinds: the power to make decisions and the power to influence those making 
decisions. The degree of real power sharing in decision-making often surfaces as a~ 
issue in the co-management literature. 52 Political scientists Arun Agrawal and Clark 
Gibson have indicated three important political processes to examine in this regard: 
firstly how rule-making for resource use and conservation is negotiated, secondly how 
those rules are implemented, and lastly how disputes are resolved. 53 
51 Bolman and Deal, Reframing Organizations, 16. 
52 See for example Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson, "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of 
Community in Natural Resource Conservation," World Development 27, no. 4 (1999): 638 ; Stan Stevens, 
"Lessons and Directions" in ed. Stan Stevens, Conservation Through Cultural Survival, 277. 
53 Agrawal and Gibson, "Enchantment and Disenchantment," 638. 
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In New Zealand all these processes are fully controlled by the government agency. 
Maori must be consulted in the process of composing statutory policy documents, and 
in the implementation of rules that are considered to particularly affect them, but have 
no veto or final decision-making power. Their only recourse in the event that a dispute 
cannot be-resolved informally, is to go completely outside the park management process 
to the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal. The article written on New Zealand co-
management by Todd Taiepa and others identified unwillingness on the part of 
government agencies to share power with Maori, and argued this was holding back true 
co-management in New Zealand. 54 In submissions and interviews, several claimants 
argued that such unwillingness exists, but is located at departmental headquarters, rather 
· than at the conservancy level. 55 Other claimants were critical of local management, 
however. Some submissions, particularly from groups that do not have well-established 
relationships with DOC, argued that local DOC staff deliberately avoided working with 
their particular group. 56 
While Maori have no power to make or to veto decisions, they have several channels of 
power in terms of influencing those decisions, and they tend to make good use of these. 
They have some degree of persuasive power, as it is clear that DOC has interests in 
maintaining a good relationship with Maori. Maori also have the option of legal action, 
through the courts or the W aitangi Tribunal, if they feel that DOC has not honoured its 
legislative duty to give effect to the Treaty of Waitangi, although this option is lengthy 
and expensive. At time.s certain Maori groups and individuals have also had high level 
political connections which have made local relationships less important: 
, PG: Recognition of iwi changes from one government to another, too. At 
the moment for example, iwi think government listens to them very 
. closely, especially the deputy prime minister. 
KM: And in terms of the way that's affecting relationships ... ? 
· PG: Well, at times like this there's not much point getting -involved in 
local management. 
KM: Because it's all happening at a higher level? 
54 Taiepa et al. , "Co-Management ofNew Zealand's Conservation Estate by Maori and Pakeha: A 
Review," 240. _ , 
55 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 55, 11. 
56 For example Brief of Evidence ofRangi Bristol, #D40; Closing submissions of Tamahaki , Wai 1130, 
#3.3.19, May 14, 2007, paragraph 33 , 83. 
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PG: Yes, they can go straight to the deputy prime minister.57 
In certain places and cases Maori have property rights that can be used as leverage. 
There is an ongoing dispute over guiding on the Tongariro Alpine Crossing, where 
tangata whenua want a much greater role in guiding and in the assessment of concession 
applications. 58 A small part of the track crosses the Ketetahi block, a roughly thirty-nine 
hectare piece of land which is owned by a Maori Trust Board, the Ketetahi Trust. 59 As 
the Trust could potentially close access to the section of the track-that crosses their land 
there have been extensive negotiations between the Conservancy and the Ketetahi Trust. 
DOC also has the option of redirecting the track to go around the Ketetahi block, and 
both parties have interests in remaining in a good relationship. It is a complex political 
situation, and a good example of the various different means of leveraging power to 
which parties have access beyond the direct lines of authority. 
The internal politics of both the conservation agencies and the indigenous groups can 
affect their relationship and ability to work together. The internal politics of DOC is 
sometimes complicated. DOC has a highly divisionalised structure, with each 
conservator having considerable discretion over issues within their conservancy, and 
there can be tensions between local staff and staff at the Wellington headquarters over 
who is better-placed to make particular decisions. I was present at a Waitangi Tribunal 
hearing for the Flora and Fauna claim during which one DOC Conservator described his 
conservancy's practices of avoiding interference from headquarters as "govemment-
proofing. "60 
Several writers have e1nphasised the importance of understanding the micro-politics that 
goes on within the often simplistic idea of the "community." 
The way that stakeholders are identified and represented in management 
regimes is crucial to ensure local participation. One set of issues revolves 
around how representatives for co-management bodies are selected from 
within community-based groups, whether a range of local viewpoints 
57 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, July 22 , 2008. The Deputy Prime Minister at that time 
was the Labour Party' s Michael Cullen. 
58 Brief of Evidence ofTyronne Smith, #G24, paragraphs 40-7, 12-5 ; Paul Blaschke and Pauline Whitney, 
"Establishing Integrative Use Limits on the Tongariro Crossing, Tongariro National Park. Final 
Report.,"(2007) , vi, 23-4, 35, 39 , 
http ://www. tba. co .nz/kete/ case_ studies/pdf/tongariro _ crossing_ case_ study. pdf. 
59 The Ketetahi Block and the Tongariro Alpine Crossing are both marked on Appendix C: Map of 
Tongariro. 
6° Crown hearings for the Flora and Fauna inquiry, Waitangi Tribunal Unit, Wellington, December 2006. 
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based on differences of resource use arising from gender, class, caste, or 
other differences is taken into account. 61 
Brosius, Tsing and Zerner ask whether granting collective rights to groups which may 
have relatively powerless sub-groups within them, such as women, or the poor, might 
have negc1tive effects. 62 
Which groups, and which members of those groups, should be engaged with can be 
difficult to know. Coombes and Hill stress this difficulty and the conflicts that can ensue 
from the process of choosing co-management partners. A proposal to establish 
collaborative management of a small area within Te Urewera National Park foundered 
on this particular problem: 
Inter- and intratribal competition for the right to be a comanagement 
partner led to fears of conflict, stimulating withdrawal of all parties .... 
All accepted that it was inappropriate for DoC to choose its 
comanagement partner and, if iwi could not settle the matter internally, 
that abandonment of the formal agreement was preferable to public 
struggles for authority. 63 
Questions of whether consultation is being conducted at the right level, with people who 
have the political mandate, and with all the relevant groups, are difficult for DOC to 
answer. As in the example of Te Urewera above, the common consensus is that it.is not 
appropriate for DOC to adjudicate matt~rs of internal Maori governance. Agreements 
made with the wrong, or too few parties, however, are likely to run into problems, so 
these questions are also hard for DOC to ignore. The suggestion made by Coombes and 
Hill, to leave agreements unwritten a~d open, may in some cases be a practical solution, 
although 'it does little to unsettle th~ t:xisting power imbalances within the communities. 
Knowing something of the internal politics of communities assists in creating fair and 
. 
functioning co-management arrangements. 
Another key influence is the politics happening outside the process of collaboration. 
Groups and individuals may be pursuing agendas outside the collaboration which affect 
the relationships inside it. This is certainly true. in Tongariro, where the National Park 
' ' 
inquiry al)d other Treaty claims and negotiations take up a lot of the Trust Board's time. 
61 Castro and Nieisen, "Indigenous People and Co-Management: Implications for Conflict Management," 
236. See also Agrawal and Gibson, "Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in 
Natural Resource Conservation." 63 6-7. 
62 J. Peter Brosius, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, and Charles Zemer., "Representing Communities,: Histories 
- ' 
and Politics of Community-Based Natural Resource Management," Society & Natural Resources 11, no. 
2 (1998): 165 .. 
63 · Coombes and Hill, ""Na Whenua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C. Te Partner"," 144-46. 
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Te Puni Kokiri, in their reviews of DOC's relationship with Maori, noted that claims 
had a strong effect on relationships: 
Most iwi and hapu are involved with Treaty claims processes which 
include sections of the public conservation estate. It is very difficult for 
them to separate those claims from overall issues associated with the 
Department ' s management of the public conservation estate. 64 
This observation was repeated in the follow-up review in 2002.65 As already mentioned, 
Maori authorities are often busy fielding multiple demands from agencies for their 
input, as well as their core business of fostering tribal development. DOC also has other 
interests to pursue; its mandate includes conservation work across the conservancy, 
advocacy efforts, co1nmunication and interpretive roles, fundraising and negotiating 
with various other groups which have interests in the area. 
In surmnary, the political power balance at Tongariro is firmly in favour of DOC. 
Maori, however, have a history of using the available points of leverage to good effect. 
While this is obviously not an ideal situation, perhaps for either party, Maori political 
skill has achieved several gains for them, albeit srnall and incremental ones. Particularly 
since 1987, the efforts of local Maori to make the government listen to their concerns 
allowed some sophisticated local relationships to grow where relationships had 
originally been conflicted. This history will be detailed in chapters five, six, and 
particularly chapter seven. 
3. The Symbolic Frame 
Bolman and Deal describe the symbolic frame as one in which the making of meaning 
is the central focus. 66 
It abandons assumptions of rationality-prominent in other frames and 
depicts organizations as cultures, propelled by rituals, ceremonies, 
stories, heroes, and myths rather than rules, policies, and managerial 
authority. 67 
Beliefs and attitudes underlie concepts of environmental degradation, good 
management, and the relative value of resources. This is recognised in the co-
management literature: 
The ideas, ideologies, and beliefs brought to bear on problem definition 
by different stakeholders can substantially influence problem perception. 
64 Te Puni Ko.kiri, Key Stakeholder Interviews, 11. 
65 Te Puni Ko.kiri, Follow up Review, 11. 
66 Bolman and Deal, Refi-aming Organizations, 253 . 
67 Ibid., 16. 
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Religious beliefs and moral conviction can be important in structuring 
understanding, both among local people and scientists. Ideas derive 
legitimacy from received wisdom about theory ... and from ideas outside 
formal science, including informal or "folk" knowledge. Policy narratives 
or story lines can exert a powerful influence on official decisionmakers' 
perceptions of resource management problems. 68 
Beliefs and attitudes also affect how each party views and relates to the other, 
particularly their knowledge and interpretation of their shared history. The National 
Park inquiry has brought this history and these interpretations to the forefront. An 
inquiry is a kind of contest of meaning, each side trying to present a winning narrative 
to the Tribunal members. In chapters four to seven I discuss this process in detail. In 
this section I describe some of the key features of DOC and Maori beliefs and attitudes 
regarding the park and each other. This section has two parts. In the first I address the 
attitudes that DOC and Maori have towards the land and its management, and in the 
second I look at the parties' attitudes towards each other. 
Mountains and Management 
The attachment people have to land is full of myths and symbolic meanings. As 
environmental historian Eric Pawson puts it: 
... mountains are not neutral landscapes but features of tne environmen~ 
employed to various social ends. They are, in other words, charged with 
meanings, even if to Pakeha these meanings have tended to be more 
detached than for Maori. 69 
Both Pawson and Jacinta Ruru say that the Pakeha relationship with mountains has 
evolved from fearfulness to an appreciation of their beauty and intrinsic value.70 Ruru 
describes the Maori connection to mountains thus: 
The environmental ethic [ of kaitiakitanga] has ensured that Maori interact 
and care for mountains and resources found on mountain slopes as taonga 
(treasures). It is an ethic that embodies the historical, spiritual and 
culturfil association with land. Through oral tradition and practical 
observation, this knowledge is passed on to the next generation. These 
practices are absolutely vital for Maori well-being and cultural survival. 71 
In the National Park inquiry many claimants described their deep connection to the 
mountains, and accused the Crown of past ,and continuing mismanagement of the park. 
The lawyer-led closing _submissions for Ngati Tuwharetoa contended that the values of 
68 W.M. Adams et al., "Managing Tragedies: Understanding Conflict over Common Pool Resources," 
Science 302, no. 5652 (2003): 1915. .. 
69 Eric Pawson, "The Meanings of Mountains," in Environmental Histories of New Zealand, ed. Tom 
Brooking and Eric Pawson (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), 150. · 
70 Pawson, "The Meanings of Mountains," 136-8; Rum, "Indigenous Management of Mountains," 116-7. 
· 
71 Rum, "Indigenous Management of Mountains," 116. 
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N gati Tuwharetoa and the Crown with respect to the environment were so different as to 
be irreconcilable: 
These submissions ask the Tribunal to accept a straightforward 
proposition: given the dichotomy between the cultures, it is conceptually 
impossible to reconcile the Crown's aspirations for the Tongariro 
National Park with Ngati Tuwharetoa' s tikanga and values. It is 
misconceived, therefore, for the Crown to submit that there was 
congruence between Te Heuheu 's objective to protect the tapu nature of 
the Peaks, and the Crown's objective to preserve the special character of 
the mountains for all time for the nation.72 In both practice and theory, the 
objectives were fundamentally at odds then and remain so now.73 . 
Despite this strong statement of the differences between government and Maori values 
in relation to the environment, the Tuwharetoa closing submissions do allow for the 
possibility of working together through these differences, specifically requesting a co-
manage1nent model for such a relationship.: 
In seeking co-management that will enable the mountains to be managed 
in accordance with the values of tangata whenua, Ngati Tuwharetoa 
acknowledge that much water has passed under the bridge since 18 8 7. It 
is recognised that it is not going to be possible to return the mountains to 
their pristine untouched state. That does not mean, however, that the 
status quo should prevail. These are complex issues that need to be 
worked through within Ngati Tuwharetoa, as well as without - with Ngati 
Rangi and the other iwi and hapu that whakapapa [trace descent] to the 
mountains, and finally with the Crown.74 
The Crown closing submissions contended that DOC and Maori had many values in 
common, and a proven abil1ty to work through differences. 75 In an interview, the then 
Conservator, Paul Green, said that of all the people the local conservancy worked with, 
they shared more views with tangata whenua than any other group. 76 This was true of 
the multi-party negotiations over the managetnent of a looming lahar threat (a lahar is a 
destructive mudslide from a crater lake) on Ruapehu from 1995-2007, where Maori and 
DOC were united against the opinion of many other parties involved. 77 
DOC runs a course for new staff that -aims to teach them more about Maori 
perspectives. The course is called the Piikenga Atawhai, and is_ run by the Pou Kura 
Taiao. It lasts a week, and is hosted by different hapu at different mar3:e across the 
. 
country, so that DOC staff are able to learn, directly from the tangata whenua, some of 
72 Crown Opening Submissions, #3.3.17, paragraph 36 : 
73 Closing submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43 paragraph 8.9, 166. Tikanga literally means 
' rightness,' and is often translated as customs, rules, or protocol. 
74 Ibid., paragraph 8.131 , 204. 
75 Closing Submissions of the Crown, "Chapter Nine: Park Management," paragraph 106, 30. 
76 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
77 This negotiation is detailed in chapter seven. 
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their particular perspectives, as well as the general course content delivered by the Pou 
Kura Taiao. The group stays and sleeps on the marae, and attends classes during the 
day. The content covers practical questions of how to properly behave at marae, and 
how Maori authorities operate, as well as more philosophical and historical issues 
regarding cultural worldviews and interpretation of the Treaty. 
A DOC staff member at the Wellington Conservancy had this to say about his 
experience at a Pukenga Atawhai in 2009: 
We left with our brains bursting with both fresh and ancient information, 
and also with the knowledge that probably, we would soon be putting this 
new information to use in each of our roles. Since treaty settlements 
began, we've had more and more to do with Maori, and if you look 
across the Department, we probably interact on a near-daily basis. Most 
of our core business at DOC will involve Maori at some time, and Te 
Pukenga Atawhai goes a long way towards the strong relationships we 
now enjoy with iwi right across Aotearoa.78 
This was written as a piece for DOC's blog, so there is reason for the review to be 
glowing, but, having attended a Pukenga Atawhai course myself during my fieldwork 
period in 2007 I can provide a more disinterested second opinion that it is a unique 
experience. One of the Conservation Board members I interviewed also specifically 
mentioned the Pukenga Atawhai and how enjoyable it was. 79 --
The Pukenga Atawhai is perhaps a cause, but is certainly an effect, of a strong 
commitment on the part of DOC to understand and incorporate Maori environmental 
perspectives. How well they achieve this is a different question, and how well Maori 
perspectives can be e111:braced when power-sharing with Maori is not, is another. Some 
of the claimants who had close contact with DOC gave them limited credit for these 
efforts: 
Although I acknowledge that the Department is the foremost Crown 
Agency in learning/teaching its staff Maori values and philosophy, the 
gap [between DOC apd Maori interpretations of section 4 of the 
Conservation Act] still exists. 80 
Although there are differences bet\Yeen the way Maori relate to the land, and how they 
wish it to be managed, and the attitudes and opinions of DOC staff, it is difficult to 
generalise upon them. For example, some Maori object to the use of 108-0 poison for 
78 Sam O'Leary, "Marae Life: Education by Immersi~n," November 5, 2009. 
http:l/blog.doc.govt.hz/2009/11/05/marae-life-education-by-immersion/. 
79 Interview with Conservation Board Member 4, March 2007. 
·
80 Brief of Evidence ofTyronne Smith, #G24, paragraph 20,. 9 
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pest control, but others support its use, and there are also many Pakeha who object to 
the use of the poison. 81 Some Maori object to the ski fields on the mountains, others 
accept them, and even ski on them. 82 DOC staff do not speak with one voice either, and 
some are more sympathetic than others to Maori interests. Importantly, there is a long 
history of living and working alongside each other, and a track record of reaching 
compromise. 
Attitudes towards each other 
The attitudes of DOC regarding Maori and Maori regarding DOC are coloured by the 
history of colonisation, and each party's knowledge and interpretation of that history. I 
discuss this in detail in the historical chapters of my thesis, but address some broad 
issues here. Wondolleck and Y affee identify that "attitudes and perceptions" create 
obstacles to successful collaboration. They argue that the baggage people carry from 
past experiences, and the often unsubstantiated presumptions they hold about each 
other, must be dealt with before effective co-management can occur. 83 Fisher and Ury, 
on the other hand, have argued that trust is not a necessary condition of successful 
negotiation, and can in fact be a healthy defence against being exploited. 84 This is in 
some ways a more hopeful conclusion in these contexts, where legitimate grievances 
have been held for more than a century and cannot be easily overcome. 
The understanding and awareness of history is often different between Maori and DOC. 
DOC tends to think of itself as an organisation whose history goes back to 1987 and no 
further, whereas for Maori it is yet another government agency in a chain going back to 
the nineteenth century, separating them from control of their ancestral land. Brad 
Coombes and Stephanie Hill argue that proposals for co-management fail to historicise 
the relationship between the state and Maori, by refusing to address the question of 
whether conservation agencies are legitimate partners at all. They argue that successful 
co-management tends to follow, rather than precede, the resolution of land grievances. 85 
81 Environmental Risk Management Authority, The Reassessment of 1080: An Informal Guide to the 
August 2007 Decision of the Environmental Risk Management Authority, (Wellington: ·Environmental 
Risk Management Authority, 2007) , 12-3. 
82 Brief of Evidence of Rosita Rauhina Dixon, Wai 1130, #D35(a) , May 5, 2006, paragraph 23 , 10; 
Affidavit of Brian Hauauru Jones, Wai 1130, #18, February 12, 2007, paragraph 3, 2. Some are tom 
between. Rangihopuata Rapana wrote in his evidence he believed no-one should go up on the mountains, 
but he felt drawn up there to keep an eye on·ihe activities on the ski field. Brief of Evidence of 
Rangihopuata Rapana, Wai 1130, #D37, May 5, 2006. 
83 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 159-62. 
84 Fisher and Brown, Getting Together, 117-21. 
85 Coombes and Hill, "" Na Whenua, Na Tuhoe. Ko D.O.C. Te Partner"," 137. 
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Mistrust about each other's motives in this context is probably unavoidable, and to hope 
that it can be overcome in any way other than through long years of successful 
interaction is unrealistic. W ondolleck and Y aff ee argue that the breakdown of 
stereotypical assumptions usually occurs naturally in the process of negotiating with 
each other, given time. 86 They also warn that the structure of relationship interactions 
has to foster, or at least not disrupt, positive interaction, because "[ e ]xtreme polarization 
can occur when intergroup attitudes are reinforced by adversarial processes. "87 As I 
argue in the following chapters, this occurs in the Tribunal, but as it is a temporary 
process it may not be harmful in the long term. 
4. The People Frame 
Bolman and Deal describe what they call the 'human resource frame' as one in which 
an organisation is "an extended family, made up of individuals with needs, feelings, 
prejudices, skills and limitations."88 Wondolleck and Yaffee also use the metaphor of a 
family to describe the ideal dynamics between participants in a collaborative initiative: 
Toledo Metroparks official Michelle Grigore suggests that a good way to 
look at partnerships like the Oak Openings project is as a family: 
"Sometimes you love them, and sometimes .... " Just like a family, 
successful collaborative efforts pay attention to the bond_s that unite them 
and respect them even when tempted to find fault or turn away. 89 
The role of personal relationships in co-management has recently received a lot of 
attention in the literature on co-management. Anthropologist David Lawrence, in his 
book on the making-of Kakadu National Park, sees joi~t management as "a continuing, 
evolving process of dispute resolution, negotiation and compromise. "90 He advocates 
for the importance of supporting the relationships that sustain the process: 
The future success of joint-management will be determined not by a 
commitment to legal and administrative frameworks but through building 
and maintaining Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relationships.91 
Toni Bauman and Dermot Smyth, in a report on partnerships in Australian protected 
areas, identify, as a 'critical succ~ss fa~tor,' the "productive day-to-day, on-ground 
working relationships and mutual respect between the individuals involved in protected 
86 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 159-62. 
87 Ibid., 60. 
88 Bolman and Deal, Reframing Organizations, 16. ,. 
89 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 166. 
90 David Lawrence, Kakadu: The Making of a National Park(Melboume: The Miegunyah 'Press, 2000), 
264. 
·
91 Ibid. 
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area partnerships between and across all areas of management."92 In her chapter on 
Nitmiluk National Park, Bauman emphasises the importance of recognizing the· 
"emotional, procedural and substantive needs of parties in the decision-making 
process."93 Wondolleck and Yaffee also argue that it is vital to recognise that 
partnerships are made up of individuals: 
" . . . partnerships are people joined through relationships. While people 
may represent organizations, agencies, or occupations in a collaborative 
process, they are fundamentally individual human beings. The 
relationships that form the core of collaborative partnerships are between 
those individuals, not between organizations. Yet people are only human. 
They can get angry, be affronted, and become discouraged. Hence, 
human emotions and fears and the tendency to develop stereotypes and 
misperceptions pose challenges to effective collaboration. On the other 
hand, the development of understanding, empathy, trust, and motivation 
can foster collaborative interaction."94 
Fisher and Ury also make this point about the ability of personal relationships to foster 
or stymie collaboration. 95 Personal relationships can transcend problems in the other 
frames, or create problems when all should be smooth sailing. Research has shown that 
people's social networks have a strong effect on their attitudes and beliefs, more so than 
their formal affiliations with particular groups or organisations. 96 
Much of the response to these revelations has been to try to map and categorise these 
processes of interaction. Definitions· of' social capital' sort relationships into those 
between individuals in the same group or institution ('bonding'), relationships between 
people in different groups and organisations ('bridging') and relationships between 
individuals at different management levels ('linking'). 97 This measuring process may 
provide some useful information as to how closely different agencies are networked, but 
fails to adequately capture what makes relationships important, which is their ability to 
create opportunities for compromise where a situation would otherwise be impassable. 
It also suggests that relationships are simple enough to reduce to connecting lines, and 
are able to be measured in numbers. It is hard to imagine how one could properly 
92 Toni Bauman and Dermot Smyth, "Indigenous Partnerships in Protected Area Management in 
Australia," (Canberra: Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies and the 
Australian Collaboration, 2007), xiv. 
93 Bauman, ''Nitmiluk National Park: Joint Management as Process and Balancing Interests," in Bauman 
and Smyth, Indigenous Partnerships, 70. 
94 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 159. 
95 Fisher, Ury and Brown, Getting to Yes, 19. 
96 Prell et al. , "Competing Structures, Competing Views: The Role of Formal and Informal Social 
Structures in Shaping Stakeholder Perceptions," unpaginated. 
97 For example R. Plummer and J. FitzGibbon, "People Matter: The Importance of Social Capital in the 
Co-Management of Natural Resources" (2006), 53 . 
84 
quantify things like trust, respect, reciprocity and commitment or measure the impact of 
an individual leader or relationship broker. 
The reports of participants themselves are the richest data on the health and 
sophistication of relationships. Many writers observe that participants in collaborative 
initiatives emphasise the importance of personal relationships. Bauman noted that many 
people involved in co-management identify relationships as the most important part of 
joint management. 98 Wondolleck and Yaffee also observed this, and said that the 
participants' realisation of the importance of relationships increased as time went on.99 
Wondolleck and Y affee provide examples in their book of how relationships can create 
solutions and new possibilities. 100 At Tongariro there were many examples of this. The 
Conservator described how the people who were more involved in liaison with Maori 
were less affected by the animosities which are to some degree required in the inquiry 
process: 
KM: ... is there a difference there between people who are more involved 
in park management and people who are less involved? 
PG: Yes, people who are less involved, they haven't been on the trust 
board or been key contacts, are probably impacted by the process more, 
in terms of relationships. They don't see what's going on, the day-to-day 
stuff. And it's the same with us, the staff who are less involved get more 
upset at some of the things they see in evidence, than I do, because I 
understand the process. 101 
Several of the key staff involved in the local' conservancy, including the conservator and 
two out of the three area managers, .had been working in the area for around twenty 
years each at the time of my research, which was noted by the Tribunal researchers 
Nicholas Bayley and Mark Derby as a strength in local relationships. 102 This was not 
true of many of the other staff in the conservancy, The turnover of DOC staff was a 
matter of contention in the inquiry. · One claimant complained that his iwi spent a lot of 
< 
time training new me1nbers of DOC to "a level of vision and understanding to be useful 
to our partnership." 103 
98 Bauman, ''Nitmiluk National Park," 47. See also Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 
159; Michael A. Schuett, Steve W. Selin, and Deborah S. Carr, "Making It Work: Keys to Successful 
Collaboration in Natural Resource Management," Environmental Management 27, no. 4 (2001). 
99 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 159. 
100 Ibid., 167. . 
101 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, July 22, 2008. 
102 Nicholas Bayley and Mark Derby, Tongariro National Park Management from 1980 to ·the Present: A 
Scoping Report, Wai 1130, #A6, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 2004), 21-2, 38. 
103 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 63, 13. 
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The importance of project-based relationships was noted by two of my interviewees 
from DOC. 104 The Pou Kura Taiao argued that the presence of a clear purpose for the 
relationship helped to unite and motivate the individuals involved, and built up trust 
over time. 105 Wondolleck and Yaffee also argued that concrete collaborative projects 
were important to overall success. There was complaint in the inquiry, however, saying 
DOC had failed to take these positive examples of cooperation to the next level, a more 
comprehensive collaboration over conservancy-wide issues and decisions. 106 This 
criticism has mainly been levelled at DOC headquarters, rather than at conservancy 
staff. 
Relationships need time, and an institutional and political environment that supports, or 
at least does not provide an obstacle, to negotiation. 107 A personnel policy that 
encourages staff in key roles to stay for long periods is an obvious example of a 
supportive policy. Careful hiring policies, geared towards selecting diplomatic staff 
with a good understanding of both cultures involved in the collaborative initiative, have 
also been advocated. 108 Several writers have suggested that opportunities to socialise 
informally are helpful, and some go so far as to suggest negotiation training, though 
whether this is effective in practice has not been researched. 109 
At Tongariro the longevity of key relationships has been a real strength. Both parties 
have shown a willingness to work together and an ability to transcend their differences 
and reach agreement. These relationships were poorly supported by DOC policies 
which did not allow locals to set goals and protocols for their own relationships, or to 
resource the level of collaboration in which local parties are willing to engage. 
Conclusion 
The underlying problems in relationships between DOC and tangata whenua at 
Tongariro is the confusion over what that relationship is meant to achieve, and the 
differing opinions of Maori and DOC in this regard. The relationship model of 
104 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Pou Kura Taiao, March 2, 2007 ; Interview withTongariro-Taupo 
Conservator, March 4, 2008. 
105 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Pou Kura Taiao, March 2, 2007. 
106 Keith Woods, cross-examined by Mark McGhie, Draft Transcript of National Park Inquiry Hearing 1, 
Wai 1130, #4.1.6, (Maungarongo Marae, Ohakune, February 20-23 , 2006), 29. 
107 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 166-7; Richard Margerum., "Integrated 
Environmental Management," 154-5. 
108 For example Bauman, ' 'Nitmiluk National Park," in Bauman and Smyth, Indigenous Partnerships, 52. 
109 Wondolleck and Yaffee, Making Collaboration Work, 218-9; Schuett, Selin, and Carr, "Making It 
Work," 592; Bauman and Smyth~ Indigenous Partnerships, xvii. 
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consultation fails to meet Maori expectations about the level of power-sharing they 
believe is appropriate to that relationship. This is further exacerbated by the lack of 
ability on the part of DOC's conservancy-level staff, to innovate with new relationship 
structures. The lack of flexibility and fear of setting precedents is hampering 
development in relationships, as is the lack of funding available for investing in these 
relationships, and the pressure to reach decisions quickly. The history of Tongariro' s 
establishment and development sheds light on the evolution of these features. 
Some of the strengths of the DOC-Maori relationship at Tongariro during my fieldwork 
were the length of key local relationships, the willingness of both parties to work with 
each other, and the skill of Maori leaders, who are adept at using the political strategies 
available to them to advance their interests. Another important strength is the 
reasonably high level of commonality the parties have in their environmental values. 
During the National Park inquiry, participants were preoccupied with historical issues. 
The interpretations of this history coloured the depictions of the current relationship. In 
the next chapter I discuss the way the inquiry process privileges certain depictions of 
the Crown-Maori relationship over others. The subsequent historical chapters trace the 
development of the relationship at Tongariro and the way thoseJ1istorical periods were 
depicted in the course of the claim. 
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Chapter Four: Tribunal Inquiries, Beach Crossings 
At the time of my research, the National Park inquiry was in the hearings phase. 
Tribunal inquiries are important events, and they have a strong effect on the 
relationships of people in the communities involved. According to the criteria for a 
good relationship process identified in the previous chapters of this thesis, the inquiry 
constitutes a 'problem' in relationships because it is making it difficult for the parties to 
work together, but its long-term consequences may well end up creating much greater 
strengths. An inquiry, and the settlement process which follows it, is a 'crossing,' as 
Greg Dening describes, and is intended to remake the relationships between the 
government and the claimants. Dening also explains that these crossings and remakings 
can be painful. 1 
The Waitangi Tribunal has received plenty of scholarly attention, particularly from 
historians. Their focus, however, has mainly been on the kind of history the Waitangi 
Tribunal produces in its reports, and how similar or dissimilar it is to academic history. I 
draw from theirinsights into the ways the Crown-Maori relationship is characterised 
during historical debates, but my fo~us is on the submissions made by Crown and 
claimant parties, rather than the reports produced by the Tribunal. I am concerned with 
what legal academic Paul McHugh has pointed out is "the more fundamental issue"2 of 
the ongoing relationships between government and Maori, specifically how those 
relationships are described in the inquiry, and how an inquiry affects those relationships 
in the short term. These questions have thus far received little attention from New 
Zealand scholars. 
The Waitangi Tribunal 
The Waitangi Tribunal is designed to hear claims, brought forward by Maori, regarding 
alleged Crown breaches of the Treaty ofWaitangi. As long as the claim is brought 
forward by Maori, and as long as it is not 'frivolous or vexatious,' or solvable by other 
more obvious legal means, the Tribunal must inquire into it. 3 The inquiry determines 
1 Dening, Islands and Beaches, 3. 
2 Paul McHugh, "Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and Australasia ," in Living 
Relationships, Ko kiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of Waitangi in the New Millenium , ed. Ken S. Coates. Paul 
McHugh, and (not editors) (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1998). 116. 
3 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 , section 7. 
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whether the Crown has breached or is breaching the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and whether the claimant group or groups, are prejudicially affected by those 
past or continuing breaches.4 At the end of the inquiry a report is published, and if the 
Tribunal has found in favour of the claimants, the claim proceeds into a negotiation 
phase with the Office of Treaty Settlements, a wing of the Justice Department which 
negotiates claims on behalf of the Crown. 
The Tribunal was established by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, in response to 
gathering Maori protest about their contemporary and historical treatment by the state. 
Its creation was largely the effort of the then Minister for Maori Affairs, Matiu Rata. In 
its first form the Tribunal could only inquire into Treaty breaches post-197 5, which was 
a major disappointment to Rata himself, as the root causes of the grievances Maori were 
voicing in the 1960s and 70s were historical. 5 The Tribunal made no recommendations 
on the first claim that came before it, and little happened after that for several years. 
In 1981 Edward Taihakurei Durie became the chief judge of the Maori Land Court, and 
therefore also the chairperson of the Tribunal. Durie radically reshaped the Tribunal's 
procedure and outlook. The Tribunal adopted consciously 'bi cultural' processes, 
holding claimant hearings on local marae, and allowing submis_~ions to be made in 
either English or Maori. The first of the hearings under Durie' s leadership were the 
Motunui-Waitara hearings in 1982. The Motunui-Waitara claim was brought forward by 
Aila Taylor on behalf of Te Atiawa iwi of Taranaki, on the west coast of the North 
Island. The claimants were concerned about the granting of the right for a synthetic 
fuels plant to discharg~ waste out of a new pipeline at Motunui. This was exacerbated 
by the fact that there was already a pipeline at nearby Waitara that had polluted the 
surrounding reefs, and the reefs at Motunui were among the few left unpolluted. The 
issue attracted widespread attentio1!. 
The Trib_unal found in favour of the Motunui-Waitara claimants, recommending that the 
outfall he abandoned and the alternative of land based treatment be looked into. It also 
called for greater recognition of Maori ·cultural values with respect to water resources in 
the legal system. The Muldoon Government rejected the Tribunal's recommendations 
outright. This sparked such an outcry from the media, the Pakeha left and Maori, that 
the Government was forced to about tum and accept the Tribunal ' s suggestions to 
4 Ibid., section 6. 
~ Sharp, Justice and.the Maori , 75. Not long afterward Rata broke froi:n the Labour Party and formed a 
Maori political party called Mana Motuhake (which is often translated as "separate authority") . 
(\ 
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abandon the plans for an outfall.6 The Motunui-Waitara inquiry was a turning point in 
the importance of the Tribunal, and encouraged other Maori to file claims. 7 It also set a 
precedent, in the early claims, for cases of environmental degradation to be brought to 
the Tribunal. The environmental movement was in full swing in this period, and 
environmental groups often attended hearings and gave submissions in support of the 
claimants' arguments. 8 
In 1985 Parliament amended the 1975 Act to allow the Tribunal to investigate claims 
right back to the signing of the Treaty in 1840. By 1nid 1989 a hundred claims had been 
filed to the. Tribunal; two hundred had been filed by February 1991. 9 The Tribunal was 
expanded to seventeen members and the process of hearing historical claims began in 
earnest. 10 The expansion of the Tribunal's scope led to much more complex inquiries, in 
which concern over environmental degradation was only one of a huge number of 
features in a claim. The previous alliance between environmental groups and Maori 
channelled off into separate streams. Environmental groups campaigned for, and 
achieved, the establishment of a government agency to advocate conservation, DOC, 
and Maori efforts went into their historical claims. 11 
Several Acts passed during the 1980s included clauses referencing 'the principles of the 
Treaty ofWaitangi.' The earliest of these were the Environment Act 1986, the State 
' 
Owned Enterprises Act 1986, and the Conservation Act 1987, which established the 
Department of Conservation and set its direction. The strength and meaning of these 
clauses were tested in court over the following years. The watershed case in this regard 
was the so-called 'Lands Case.' in which the New Zealand Maori Council succeeded in 
achieving an injunction on the sale of government assets to private ii;iterests under the 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, on the gro1:1nds that the land would therefore be 
unavailable for settlement of Treaty claims and this would be a violation of the 
6 See Ranginui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, Struggle without End (Auckland: Penguin Books, 
1990), 248-9 ; Sharp, Justice and the Maori , 77; David Young, Our Islands, Our Selves: A History of 
Conservation in New Zealand (Dunedin: Otago University Press, 2004), 194. 
7 Paul Hamer, "A Quarter-Century of the Waitangi Tribunal," in The Waitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu 
Whakamana I Te Tiriti O Waitangi , ed. Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen (Wellington Bridget 
Williams Books, 2004) , 5. 
8 Environmental groups made supportive submissions at the Motunui-Waitara, Kaituna and Manukau 
Tribunal hearings. See chapter seven for more detail. · 
9 Hamer, "A Quarter-Century of the Waitangi Tribunal," 6. 
10 Though this was the beginning of a new wave of historical claims, it is important to note that most of 
the claims filed to the Tribunal had already been through other courts, at other times. Litigation over these 
issues is not new. See Belgrave, "Something Borrowed." 
11 Keri Mills, "The Changing Relationship between Maori and Environmentalists in 1970s and 1980s 
New Zealand," History Compass 7, no. 3 (2009). 
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principles of the Treaty of W aitangi, protected under section nine of the Act. 12 As a 
result of this legal victory memorials were placed on land marked as potentially subject 
to future Treaty claims, allowing those lands to be compulsorily bought back by the 
government for use in settlements. The Tribunal also gained powers to insist upon the 
return of lands thus earmarked, though these special powers have only once been used. 13 
Due to the increasing length of inquiries of the 1990s, members of the Tribunal, 
particularly judges Joseph Williams and Carrie Wainwright, reworked the Tribunal's 
procedure to make it more efficient. This involved earlier participation from the Crown, 
full pleadings in terms of acknowledgment and denial of alleged Treaty breaches, and a 
shortened timeframe. Lawyers responded to this by collaborating more thoroughly on 
issues in cormnon to all claimant parties, and agreeing for individual lawyers to 
specialise on themes. Richard Boast has argued that these gains in efficiency benefited 
all parties, but that the increasing reliance on the expertise of lawyers could be seen as a 
partial disenfranchisement of claimants. 14 
Tribunal procedure: the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
The phrasing of the 197 5 Treaty of Waitangi Act stated that the Tribunal should advise 
upon the "practical application of the principles of the Treaty of-Waitangi." 15 This 
choice of words was possibly design~d to ensure the abilities of the Tribunal did not 
extend to the literal enforcement of the provisions of the Treaty. Andrew Sharp suggests 
that the government purposefully made the Tribunal weak in this way, consistent with 
other limitations that it put in place; the Tribunal could ·merely recommend action, and 
its inquiries were Jimited to post-.1975 events. 16 The legislation allowed the Tribunal to 
determine what the principles of the Treaty were. Political scientist Janine Hayward 
explains. that: 
The Tµbunal' s jurisdiction is broad in this regard - it has the authority to 
establish the benchmarks against which action is judged, and has the 
12 Sectiqn 9 states: ''Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." 
13 In the Turangi Township claim. 
14 Richard Boast, "Waitangi Tribunal Procedure," in fVaitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu Whakamana I Te Tiriti 
0 Waitangi, ed. Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2004), 61-
2. . . 
15 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Preamble. 
16 Sharp, Justice and the Maori, 74-5. 
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capacity, through its interpretations of the Treaty, to make findings as to 
whether the Crown has breached Treaty principles. 17 
In its early decisions the Tribunal made a number of general statements about the nature 
of the Treaty and the way it should be interpreted. The most oft-quoted of these are as 
follows: 
A Maori approach to the Treaty would imply that its wairua or spirit is 
something more than a literal construction of the actual words used can 
provide. The spirit of the Treaty transcends the sum total of its 
component written words and puts narrow or literal interpretations out of 
place. 18 ' 
The Treaty was also more than an affirmation of existing rights. It was 
not intended to merely fossilise a status quo, but to provide a direction for 
future growth and development. The broad and general nature of its 
words indicates that it was not intended as a finite contract but as the 
foundation for a developing social contract. We consider then that the 
Treaty is capable of a measure of adaptation to meet new and changing 
circumstances provided there is a measure of consent and an adherence to 
its broad principles. 19 
The use of stated, though never fixed, 'broad principles' was soon to beco1ne the way in 
which the Tribunal interpreted the Treaty and judged its alleged breaches. This was, as 
the Motunui-Waitara Tribunal noted, and several academic writers have since agreed, in 
~ome respects a necessary measure. The legislation gave the English and Maori versions 
of the Treaty equal weight, and given that there are substantial differences between the 
two versions, the legislation would not have been operable had some method of broader 
interpretation not been sought. 20 The legislation required the Tribunal to mediate 
between the differences in the two versions and to define the principles of the Treaty. 
There is no definitive list of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, though there is a 
useful document produced by Janine Hayward for the Tribunal in 1997 which reviewed 
the principles identified in the Tribunal and the courts to that date. Some of the most 
often used and important principles are listed and briefly described below. 
Partnership, adapted from the descriptions given in judgments on the 
Lands Case: the principle that Maori and the Crown should have equal 
status in their interactions; · 
17 Janine Hayward, "Flowing from the Treaty' s Words," in The Waitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu 
Wh akamana I Te Tiriti O Waitangi, ed. Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books, 2004) , 29. 
18 Waitangi Tribunal, Motunui-Waitara Report, paragraph 10.1. 
19 Ibid. , paragraph 10 .3. 
2° For example F.M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law, and Legitimation 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999), 152. 
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Kawanatanga: the right of the Crown to govern in the interests of all 
New Zealanders, which must be balanced with the principle of . 
Tino rangatiratanga: the right of Maori to (variously) manage, control 
or determine their affairs, including their taonga, or all things they hold 
valuable.21 
The duty to act in good faith, on the part of both Maori and the Crown; 
The right of redress: that the Crown must provide redress for any 
injustices it inflicted upon Maori in breach of the Treaty.22 
Active protection, or the duty of the Crown to actively provide for Maori 
interests; 
The right to development, i.e. that the Crown must allow for Maori to 
develop their interests; and 
The duty to consult with Maori on matters of importance to them.23 
This is a very brief list of a few of the main Treaty principles the Tribunal uses in its 
decisions. Hayward lists many more. In each claim lawyers and Tribunal members use 
principles from previous inquiries, adapt their use to fit new cases, and identify new 
ideas. Commentators agree that the Treaty principles are "a fluid body of doctrine."24 
The Tribunal decides which Treaty principles are appropriate to the claim at hand, but 
claimant lawyers also come up with lists of principles that they feel are appropriate, and 
reference to principles or key phrases such as 'good faith' and 'partnership' sometimes 
appear in individual submissions. It is hard to know whether these are intended 
reference~ to the Tribunal's recommendatory process, references to principles included 
in policy documents; or a product of influence from wider political discourse. 
Several of.the principles referred -to in the above list were drawn from the judgment of 
Sir Robih Cooke in the Lands Case. In his individual judgment, Cooke wrote: 
. . . 
The Treaty signified a partnership between Pakeha and Maori requiring 
each to · act towards the other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. 
The relationship between the Treaty partners creates responsibilities 
analogous to fiduciary duties. The duty of the Crown is not merely 
passive but extends to active protection of Maori people in the use of 
their lands and waters to the fullest extent practicable.25 
. . 
21 In claims, the term 'taonga' has covered resources such as fisheries, indigenous species, sacred places, 
the Mao.ri language, airwaves, geothermal resources and many others. · 
22 Hayward identifies this as a subset of an 'overarching principle of exchange' whereby Maori allowed 
the Crown the right to govern in exchange for the guarantee of their absolute chieftainship/ tino 
rangatiratanga and the other protections contained in the Treaty. 
23 Janine Hayward, 'The Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi,' appendix to the Rangahaua Whiinui 
Report, ed. Alan Ward (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal; 1997), 486-493. · 
24 The phrase comes .from Oliver, "The Future Behind Us," 12. 
25 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1987], I.New Zealand Law Reports, 641. 
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He also recommended that the principles be interpreted generously and in the spirit of 
goodwill. And that is largely what has occurred. Andrew Sharp has described the 
Tribunal's interpretation of the Treaty thus: "[t]he Treaty simply stands for good 
relations intended between the peoples."26 
William Oliver, in a seminal, and critical, article on the Tribunal's historical methods, 
described Tribunal inquiries as asking three main questions of the evidence presented to 
it: firstly, whether or not the Crown was responsible for what the claimants allege it did 
or failed to do; secondly whether or not this action or omission was prejudicial to the 
claimants; and thirdly whether or not it was in breach of the Treaty. Oliver notes that in 
practice the last two questions are always answered as one - if the action or inaction 
was prejudicial, then it was in breach of the Treaty.27 
Other writers have noted the use of the Treaty as an umbrella for various ideas of 
justice. Andrew Sharp, for example, in his book Justice and the Maori ( 1991 ), describes 
the way in which the Tribunal's jurisprudence weds two fundamentally different types 
of justice that the Tribunal attempts to address: reparatory justice, in which claimants 
are to be compensated for past wrongs; and distributive justice, or 'social equity' 
issues.28 Paul McHugh has argued that the identification of Treaty breaches in the Ngai 
Tahu Report bears too strong a resemblance to the modem legal concept of contractual 
unconscionability to be coincidental.29 Many writers have made the connection between 
the way Treaty principles are used and a legalistic approach to the assessment of past 
events. 30 
The Tribunal and the shaping of stories 
The Waitangi Tribunal's processes and politics lead to particular kinds of narrative 
about Crown-Maori history. The incentive structure in place means that claimants . 
26 Andrew Sharp, "Recent Juridicial and Constitutional Histories of Maori," in Histories, Power and Loss: 
Uses of the Past - a New Zealand Commentary, ed. Andrew Sharp and Paul McHugh (Wellington: 
Bridget Williams Books, 2001), 45. 
27 W.R . Oliver, "The Future Behind Us: The Waitangi Tribunal's Retrospective Utopia," in Histories, 
Power and Loss: Uses of the Past - a New Zealand Commentary, ed. Andrew Sharp.and Paul McHugh 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2001), 11. 
28 Sharp, Justice and the Maori , 34. 
29 Paul McHugh, "Law, History and the Treaty ofWaitangi," The New Zealand Journal of History 31 , no. 
1 (1997): 54. 
3° For example Giselle Byrnes, The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 63-101; Oliver, 'The Future Behind Us," 21-3; McHugh, "Law, History and the 
Treaty of Waitangi," 53 ; Sharp, "Recent Juridicial and Constitutional Histories of Maori;" Michael 
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benefit from a narrative in which the Crown is powerful and has systematically set out 
to deprive Maori of their resources by trickery and force. The Crown benefits from a 
version in which most of the damage to Maori interests was done by non-Crown agents, 
or by Crown agents acting with good intentions and in good faith, and entering 
agreements with Maori who were willing and informed. The pressure to conform to the 
shapes of these stories has a marked effect on the documents prepared for a Tribunal 
inquiry, from the lawyers' submissions on behalf of claimant groups or the Crown, on 
the individual submissions given by witnesses, and on the historical reports prepared by 
paid researchers. The Tribunal, although technically a commission of inquiry, has 
developed into an adversarial forum, with lengthy cross-examination of lawyers, 
researchers and witnesses, with the exception of tribal elders, whom it would be 
disrespectful to barrage with questions. 31 In the confines of the hearings, the Crown and 
Maori participants are pitted against each other in a fight to have their version of history 
accepted by the Tribunal. 
The stories produced by all parties in the Tribunal process are significantly shaped by 
the structure of inquiries. The main players in the debate are already marked as Crown 
or claimants, and they are already marked in opposition. The claimants are bringing a 
case against the Crown; the Crown is defending itself against the claimants. It is 
important to note, however, that there are individuals on both sides who are concerned 
with maintaining relationships when the claim has been settled, which curbs antagonism 
in the hearings to some extent. 
Another important asp~ct of the Tribunal process is that the broad moot is set from the 
beginning:. the claimants must argue that Crown actions and/or inactions after 1840 
have prejudicially affected them in a way that breaches the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The claimants do well if they can show that the misfortunes in their history 
were entirely due to Crown action ( or inaction), thus the Crown is cast as a powerful 
and malevolent force. Historian Michael Belgrave has described this characterisation, as 
it appears in the Tribunal's finished reports, as: 
... the Tribunal's Frankenstein-like re-creation of the Crown. The Crown 
is a ubiquitous, ever active, and sexually ambiguous ( at some times male, 
at others female) historical figure. In the Treaty literature, the Crown is 
· able to metamorphose into a surveyor in the 1860s, a minister of Maori 
affairs in the 1980s, the governor in the 1860s, and a clerk in the colonial 
31 Boast, "Waitangi Tribunal Procedure," 57. 
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office in the 1840s. The Crown has become all-seeing, all-knowing and, 
most importantly, all-responsible.32 
Some historians dispute this, arguing that the Tribunal, in recent years especially, has 
been concerned to present a rounded view of Crown agents, and pays attention to the 
social context in which they lived. 33 There is no doubt, however, that the claimants and 
their lawyers describe something of a 'Frankencrown' in their submissions. 
The dichotomy of Crown and Maori causes some difficulties with such figures as Maori 
who worked for ( or closely with) the Crown, and the Pakeha ancestors of claimants. An 
issue which apparently caused some consternation among claimants in the lead-up to 
the National Park inquiry was the role of the Grace brothers, sons of the local 
missionary, three of whom were Crown agents in the late 19th century. Two of the 
brothers married high-born Tuwharetoa women, and have many descendants among the 
Tuwharetoa claimants. Another example from the National Park inquiry is the group of 
tangata whenua employed by the Department of Conservation, some of whom have key 
roles in the liaison process. These roles were subject to very little examination in the 
. . 1nqu1ry. 
There has been some argument as to whether or not the Tribunal reports cast Maori as 
victims at the same time as they make a monster of the Crown. Byrnes identifies a 
"paradox of agency" whereby the Tribunal, seeks to reclaim the agency of Maori actors 
in New Zealand history (traditionally left out of the story or cast as helpless), yet is 
constrained by the Treaty claims procedure which requires Maori to be victims of 
Crown action in order to receive compensation·.34 Responding to Byrnes, Jim McAloon 
has argued that the Tribunal ' s characterization of events is historically accurate and not 
contradictory in the way Byrnes describes. 35 ·Byrnes is making the point, however, that 
Maori victimisation is necessarily stressed by the Tribunal, rather than that Maori \Yere 
not victims. Recent works by Richard Boast and Michael Belgrave illustrate this 
difference by showing that many Maori made decisions to sell land, or sign the Treaty, 
32 Belgrave, "The Tribunal and the Past: Taking a Roundabout Path to a New History," 37. 
33 For example Jim McAloon, "By Which Standards? History and the Waitangi Tribunal," The New 
Zealand Journal of History 40, no. 2 (2006). 
34 Byrnes, The Waitangi Tribunal and New Zealand History, 109-1 2. 
35 McAloon, "By Which Standards? History and the Waitangi Tribunal," 206. 
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after carefully considered thought, and without being forced into such decisions by 
Crown agents. 36 Such stories do not appear in Tribunal reports or claimant submissions. 
Another effect of the Tribunal's mandate and process on its historical narratives is that 
actors and forces other than the Crown and Maori are rendered irrelevant. Belgrave 
notes that other key causes of Maori marginalisation and land loss such as "nineteenth 
century capitalism, the poor judgement of citizens, or Pakeha racism" cannot be held 
responsible in the Tribunal setting, because, under the current system, the Tribunal's 
account of their actions would fail to provide a case for recompense. 37 This leaves a 
rather shrunken set of accounts: the actions of Pakeha and other settlers have no role 
save as a rogue force that the Crown has responsibility to restrain or foster, depending 
on their impact on Maori. Economic, pathological, and meteorological events must be 
either the Crown's responsibility or be irrelevant in the narratives produced by the 
Tribunal process. 
A related feature of the Tribunal process is its focus on the intent of Crown agents. It is 
not clear why this is, as a Crown action or inaction breaching the Treaty and causing 
prejudice to Maori could in theory have been done ( or not done) without malicious 
intent. The definition of Treaty principles focusing on 'good fait!i' angles debates in this 
direction, however. As I will argue in the following chapters, in the case of the National 
Park inquiry this has led to an underemphasis on the role of institutional factors in 
Maori marginalisation, which are an important aspect of the history of relationships in 
the park. 
To summa~ise, the Tribunal process encourages submissions from the claimants and 
their lawyers and researchers, which emphasise features of the Crown's power, malice 
. . . 
and trickery. Crown witnesses, lawyers and researchers, on the other hand, have 
incentive~ to produce a version of history in which the Crown is well-intentioned and 
. 
honest in_ its dealings, and that its actions and 01nissions were largely unavoidable due to 
the circumstances of the times. The process encourages those on both sides to battle 
over these conflicting versions in order ·to convince a neutral party, the Tribunal, that 
· their version is the true story. This is not always how the parties operate in the Tribunal 
process, but they are certainly encouraged by the Tribunal process to perform in that 
36 Michael Belgrave, Historical Frictions: Maori Claims and Reinvented Histories (Auckland: University 
of Auckland Pre_ss, 2605). Richard Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land: Governments· and Maori 
Land in the North Island 1865-1921 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2008). 
37 Belgrave; "The Tribunal and the Past: Taking a Roundabout Path to a New History," 37. 
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way. This contrived scenario of conflict is exacerbated by the material importance, to all 
parties, of the Tribunal's recommendations. 
Pressure and Politics 
For the players in a Tribunal inquiry, the historical report is a tool to take into the 
settlement process. For the claimants the stakes are very high- and everyone, from the 
witnesses to the researchers, to the lawyers and to the Tribunal members, is put under 
pressure. Tipene O'Regan, the key negotiator in one of the biggest claims settled in 
New Zealand, the N gai Tahu claim, has argued that: 
In the context of Treaty issues, the floor of the High Court and that of the 
W aitangi Tribunal become a battle ground of the most fundamental 
cultural conflicts. They are not so much conflicts about facts and issues, 
as conflicts of mindset. In that environment, history and culture cease to 
be recreational or scholarly pursuits. The stakes are too high. The 
evidence of the conventional historian, the requirements of 'due process' 
and the whakapapa of the Maori, are presented for one purpose, that of a 
substantial result, achieved or denied, in terms of money, resources or 
property. I leave justice to one side.38 
0 'Regan emphasises that the search for justice, and the search for truth, in Tribunal 
inquiries, are being conducted under the itnmense political pressure that tends to 
accompany large sums of money and valuable tracts of land. Submissions are often 
highly coordinated: the sub1nissions of Crown witnesses are viewed by the Crown Law 
Office before submission, and claimant lawyers usually delegate thematic issues 
between themselves to increase efficiency. 39 The submissions ofNgati Tiiwharetoa to 
the .Tribunal for the National Park inquiry sho'Y signs of extensive co-operation between 
individuals and hapu, with some individuals delegated by the Paramount Chief to speak 
on certain matters, and much cross-referencing between hapu closing submissions. This 
kind of co-ordination is to be expected, and has the advantage of unity of argument, but 
indicates the presence of a party line, and the possibility of the pressure to toe that line. 
Alan Ward, a prominent New Zealanq historian who has worked extensively with the 
Waitangi Tribunal, gave an example of an elder who gave evidence which did not 
adhere to the wider party line, causing great ire to the claim leader. 40 
38 Tipene O'Regan, "Old Myths and New Politics. Some Contemporary Uses of Traditional History," 
New Zealand Journal of History 26, no . 1 (1992): 11. 
39 Boast, "Waitangi Tribunal Procedure," 60. 
40 Alan Ward, "Historical Method and Waitangi Tribunal Claims," in The Certainty of Doubt: Tributes to 
Peter Munz, ed. Miles Fairburn and Bill Oliver (Wellington: Victoria University Press, .1996), 146. 
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Nor are researchers immune from the pressure to tally their findings to the argument of 
one side or another. Several commentators have noted the tendency for research reports 
to be skewed in the direction of their funding source.41 Richard Boast, who has played 
the roles of both counsel and historian in the Tribunal process, has noted that in his 
experience historians are usually advocates to some degree. 
... a historian briefed by the Crown to prepare a report ... for the purpose 
of W aitangi Tribunal proceedings ... has been retained by the Crown and 
thus there is an in-built stance that on the whole the evidence will be 
selected and read to put a favourable gloss on the Crown's actions (in the 
same way that claimant historians will want to put an unfavourable gloss 
·) 42 on 1t. 
The particularly 'glossy' parts of the National Park inquiry reports were the arguments 
surrounding the 'gift,' and those surrounding Crown motivations for establishing the 
national park. 
National parks in Waitangi Tribunal inquiries 
\ 
According to Nicola Wheen and Jacinta Ruru, (academics who have written on 
environmental law and Maori rights), environmental management issues are the most 
common recurring theme in Tribunal reports. They cite Mason Durie's argument that 
this is understandable, given that the different cultural perspectives on the environment 
have been an important contributing factor to the distrust between Maori and the 
government. 43 In the context of Tribunal inquiries, the 'prejudicial effect' most 
commonly claimed in relation to environmental issues is "the depletion of spiritual and 
material resources."44 
Geoff Park has argued that "of all the themes concerning Crown actions with respect to 
the indigenous flora ·and fauna in the 1912 to 1983 period, the theme of national parks 
. 
. 
has been the least disputatious."45 He speculates that this is because New Zealand 
national parks were mainly established in mountainous environments that, although in 
41 Michael Belgrave, "Something Borrowed, Somet~g New: History and the Waitangi Tribunal," in 
. Going Puplic: The Changing Face of New Zealand History, ed. Bronwyn Dalley and Jock Phillips 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2001), 103; Richard P. Boast, "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and 
the Judicial Process," Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 28(1998): 108-9; O'Regan, "Old 
Myths a~d New Politics. Some Contemporary Uses of Traditional History," 11. 
42 Boast, "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and the Judicial Process," 108-9. 
43 Nicola R. Wheen and Jacinta Ruru, "The Environmental Reports," in The Waitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu 
Whakamana I Te Tiriti O Waitangi, ed. Janine Hayward and Nicola R. Wheen (Wellington: Bridget 
Williams Books, 2004), 96. The quote they use is from Mason Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The 
Politics of Maori Self-Determination (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1998), 24. · 
44 Wheen and Ruru, .''.The Environmental Reports," 102. 
45 Park, Effective Exclusion?, 384. 
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use by Maori, were not heavily settled or the most productive areas for food gathering.46 
Park also points out that there were two major exceptions to this rule: in the Ureweras, 
in the north-eastern North Island; and the Whanganui region, where land that was 
important for everyday Maori life in the area, was taken in large amounts for scenery 
preservation. These reserves were subsequently made into national parks in both cases. 
Park argues that, among the places in New Zealand where scenery protection is a major 
land use," .. .it is in the Whanganui River country that the Crown's [establishment of 
reserves] has had the greatest impact on Maori."47 
This concern may also go some way towards explaining why, as Park notes, national 
parks have been less controversial than other environmental issues, as, for the latter part 
of their history at least, national parks have been designed to prevent or arrest the 
degradation of the environment. The more painful issue for claimants with respect to 
national parks and scenic reserves is that they entailed the removal of large amounts of 
the environment from Maori control and use. The lawyer for N gati Tuwharetoa in the 
National Park inquiry suggests in the iwi's closing submissions that "[p]erhaps it does 
not matter much what motivated the Crown to seek to acquire the mountains. From 
where tangata whenua are sitting, what matters is that the Crown took them."48 Despite 
this there was much focus in the National Park inquiry reports and submissions on the 
Crown's motivations for establishing a national park. 
The submissions. 
The bulk of the academic literature on the Tribunal focuses on the its published reports, 
and, to a lesser extent, the reports written as evidence to the inquiries by professional 
historians. The individual submissions written by Crown and claimant witnesses, and 
the group submissions written by their counsel, are seldom analysed by academics.49 
This is both unfortunate and surprising, given that much of the debate about the research 
reports ( and, to a lesser degree, the final reports) is about how much they are shaped by 
the political motivations of claimant or Crown parties. The submissions contain a great 
deal of information regarding the political motivations of claimant an~ Crown actors. In 
particular, the group submissions can be seen as the political positions that supposedly 
46 Ibid., 384. 
47 Ibid. , 308 
48 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 7'.23 , 108 . 
49 Judith Binney has also observed this. Judith Binney, "History and Memory - the Wood of the Whau 
Tree, 1766- 2005 ," in The New Oxford History of New Zealand, ed. Giselle Byrnes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 83 . 
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influence the historical reports. They are the carefully considered written forms of the 
advocates' arguments. 
The Tribunal, researchers, claimants, lawyers and Crown witnesses in a Tribunal 
inquiry are all under particular kinds of pressure in the production of their reports and 
statements. The Tribunal reports, as many writers have shown, are strongly shaped by 
the Tribunal's guiding legislation and purpose. The reports are also a product of the 
evidence presented to the Tribunal in the course of a hearing, and the arguments made 
by Crown and claimant counsel. The literature on the subject has also shown that 
research reports are affected by the political goals of the party by whom they were 
commissioned. Researchers are also influenced by the Tribunal process in ways as 
obvious as the time restrictions they are under and the particular questions they are 
required to answer. Some researchers voice their own opinion as to whether principles 
of the Treaty have been breached, and if so which particular principles they are, while 
other researchers consider this a step too far into advocacy. 50 
The influences upon lawyers and witnesses have not received the same amount of 
scrutiny from academics as the Tribunal members and researchers. There are 
exceptions: Richard Boast, himself a lawyer who has often acte9_ for claimant groups, 
has written about the role of lawyers. Tipene O'Regan, who led the negotiations for the 
N gai Tahu claim, has written about the pressures and perverse incentives upon claimant 
groups, though neither Boast nor O'Regan focus on the production of submissions. The 
group submissions are clearly influenced by the principles-based method of judging 
Treaty breaches. Almost all the claimant closing submissions to the National Park 
inquiry, which are written by lawyers, provided an explicit list of the Treaty principles 
they believed to be relevant, and the ways in which they believed those principles to be 
. 
breached. It can be_ clearly seen that the submissions cater to the Tribunal's prescribed 
system ofJudging-Treaty breaches, and offer their own Treaty principle-focused 
analysis of the evidence in the hope that the Tribunal will find their arguments 
convincing. The lawyers are also, by th~ very nature of their profession, influenced by 
· the demands of their clients . 
Crown.lawyers have a more ambivalent role in the Tribunal process. The government 
has ultimate interest, after all, in relieving historical grievance, albeit as cheaply as 
possible, and it is not in their interests to antagonise claimants by strongly denying their 
5
.
0 Ibid. 
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claims. Neither, however, is allowing any and every claimant accusation to go 
unchallenged. The ideal position is a careful acknowledgement of some wrongs;· and a 
careful denial of others. The Crown submissions to the National Park inquiry addressed 
only some of the accusations of breaches made by claimant counsel. A short exposition . 
in the Crown closing submissions on 'the role of the Crown' argued that this was 
because they aimed to play an 'assisting' role, helping the Tribunal by providing 
evidence where it saw gaps, rather than a role as a defendant. 51 
As for the claimants, O'Regan makes it clear that he thinks the settlement outcome is 
always an important consideration when presenting evidence to the Tribunal, for the 
claimants as for any actor in the Tribunal process. Judith Binney has argued that the oral 
evidence given by claimants is "testimonial" in form, in that the claimants seek 
restorative justice. She goes on to argue that these 'presentist' tendencies are checked 
and balanced by the written evidence provided to the Tribunal. 52 
An important question is how much individual submissions have been vetted and 
shaped by lawyers and the influential members of claimant and Crown groups. There is 
certainly evidence of group co-ordination in the claimant submissions to the National 
Park inquiry. Individual claimants cited other claimants in their evidence, and it is clear 
that in some instances people were asked to cover certain issues by tribal leaders. 53 On 
. 
the Crown side it is also clear that witnesses were given advice by lawyers. 54 During the 
Crown hearings both Crown witnesses were reluctant to answer some questions, 
especially about future settlement options. One would expect some level of co-
ordination within groups, of course, and one would also expect a competent lawyer at 
least to read submissions and offer advice on the implications of particular statements 
and arguments. Unfortunately I was not privy ~o these processes, and am unable to shed 
much light on the level of influence lawyers and claim leaders had over the individual 
submissions to the National Park inquiry. The experience of reading the individual 
claimant submissions convinced me that they are primarily the work of separate people. 
Individual voices came through strongly, and the submissions often read like memoirs, 
chronicling tales of personal loss, sometimes sadly, sometimes angrily: Y ery few make 
51 Closing submissions of the Crown, "Chapter One: Introduction," Wai 1130, June 20, 2007, paragraphs 
33-4, 12. 
52 Binney, "History and Memory - the Wood of the Whau Tree," 83. · 
53 For example Stephen Asher stated in his evidence that the Ariki; Tumu Te Heuheu, had asked him to 
speak about the block of land called Rangipo North 8. Evidence of Stephen Asher regarding Rangipo 
North No 8, Wai 1130, #G39, October 2, 2006, paragraph 1, I. 
54 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 2008. 
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explicit demands, and do not seem like the work of political strategists. The two Crown 
witnesses made more dispassionate submissions, but also read like individual works. 
The use of these documents as data has benefits and difficulties. The submissions are a 
rich source of information and opinion on the relationship between Maori and 
govermilent agencies, both contemporary and historical. They are also highly political, 
and presented, as Tipene O'Regan put it, to achieve or deny 'a substantial result. ' 55 
Anthropologists Paul Antze and Michael Lambek describe the performative nature of 
memories presented in order to achieve a result: 
Memories are acts of commemoration, of testimony, of confession, of 
accusation. Memories do not merely describe the speaker's relation to the 
past but place her quite specifically in reference to it. As assertions and 
performances, they carry moral entailments of various sorts.56 
There has been a recent profusion of writing about 'memory,' or the processes by which 
people make sense of the past. The relationship between memory and academic history 
has been a focus of this literature. Pierre Nora, one of.the key figures in this field, 
describes the difference between memory and history like this: 
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains 
in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and 
. forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriat~on, susceptible to being long dormant and 
revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always 
problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer.57 
The relationship between what happened, or the rigorous attempt to reconstruct an 
accoun~ of those events, and the more dynamic, social process of 'remembering' the 
past, is a complicated equation. Some argue that academic history is just one of many 
influences on collective story-making. Greg Dening, acknowledging that there is no 
word in English which ,encompasses the many different ways of knowing the past, 
. 58' 
suggested-they might all be called history. 
Nora also writes of "lieux de memoire" or "sites of memory" where the transmission of 
stories about the past takes place: Examples of these are "[ m ]useums, archives, 
cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, ,depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, [ and] 
55 O'Regan, "Old Myths and New Politics," 11. 
56 Paul Antze and Michael Lambeck (eds) Tense Past:_ Cultural Essays i~ Trauma and Me;,,ory (New 
York: Routledge, 1996), xxv. 
57 Pierre Nora, !!Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire," Representations 26, no. Special 
Issue: Memory and Gounter-Memory (1989), 8. 
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fraternal orders."59 Nora argues that not only are the stories of the past produced at such 
sites, but our identities rest upon them as well. 60 Peter Novick has elaborated on·this 
point, explaining that 
... there is a circular relationship between collective identity and 
collective memory. We choose to center certain memories because they 
seem to us to express what is central to our collective identity. These 
memories, once brought to the fore, reinforce that form of identity. 61 
Henry Rousso, a French historian, wrote a groundbreaking book called The Vichy 
Syndrome (1991), an account of the way the Vichy regime's involvement with the Nazis 
had been communicated and understood in France over time. He describes the changing 
levels of attention paid to the history of the Vichy regime, noting a series of "crisis 
situations in which the presence of the past cannot be denied."62 
A Waitangi Tribunal inquiry can be seen as one such 'crisis situation.' It can also be 
seen as a very particular 'site of memory' in which official, organisational, cultural and 
scholarly versions of history are juggled and jousted over. Gillian Whitlock has written 
about the implications of the government's child removal policies in Canada and 
Australia becoming a site of memory. The recentness of the events being remembered, 
and the political context in which the events are being recalled, Whitlock argues, calls 
our attention to: 
... the connections between memory and· identity politics, and the ways in 
which acts of memory in the present construct changing relationships to 
the past. Here acts of remembering take on performative meaning within 
a charged field of contested moral and political claims.63 
The atmosphere in and around a Tribunal inquiry is well described as 'a charged field of 
contested moral and political claims.' This chapter has shown some of the ways it is 
'charged,' and broadly how the documents and submissions produced in inquiries are 
subject to those 1noral, political and institutional forces. The points made in this section 
will be returned to in the following chapters discussing both the history of Tongariro, 
and how this history has been portrayed in the inquiry. The next section of this chapter 
. 
. 
examines how the claim has affected the practice of relationships. 
59 Nora, "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux De Memoire," 12. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), 7. 
62 Henry Rousso , The Vichy Syndrome (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), 219. 
63 G Whitlock, "Active Remembrance: Testimony, Memoir, aJ?.d the Work of Reconciliation," in 
Rethinking Settler Colonialism, ed. Annie E. Coombes (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 
27. 
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How does the claim affect relationships? 
The chapter so far has discussed the internal workings of the claims process and its 
effects on the statements made to it in evidence. The claim is also playing an active role, 
however, in influencing the practice of relationships in the park. Many consultation 
processes were disrupted, and in some cases stopped, while the claim was in progress. 
In some cases personal relationships between DOC staff and Maori became fraught as 
controversial issues were raised and debated. Most relationships, however, continued to 
function, in a disrupted form, despite the disagreements expressed in the inquiry. Many 
people noted the opportunities for the relationship and for management that a Treaty 
settlement may offer, such as better structures and directions for involvement, and 
funding in the form of redress for Maori which will better enable them to participate. 
During the National Park inquiry, and for some time afterwards, formal consultation 
processes between DOC and iwi and hapu groups slowed or ground to a halt. One of the 
best-established and regular of the DOC-Maori connections - the liaison committee 
between DOC management and the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board - met only once in 
2006.64 This was a target for criticism during the claim. Tuwharetoa contended that 
"[fJailure to have regular meetings is ... symptomatic of a far from healthy 
-
relationship."65 It could also be the sign of a temporarily disrupted relationship·, 
however, as one interviewee from DOC suggested: 
" ... every time the liaison committee .hasn't met, it's been because 
. Tuwharetoa have decided not to meet. Sometimes it's in protest, 
sometimes it's just, they're busy, their attention is elsewhere."66 
Early in 2097 I was told. that "at the moment it's really hard to get meetings, no-one 
wants to talk," and that the joint committee to run the fishery had been a boon in this 
. . . 
respect because it meant people had to come together. 67 
Several of-the Maori members of the Conservation Board attended few or no meetings 
during 2007. 68 Observers tended to think this was because they were busy: "[l]ately 
other Maori members haven't been attending -because of the claim issues,"69 and that 
. this was.common when members were busy '-Yith tribal issues in general: "when there's 
64 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 8.105, 197. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 2008. 
67 DOC Manager 2, in interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
68 Minutes oftheTongariro/Taupo ConservationBoard; l6.2.07, 13.4.07, 15.6.07, 19.10.07; 07.12.07, 
available online at http://www.doc.govt.nz/templates/page.aspx?id=38898. 
69 Interview with Conservation Board Member 4, March 30, 2.007. 
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something going on sometimes you won't see a Maori face." 70 There was also 
indication that this was to do with a general trend at the time towards high level ·· 
negotiations, exemplified by the major settlement deal signed between Central North 
Island iwi, including Tuwharetoa, and the Crown in 2008.71 Project-based initiatives 
also encountered difficulties: a Tongariro Forest Management group could get iwi 
attendance at only two out of six meetings, and the Karioi Rahui partnership project 
with Nga.ti Rangi, often held up by DOC as a best practice example of working with 
iwi, was described as being in "a stuttery phase" in 2007, though my interviewee 
blamed this on the death of one board member and the departure of another. 72 
Another possible feature of the interruption in relationships is the fact that within the 
adversarial structure of Waitangi Tribunal inquiries, it does claimant groups no service 
to be seen as having a well-functioning relationship with a government department. 
Carrying on with the status quo could potentially be interpreted as a tacit acceptance of 
the status quo, so it is in the claimants' interests to pull back from interaction. The use 
of the lack of meetings as an attack on DOC in the claim is an indication that this 
possibility was not lost on the Tuwharetoa claimants. 
Some of these disruptions continued when the hearings ended. This may have been 
partly due to the ongoing effect of the debates that took place during the hearings. It is 
also an indication of the uncertainty in the relationship that will persist until after 
settlement. In July 2008 the process of consulting on new concession applications had 
stalled because Maori were finding it difficult to approve new concessions while 
settlement was pending: 
At the moment we're hearing all the_time from iwi that they are not 
wanting to give endorsement for concession applications, same issue with 
resource consents. I can say it because they say it to us all the time, 
they're finding it difficult to endorse, when their aspirations in that the 
park will be returned to them as owners, they don't want to be 
encumbered by concessions and decisions made when they weren't in 
that owner role. 73 · · 
In some cases personal relationships between DOC staff apd Maori were affected by the 
claim. Emotions occasionally ran high while these major issues of past and continuing 
injustice were being discussed and DOC staff came under so1ne attack. One of my 
70 Interview with Conservation Board Member 5, May 3, 2007. 
71 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 2008; Deed of Settlement of the Historical 
Claims of CNI (Central North Island) Forests Iwi Collective to the Central North Island Forests Lands, 
June 25 , 2008. 
72 Interview with DOC Manager 5. 
73 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, -2008. 
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interviewees said the Conservator "took bullets from everywhere" during the hearings. 74 
The best example of this was a debate over part of the Conservator's submission in 
which he said Hepi Te Heuheu had advocated the practice of heli-skiing on the 
mountains in the 1970s. During the hearings the lawyer for N gati Tuwharetoa said that: 
[ m ]y instructions are that Tuwharetoa are very upset that the mana of Sir 
Hepi has been belittled by suggesting that he would support heh-skiing 
within the peaks and that that is not consistent with the Tikanga that 
pertains to these mountains. 75 
The example shows the potential for damage to the relationship between DOC staff and 
Maori that the inquiry process can have. Paul Green withdrew the controversial 
sentences in his submission, saying he thought it was the best thing to do in the 
circumstances, which indicates a desire on his part to maintain relationships through the 
process. In an interview he spoke of being very cautious about what he said in the claim 
in order not to cause offence. 76 
Though there were disruptions, in general the personal relationships between DOC staff 
and Maori continued. The Conservator said he was still asked to come to tangi, and 
interrupted during meetings by Tuwharetoa leaders who wanted to introduce him to 
people. 77 The community liaison manager at Tongariro travelled to Australia with a. 
member of Tuwharetoa and to Canada with two members ofNgati Rangi as part of a 
research project on co-management in 2007. It seems that the longer-standing, closer 
relationships were less affected by the claim. 
(KM) ... is there a difference there between people who are more 
involved in park management and people who are less involved? 
. (PG) Yes, people who are less involved, they haven't been on the trust 
board or been key contacts, are probably impacted by the process more, 
in terms of relationships. They don't see what's going on, the day-to-day 
• stuff. And it's the same with us, the staff who are less involved get more 
upset at some of the things they see in evidence, than I do, because I 
understand the process.78 
There were some cases in the claim where Maori who work for DOC gave evidence 
against DOC in hearings. In one case th.is situation bothered the claimant considerably. 
Although that claimant felt the difficulty of wearing two hats at once, it did not cause 
74 DOC Manager 2, in interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
75 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4.1.12, 468. 
76 Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, in interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
77 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, March 4, 2008. 
7
·
8 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 200S. 
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significant problems in the relationship. 79 There were individual differences in response 
to the strategies employed during claims: 
I think everyone realises that in the claim, legal cases must be made, but 
the relationship goes on. And people deal with that differently, some find 
it difficult, some don't. Sometimes it's to do with the issues, sometimes 
the individuals involved. 80 
Among DOC staff and Maori who interact closely, the concerns raised in the claim were 
in the main part already understood. There is a substantial section of the wider Maori 
community, however, which distrusts DOC, and has done from long before the claim. 
Some of this distrust is general to government departments, but it also arises from 
specific issues around land ownership and land use restriction. It is possible that the 
animosity stirred up by the claim will further damage these relationships. On the other 
hand the settlement process will probably help to ease longstanding resentment: 
KM: Could it be damaging for your wider profile, potentially among the 
next generation of Maori? 
PG: I never really thought of that. Maybe, but I think the outcome will be 
the major thing. The leadership will be positive with the model, whatever 
model is the outcome there's bound to be a higher level of engagement. I 
think people will move fairly easily from the claim through the 
negotiation, through to implementation. Styles will change. 81 
At this point it is impossible to judge the outcomes of the Tribunal inquiry, or of the 
settle1nent negotiations that will follow it. Whatever the outcome in terms of ownership, 
structure and management of the national park, however, it is fairly certain that Maori 
groups will be in a better position to deal with it. 
Conclusion 
The claims process has a strong effect on the way the Crown-Maori relationship is 
characterised in inquiries . The format of inquiries and the pressure put on participants to 
conform to the strategies best suited to the success of their claim, or the defence against 
it, creates caricatured descriptions of the relationship. The parties are to a large extent 
forced into comers against each other. · This has caused difficulties in the ongoing 
relationship, with much less interaction occurring than usual, and some tensions. Those 
parties more closely involved in the relationship take a longer term perspective on these 
disruptions, and see them as a phase which will end when settlement is made. There 
79 Interview with Maori staff member of DOC, March 2, 2007; Interview with Tongariro-Taupo 
Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
80 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, July 22, 2008. 
81 Ibid. 
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may be some damage to relationships, but this will probably be outweighed by the 
benefits of a settlement deal. 
The next four chapters begin with a period of the park's history: its beginning; its 
evolution; the big changes in administration and Maori involvement from the 1970s; 
and the period of the National Park inquiry. All four chapters finish with an analysis of 
the way the Crown-Maori relationship in that period was characterised by the Crown 
and claimant parties in the National Park inquiry, and many of the issues raised in the 
first part of this chapter will be returned to in those discussions. 
--
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Chapter Five: Beginnings 1887-1907 
The district surrounding the national park is sometimes called the Volcanic Plateau, 
which conveys some of its grandeur and inhospitality. The story ofNgatoroirangi, the 
first Tuwharetoa ancestor to claim the lands and name the mountains, is even more 
evocative. There are multiple versions of the story, in which Ngatoroirangi, a tohunga 
(priest/magician/spiritual leader), climbed Tongariro in order to survey cl;nd lay claim to 
the area. The stories of his ascent vary as to whether he was alone or with a party of 
followers, with a companion or a slave. All stories tell ofNgatoroirangi being struck 
with the cold as he climbed the mountain, and calling to his sisters in Hawaiki 1 for fire 
to save him.2 The words he called: "Kuiwai e, Haungaroa e, homai he ahi, kei riro au i 
te Tonga" (Kuiwai, Haungaroa, send me fire or I shall be seized by the South Wind), 
are the origin of the name Tongariro ('Tonga' means South Wind; 'riro' means to 
seize). His sisters sent two spirit-creatures carrying baskets of embers to Ngatoroirangi, 
but in their hurry to get to him, the creatures spilt -most of the embers along the way, 
creating the volcanic activity from Wharekauri (White Island), through Rotorua and 
Taupe\ to the place where N gatoroirangi had stopped on the mountain. When the 
creatures arrived, only he kete tahi ( 9ne basket) of embers was left. This sprang forth as 
the Ketetahi Springs. N gatoroirangi was warmed, and able to continue to the top of 
Tongariro to claim the mountain and surrounding lands as home for his descendants. 
The names of Ruapehu and N gauruhoe also derive from this story. N gauruhoe ( or 
Auruhoe) is usually said to be the name of the slave or companion with N gatoroirangi 
on the cli1nb. Sometimes Ngauruhoe is said to have died of the cold, and his, or her, 
body thrown by Ngatoroirangi into the crater of the volcano for burial - or alternatively 
that she or he was killed by N gatoroirangi and thrown into the crater as a sacrifice to the 
gods.3 Another story has it that Ngatoroirangi was angered by the fact so many baskets 
of embers had spilled on the way, and thrust his paddle into the ground, where its 
handle vibrated with the force of the action: ngauru is to vibrate, hoe is a paddle, and 
1 Hawaiki is the name for the ancestral home country, from which the canoes departed for Aotearoa. 
Similar migration stories exist in other Polynesian countries. · 
2 In some stories Kuiwai and Haungaroa are in Aotearoa. 
3 John Te Hurinui Grace tells the sacrifice story. John Te H. Grace, Tuwharetoa: A Hist01y of the Maori 
People of the Taupo District (Auckland: Reed Books, 1959, reprinted 2005), 64. · 
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Ngauruhoe means the vibrating paddle.4 He also stamped his foot so hard it made a 
crater in the ground. Rua is the word for hole or crater, and pehu_ the word for stamp, so 
Ruapehu is the stamped crater. Pehu also means a loud noise or explosion, and 
sometimes the meaning of Ruapehu is given as simply a description of its frequent 
volcanic activity. The nineteenth century references to the mountains often use the name 
Tongariro to cover both Tongariro and Ngauruhoe, and sometimes for all three 
mountains. 
The Whanganui tribes to the south and west of Ruapehu have alternate names for the 
mountains, though Ruapehu, N gauruhoe and Tongariro are still the most commonly 
used. Ruapehu is sometimes Matua Te Mana, named because Ranginui, the sky father, 
placed the mountain in the centre of Te Ika a Maui (the Fish of Maui, the name of the 
North Island) as something of great mana to bring peace to the threshing fish. Matua Te 
Mana was lonely in the centre of the island by himself, and Ranginui took pity on him 
and sent him some companions. 
The two tribes share the story of the separation of the mountains. In the beginning there 
were six mountain companions all clustered together: Matua Te Mana, Matua Te Pono 
(Ngauruhoe), Matua Te Toa (Tongariro), Matua Te Tapu, (Tara11.aki), Tauhara, and 
Putauaki. These last four mountains all loved the female mountain, Pihanga, a ·perfectly 
curved hill to the south of present-day Turangi. They fought over her, and 
Tongariro/Matua te Toa won. The other three mountains went their separate ways, and 
when the sun came up the following morning they froze_into place. Putauaki and 
Tauhara travelled north~ast to the Bay of Plenty and Taupe\ respectively. Taranaki went 
west, carving the Whanganui River as he went. 
The Whanganui tribes are linked to the Whanganui River, which winds north down 
from Tongariro, west through Taumarunui, then south down to Whanganui, a small city 
on the southwest coast of the North Island, in the curve of the "great harbour" for which 
the river is named. 5 The upper river groups have kinship ties to Tuwharetoa, though the 
relationship has ranged from friendly to 'hostile at different points in time. 6 
4 Ka ngauru te puritanga o te hoe o Ngatoroirangi. The handle of the paddle of Ngatoroirangi vibrated. 
Interview with member of Tiiwharetoa, August 21 , 2009. 
5 
'Whanga' means harbour, and 'mu' is the word for large or great. Until 2009 the official written name 
of the city was 'W anganui.' · 
6 David Young, Woven by Water: Histories from the Whanganui River (Wellington: Huia Publishers, 
1998), 16. -
e 
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Early contact in the Tongariro area 
, , 
The area covered by the National Park inquiry has a complicated territorial history. The 
claim itself was separated from two larger district inquiries, the Central North Island 
and Whanganui Lands inquiries, because of the amount of overlap between them. 
Angela Ballara, a historian and anthropologist who contributed research to the inquiry, 
described some of the complexity in a preliminary report: 
The National Park Overlap Sub-district is ... by definition, an area more 
than most marked by overlapping iwi and hapu claims. The nature of 
Maori land use, land settlement, system of tenure and inter-iwi or inter-
hapu relations makes this true of most areas in Aotearoa-Te 
Waipounamu. But this overlap district covers an area where sequential 
streams of migration and settlement coming inland from the various 
coasts met and mingled, not once, but continually throughout many 
generations until interrupted by the Treaty of W aitangi and the onset of 
colonisation. In some cases, group migration continued beyond that time, 
sometimes following commercial opportunities or as a result of war, but 
more often in response to Crown activity, including land purchasing.7 
Most of the early contact between Maori and Pakeha was in the coastal areas. Traders 
and missionaries had been in operation in Aotearoa since the tum of the nineteenth 
century, but by 1840, when the Treaty was being taken around the country for signing 
and organised British settlement was underway, very few Pakeha had travelled to these 
mountains. The first recorded Pakeha trip through the upper Whanganui River, and also 
the first into the Taupo region was a kidnapping in 1831. 8 A few early travellers were 
drawn by a desire to climb · and conquer the mountains. This created conflict with local 
Maori, for whom the mountains were sacred, and climbing to the top a desecration. 9 
Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe and Tongariro, as with many other mountains in Aotearoa, were, 
and are, seen as ancestors by the Maori who live at their feet. The p~aks are the heads of 
the ancestors, and are therefore especially sacred. 
The highest chief of Tuwharetoa at the time of the Treaty was Mananui Te Heuheu 
Tukino II (Mananui), whose mana was closely associated with Tongariro. He was 
ada1nant that no one should climb the mountain. Edward J einingham Wakefield, the son 
7 Angela Ballara, National Park Overlap Subdistrict Pre-casebook Research Review, Wai 903 / 951 , 
2003 , 9. 
8 A whaler named Andrew Powers was kidnapped by a party of Tuwharetoa at Whanganui after a fight 
broke out between a Pakeha arms dealer, Joe Rowe, who was selling human heads, and the visiting 
Tuwharetoa. Rowe and another man were killed, Powers was kidnapped and taken all the way up the 
Whanganui river and across to Waitahanui, on the east coast of Lake Taupo. 
9 There appear to have been exceptional circumstances in wh1ch ascent to the peaks was appropriate, for 
example Nga ti Rangi had a practice of burial in the crater lake. · 
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of Edward Gibbon Wakefield, founder of the New Zealand Company10 and a key figure 
in the British settlement of New Zealand, travelled to the southern Taupo region in 1842 
and asked Mananui for permission to climb Tongariro. Wakefield quotes the chief as 
replying: 
I would do anything else to show you my love and friendship; but you 
d · , t , 11 must not ascen my tzpuna, or ances or . 
He added that the chief" ... constantly identified himself with the mountain and called it 
his sacred ancestor."12 Wakefield did not climb, out of respect for the chiefs request, 
although several other travellers before and after him, went ahead despite their 
knowledge of Maori disapproval, and sometimes under risk of attack. 13 
Mananui Te Heuheu did not sign the Treaty ofWaitangi. James Cowan, an early 
historian, and recipient of a suspiciously large number of good stories, alleges that Te 
Heuheu refused to enter into a pact with Queen Victoria with the following words: 
I shall not abase myself by placing my head between the thighs of a 
I Kin h . T - 14 woman . . . am g ere m aupo. 
Mananui's younger brother, Iwikau, did sign. 15 Cowan says that Iwikau was chastised 
by his older brother for this and made to return the red blanket h~ received in 
recognition of making his mark. 16 Ballara states that Iwikau would not have had the 
authority to sign on behalf ofTuwharetoa, or even his hapu, Nga.ti Turumakina. 17 
Mananui ~ontinued to assert his independence from Pakeha authority. When Edward 
J emingham Wakefield met the Tuwharetoa chief in 1842, Mananui said to him: 
10 The New Zealand Company was an immigration company aimed at creating a new settler nation in 
New Zealand based on agriculture and farming. The company set about acquiring lands as cheaply as they 
could from_local Maori, and marketed New Zealand to the poor and desperate of Britain as a place where 
they could build a better life. The New Zealand Company organised the settlement of six New Zealand 
towns and cities, one of which was Whanganui (then Wanganui). 
11 Edward J erningham Wakefield, Adventure in New Zealand from 183 9 to 1844; with Some Account of 
the Beginnil:zg of British Colonization of the Islands, II vols., vol. II (London; John Murray, 1845), 113 . 
12 Ibid. 
13 The explorer Kerry-Nicholls, for example, attemptmg a climb ofTongariro in 1872, feared attack from 
the local chief Te Hau. J. H. Kerry-Nicholls, The King Country; or, Explorations in New Zealand: A 
. . Narrative _of 600 Miles of Travel through Maoriland (London, reprinted Christchurch: Sampson Low, 
Marston, Searle & Rivington, reprint published by Caxton Press, Christchurch, 1884, reprinted 1974), 
177-8. 
14 · · J. Cowan, Sir Donald Maclean: The Story of a New Zealand Statesman (AH and AW Reed, 1940), 16. 
Cowan spells his name Maclean because that was how his son spelt it. It is more commonly written as 
''McLean. " 
15 Iwik:au succeeded Mananui as paramount chief when the former died in 1846, and became Iwik:au Te 
Heuheu Tiikino ill. See the brief genealogy at xxx 
16 Cowan, Sir DonaldMaclean: The Story of a New Zealand Statesman, 17. 
17 Angela Ballara, "Tijbal Landscape Overview, C.1800-C.1900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and 
National Park Inquiry Districts," (Crown Forestry Rental Trust, September 2004), 401-2. 
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I am king here, as my fathers were before me, and as King George and 
his fathers have been over your country. I have not sold my chieftainship 
to the Governor, as all the chiefs round the sea-coast have done, nor have ·· 
I sold my land. I will sell neither ... You White people are numerous and 
strong; you can easily crush us if you choose, and take possession of that 
which we will not yield; but here is my right arm, and should thousands 
of you come, you must make me a slave or kill me before I will give up 
my authority or my land ... Let your people keep the sea-coast, and leave 
the interior to us, and our mountain, whose name is sacred to the bones of 
my fathers. 18 
Wakefield assured him that " ... the southern pakehas, at least, would never annoy him 
by any attempts to wrest from him his chieftainship or his land," and moved on to 
Whanganui. 19 
The Upper Whanganui, at this time, was also hard to access. When Donald McLean, 
later to be an important politician, but at the time an official in the office of the 
Protector of Aborigines, visited the upper Whanganui in 1845, the area had "rarely been 
visited by Europeans."20 There was a missionary based at Whanganui, however, where 
there was none in Taupo. His name was the Reverend Richard Taylor, and he travelled 
up and down the river to visit Whanganui Maori. The politics of the river was 
complicated. David Young explains that the Whanganui tribes could roughly be 
segmented into three groupings according to their attitude to Europeans: the pro-Pakeha 
tribes of the "lower river, the hostile, "upper river" groups21 and the groups along the 
middle stretches who were pro- or anti-Pakeha at different times. These distinctions did 
22 not always hold, however. 
Several of the important upriver Whanganui chiefs signed the Treaty, with Topine Te 
Mamaku of the upriver hapu N gati Haua being a notable exception. David Young, who 
wrote a history of the Whanganui River, considers it most likely this was a considered 
choice rather than a historical accident.23 Te Mamaku was involved in fighting against 
Pakeha in the Hutt Valley, north of Wellington, and in Whanganui, in the 1840s. 
18 Wakefield, Adventure in New Zealand, vol II. , 112. . 
19 Ibid., 113 . I am not sure what Wakefield meant by ' southern ' Pakeha - perhaps he is just referring to 
the settlement of Wellington, where he and his father landed on the first settler ship, the To,y, in 183 9. 
2° Cowan, Sir Donald Maclean , 20. This was possibly because Mananui was outspokenly opposed to the 
spread of Christianity, especially among Tuwharetoa people. See ibid., 21 ; Wakefield, Adventure in New 
Zealand, vol II. , 117. 
21 A Pakeha shorthand for the two thirds of the river upstream. Young- suggests the term "upriver" as 
applied to Whanganui Maori might have been based more as a stat"ement of perceived anti-Pakeha politics 
than geographical positioning. Young, Wo ven by Water, 21 . 
22 Ibid. , 20-1. 
23 Ibid., 29. Te Mamaku was from Taumarunui. 
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There were several violent incidents between Maori and settlers in the years following 
the Treaty, some involving the deployment of British soldiers. Not long after the Treaty 
was signed, in 1845-6, fighting broke out between British forces and Maori in the 
northern North Island. Hone Heke, the first chief to sign the Treaty, repeatedly felled 
the flagpole at Kororareka (present-day Russell). When British security around the pole 
intensified, Heke allied with another prominent local chief, Kawiti, and their men 
attacked the soldiers stationed at Kororareka, beginning a series of battles lasting a year. 
In the Wellington region there were tensions over land sales which culminated in a short 
series of battles in 1846, in which the Whanganui chief Topine Te Mamaku was 
involved.24 Later the same year, in Whanganui, an accident in which a Pakeha 
midshipman shot an old local chief sparked a series of violent incidents along the river. 
Tensions were already high between settlers and upriver Maori, and a stockade full of 
almost 200 British soldiers had been built in 1846, before the accident occurred. 
Although the chief accepted that it was an accident, the British mishandled the situation 
by hiding the midshipman away in the stockade. 25 Six of the injured chiefs young 
relatives retaliated by attacking a settler family in their home, killing most of them. 
Several of the local Putiki Maori assisted the British soldiers by tracking down the 
killers . Five of the six were delivered to the stockade, and three were hanged. Ip 
response to the hangings, and the actions of the Putiki Maori in capturing the young 
men, Te Mamaku, along with the chiefs Mak:etu, Ngapara and Te Pehi Turoa, led 600 
men into the Pakeha settlement at Whanganui. The war party occupied parts of the 
settlement and forced most settlers into the stockade, or out of Whanganui altogether. 
Fighting CO!].tinued for several weeks. Maketu was killed, but the casualties on both 
sides were low and a truce was called in the spring. 26 
Land loss and Maori political moyements 
The decades following the Treaty saw a vast amount of land pass out of Maori 
ownership and into the hands of settlers and the state. Ric~ard Boast puts the figure at 
nearly two-thirds of the country by 1860 - most of this accounted for by the Kemp 
purchases of almost the whole South Island, but a substantial amount of land was 
alienat~d in the North Island as well.27 Many Maori leaders were concerned with the 
24 James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland: 
Penguin Books, 1986), 73-4. 
25 Young, Woven by Water, 35. 
?6 . . 
- Ibid. , 35-38. . . 
27 Boast, Buylng the Land, Selling the Land, 26. 
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pace of land loss, and a movement began in the western and central North Island calling 
for a halt to land sales, and a measure of Maori self-government. What form this self-
government would take was discussed at a series of meetings in the 1850s, and a 
Kingship was decided upon. A selection of chiefs with the requisite lineage, wealth and 
standing were offered the title of King. Included among them were Iwikau Te Heuheu28 
and Topia Turoa, a great chief of the Whanganui district, both of whom refused.29 At a 
hui held at Pukawa, Iwikau's base on the southern shore of Lake Taupe\ it was decided 
that the Kingship would be offered to the Waikato chief Potatau Te Wherowhero, who 
was well-positioned in the centre of the North Island. After some persuading, Potatau 
accepted the role. 30 
Lindsay Cox, in his book on Maori unity movements, described the motivations behind 
the 'King movement' or 'Te Kingitanga,' and said the most important of these was to 
halt the sale of land. Te Kingitanga was to be "a recognized institution to control Maori 
land interests." 31 The idea of a central authority was an attempt to emulate the unity 
they perceived as being key to Pakeha strength. The individual chiefs were to retain 
their authority over their own people, but become part of a larger alliance. The 
movement was not anti-Pakeha: Ballara argues that Potatau Te Wherowhero was chosen 
partly because of his good relationship with successive Pakeha governors. 32 Wiremu 
Tamihana, a key figure in the King movement, wrote to Governor Gore-Browne in 
1861, saying: "I do not des~re to cast the Queen from this island ... but from my piece. I 
28 Iwikau Te Heuheu Tukino III, Mananui Te Heuheu's younger brother, who succeeded him in the 
paramountcy. Mananui was killed in a terrible landslide in 1846, which wiped out the village of Te Rapa 
on the southern shore of Lake Taupo and ·killed over 50 people. Mananui Te Heuheu's only surviving son 
was renamed Horonuku (landslide) to memorialise the event. Horonuku succeeded I wikau to the 
paramountcy in 1862. 
· 
29 Ballara, "Tribal Landscape Overview, C.1800-C.1900 in the Taupo_, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National 
Park Inquiry Districts," 439. She cites her reference for the offer to Topia Turoa comes as the journals of 
Richard Taylor, Vol.X, 127, held at the Auckland Institute and Museum. David Young says that the offer 
was to Te Pehi Pakaro Turoa, Topia 's father, but his source for this is unclear. Young, Woven by Water, 
39. 
30 Ballara, "Tribal Landscape Overview, C.1800-C. l 900 in the Taupo, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National 
Park Inquiry Districts," 439. 
31 Lindsay Cox, Kotahitanga: The Search for Maori Political Unity (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 46. 
. 
32 Angela Ballara, "Introduction " in Te Kzngitanga: The People of the Maori King Movement: Essays 
from the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Wellington: Auckland University Press with Bridget 
Williams Books and the Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, 1996), 7. · 
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am the person to look after my piece. "33 Kingitanga supporters did, however, monitor 
the presence of Pakeha within their borders and many Pakeha were refused entry.34 
Ngati Tuwharetoa were heavily involved in Te Kingitanga- Iwikau Te Heuheu, as 
previously noted, hosted the meeting at which the King was selected, and had been a 
contender for the role himself. He is said to have raised a flagstaff at that meeting, with 
flax ropes attached to it. He explained that the flagstaff was Tongariro, the central 
mountain of the North Island. The ropes were then cast out to the gathered chiefs, and 
they were invited to name the sacred mountains of their tribe, and tie the rope to a peg 
in front of their group to signify their support to the Kingitanga. Cox described this as 
"a powerful representation of the steadfast support of the Kingitanga which existed by 
1857."35 Support for Te Kingitanga was also widespread in the Upper Whanganui 
regions, where some hapu started restricting Pakeha access to the river. 36 
In 1860, in the western North Island province ofTaranaki, a dubious land sale sparked a 
war between the British forces and a group of Taranaki Maori led by the chief Wiremu 
Kingi. Just weeks after the fighting in Taranaki began, several Whanganui chiefs (Te 
Hipango and the brothers Te Mawae and Hori Kingi Te Anaua) organised a rally in 
Whanganui to express loyalty to the settlers. About 300 Maori a~d 100 settlers heard 
their offer of support "to God, the law and the Bible in a sacred covenant."37 Some of 
the Kingitanga Maori came to assist in the fighting in Taranaki, which was the 
justification used by Crown officials for the British invasion of the Waikato, also known 
as the King Country, in 18 63. 
During the _warfare in the King C0untry some Tuwharetoa warriors fought alongside the 
Waikato tribes, most notably at Orakau, where the Tuwharetoa chiefs Wi Kohika and 
Te Paerata were killed, along with many of their followers. Horonuku Te Heuheu (the 
son ofMapanui) also went to Orakau but arrived too late to join the warriors at the pa 
(fortified _village). 38 Some upper-Whanganui Maori also fought in the Waikato battles -
Topine Te Mamaku was present at Orakau, with a section of his Ngati Haua hapu. 39 
' 33 Tamehana to Gore Browne, June 7, 1861 , Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives 
(AJHR), _E-lB, 19, cited in James Belich, Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from 
Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1996), 234. 
34 Young, Woven by Water, 47. 
35 Cox, Kotahitanga , 50-1. 
36 b Young, Woven y Water, 47. 
37 Ibid. 
38 · Grace, Tuwharetoa, 463-9. 
39 Ballara, 11Tribal L~dscape Overview/ 452. 
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A number of new religious movements sprang up around Aotearoa during this period, 
combining parts of Christianity with Maori practices and beliefs. One of these new 
religions was Pai Marire, or Hauhauism, which began as a peaceful movement in 
Taranaki, but many of its later offshoots were violent. Hauhauism spread across the 
upper reaches of the Whanganui, overlapping heavily, but not entirely, with Kingitanga 
support.40 Whanganui Hauhauism was of the militant variety, and in 1864 an attack on the 
Pakeha settlement at Whanganui (then Wanganui) was planned. The downriver chiefs 
who had pledged to protect the settlement issued a challenge to the Hauhau, with whom 
they shared close kinship ties, to fight. In a ritualised battle at Moutoa ( also known as 
Pakaitore), where a deliberately limited number of fighters were pitted against each 
other, the Hauhau were defeated with many losses. The battle of Moutoa has been 
remembered bitterly by the people of the Whanganui River as a conflict in which 
brothers killed brothers.41 
The central North Island was to see another round of warfare in the late 1860s, when the 
prophet leader Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Turuki (Te Kooti), who had attacked Pakeha 
settlements on the East Coast, came to the volcanic plateau to try and establish a new 
base. Leaving some of his followers in Tokaanu he travelled, in the company of 
Horonuku Te Heuheu, to seek the support of King Tawhiao (Potatau Te Wherowhero's 
son and successor). Horonuku later fought alongside Te Kooti at Te Porere, very close 
to the national park, where they were defeated by a confederation of British and pro-
government Maori troops from the lower Whanganui region, led by Te Keepa Te 
Rangihiwinui (Te Keepa), in 1869.42 Te Kooti took refuge in the King Country, and did 
not re-emerge. 
The participation of Te Heuheu and his men i~ this warfare is still controversial. Te 
Kooti may have forced him to come and fight. It is also possible that his participation 
was entirely voluntary. Ken Gartner explains the difficult position Horonuku would 
have been in, whether or not Te Kooti attempted to force him: . 
40 y 
On the one hand, he had to maintain his mana amongst those N gati 
Tuuwharetoa who supported Te Kooti, and on the other hand, Te ~ooti 
was obviously a threat to his mana as paramount chief of the Ngati 
Tuuwharetoa tribe. His difficulty was in maintaining his mana in the face 
of both of these threatening forces while simultaneously hoping not to 
oung, Woven by Water, 56-64. 
41 Young, Woven by Water, 64. 
42 Te Keepa Te Rangihiwinui was also known as Major Kemp: He was a famous leader ofpro-
government Maori troops. 
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diminish his mana later with the government and those (including various 
Tuuwharetoa hapuu) allied with it in deadly opposition to Te Kooti. 43 
Gartner considers it most likely that Te Heuheu joined Te Kooti with some reluctance.44 
After the defeat at Te Porere, the colonial government also had a difficult decision to 
make regarding their treatment of Horonuku. They wanted to punish him for his 
involvement in the warfare, but not severely, as they sought him as an ally in the central 
North Island, which the government was very anxious to open up to settlement and, 
more particularly, to a central railway line. 45 Horonuku was placed under temporary 
house arrest on the east coast, but was soon freed without trial. 46 
The Native Land Court 
The Native Land Court was set up by the Native Land Acts of 1862 and 1865, and 
evolved through the various further Native Lands Acts and amendments of the 1860s 
and seventies. Its purpose was to hear claims regarding the ownership of Maori land and 
award title to lists of individual owners. This was seen as essential for the progress of 
the New Zealand economy, by changing Maori customs of communal ownership into 
Pakeha customs of legal title, and allowing Maori to 'develop' their land, or to sell it to 
Pakeha settlers. In practice it was an enormously effective vehicle for separating Maori 
from their lands. James Belich describes a 'vortex' created by the cost of attending court 
procedures, and of having land surveyed, and forcing Maori to sell their land to pay off 
the debt i!).curred by proving their ownership of the same land.47 The need for claimants 
to be present at hearings in order to have their rights acknowledged created injustices 
for thos·e unable to attend hearings, sometimes because they were attending other Native 
Land Co-µrt hearings running at the same time. Sir Hugh Kawharu called the court "a 
veritable_engine of destruction for any ~ribe's tenu~e of land anywhere."48 A recent book 
by Richard Boast provides a remind~r that ~any of the land sales were entered into 
. 
freely and willingly by Maori, but there is no doubt that the process was open to 
. 49 
corruptio~ . 
' 43 Kenneth Conrad Gartner, "Te Kooti Arikirangi Te Tuuruki: His Movements and Influence within the 
Ngaati Tuuwharetoa Region 1869-70." (Master's Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991), 164-5. 
44 Ibid. , 165 . . 
45 Robyn Anderson, Tongariro National Park, 48, 63. 
46 Ibid. , 48. 
47 Belich, Making Peoples, 258-9. 
48 Ian Hugh Kawharu; Maori Land Tenure: Studies of a 'Changing Institution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1977), 15. ._ 
49 Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land. 
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Throughout the 1870s Tiiwharetoa land remained in the King Country, unsurveyed and 
in Tiiwharetoa control. The Native Land Court was encroaching on the area, however, 
and Horonuku Te Heuheu faced the prospect of having other iwi claim the margins of 
his lands. Seeking to have a Court hearing to establish the boundaries between the lands 
of Tiiwharetoa and their easterly neighbour, N gati Kahungunu, he found that a recent 
amendment to the Native Land Act meant that a hearing to establish a border was no 
longer possible. 50 In order to have the boundary line established it was necessary to put 
all Tiiwharetoa lands through the court, and in 1886 Horonuku put the Tauponuiatia 
block before the Native Land Court. Angela Ballara offers an explanation of his 
motivations in doing so: 
The Tauponuiatia block was born of anxiety for the future. Horonuku was 
trying to put a boundary around his people's lands, including those of his 
wider kin links outside of Taupo, within which control should remain in 
the hands of the Maori owners of the land ... It was clear at the great 
meeting at Poutu in September 1885 that Ngati Tuwharetoa opinion was 
far from united as to the proper course of action: whether to renew the 
18 5 6 covenant of I wikau and join with the Kingitanga, boycotting the 
Land Court and most other colonial institutions, or to permit the Court's 
workings and all that went with it. 51 
The mountains were part of the southern Tauponuiatia lands. There is some evidence 
that Horonuku was worried by the idea of the mountain lands going through the Native 
Land Court. James Cowan, who wrote the first Tongariro National Park handbook in 
1927, provided a reconstru~ted account of what Te Heuheu said to Laurence Grace 
(Horonuku's son-in-law, and son of the missionary Thomas Grace), regarding the 
prospect: 
"If', he said, "our mountains ofTongariro are included in the_blocks 
passed through the Court in the ordinary way, what will become of them? 
They will be cut up and perhaps sold, a piece going to one pakeha and a 
piece to another. They will become of no account, for the tapu will be 
gone. Tongariro is my ancestor, my tupuna; it is my head; my mana 
centres round Tongariro. My father's bones lie there to-day. You know 
how my name and history ate associated with Tongariro. I cannot consent 
to the court passing these mountains through in the ordinary way. After I 
am dead, what will be their fate? What am I to do about them?52 
50 W.W. Harris, "Three Parks: An Analysis· of the Origins and Evolution of the New Zealand National 
Park Movement" (Master 's Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1974), 51. 
51 Ballara, "Tribal Landscape Overview, C.1800-C.1900 in the Taup6, Rotorua, Kaingaroa and National 
Park Inquiry Districts," 146. 
52 James Cowan, The Tongariro National Park (Wellington: Tongariro National Park Board, 1927)~ 30-1. 
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In response Laurence Grace is alleged to have suggested "why not make them a tapu 
place of the Crown, a sacred place under the mana of the Queen?"53 Cowan lists 
Laurence Grace among his informants so the quote probably comes from him. Tureiti 
Te Heuheu, Horonuku's son, was also one of the listed informants. Grace had become 
the Member of Parliament for Tauranga in 1885, and the Native Minister, John 
Ballance, seems to have urged him to talk to his father-in-law about the mountains. 54 It 
is most likely that Laurence Grace raised the idea of gifting the mountains with the 
paramount chief, although there was also a meeting between Ballance and Horonuku 
where the matter was discussed. 55 
The idea of a national park 
In 1872, the United States federal government passed the Yellowstone National Park 
Act, making more than 3000 square miles of Wyoming into the world's first national 
park. 56 The resident Native American population was forcibly removed in order for the 
park to become an uninhabited wilderness. 57 The idea .caught on, and national parks 
began to appear in other British settler nations. The park that is now called the Royal 
National Park was created in Sydney, Australia in 1879, and BanffNational Park was 
established in the Rocky Mountains of Canada in 1885. A prominent New Zealand 
politician and former Premier, William Fox, visited Yellowstone National Park, and the 
Yosemite Valley (then a Californian state park) in 1873, and wrote to the then Premier 
of New Z~aland, Julius Vogel, the following year: 
It is not my intention to dilate on the wonderful and the beautiful which 
abound in connection with Rotomahana and its terraces. I wish rather to 
-draw attention to the different groups of springs, with a view to their 
· sanitary use ... The government of the United States had hardly become 
acquainted with the fact that they possessed a territory comprising similar 
· volcanic wo11-ders at the forks ·of the Yellow River and Missouri, than an 
act of Congress passed reserving a block of land of 60 miles square, 
· within which the geysers and hot springs are, as public parks, to be for 
ever under the protection of the States; and it will doubtless take care that 
they shall not become the prey of private speculators, or of men to whom 
53 Ibid. . 
54 Laure~ce Grace to Ballance, 6 January 1886, LS 1-29805, National Archives, Wellington. 
55 Notes from an interview between The Hon. Te Heuheu Tukino, M.L.C, and The Hon W. Nosworthy, 
Minister of Tourist and Health Resorts, Wellington, 13. November 1922. TO 1 52/54, National Archives. 
56 Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 2nd ed. (London: Yale University Press, 1973), 
112. . . 
57 Stephen Gennie, American Green: Class, Crisis, and the Deployment of Nature in Central Park, 
Yosemite, and Yellowstone (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2001), 9. 
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a few dollars may present more charms than all the finest works of 
creation. 58 
Hot springs were an initial focus of reserve-making, as they were considered to have 
healing properties. In 1881 the Thermal Hot Springs Act was passed, and tourism 
facilities were established at Rotorua and Te Aroha. 59 
The idea of reserving areas into public ownership for public use had precedent in New 
Zealand. Queen Victoria's instructions to the first Governor mentioned reserving 
"places fit to be set apart for the recreation and amusement of the Inhabitants of any 
Town or Village or for promoting the health of such Inhabitants."60 What distinguished 
a national park from any other kind of reserve in New Zealand was not a clearly defined 
concept in this period. Queen Victoria's instructions are a rough description of what a 
park or reserve meant at the time, and a national park, ( distinguished, in the United 
States, from State Parks) was the same idea taken to a larger scale. "National park" was 
a grand title to be bestowed on grand scenery, particularly if it contained hot pools, and 
beyond that there was very little idea of a national park's purpose or how precisely to 
protect it, other than to keep its ownership out of private hands. In Tongariro this is 
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that nothing was done to protect it until a position of 
"Honorary Ranger" was created in 1914.61 The board constituted under the 1894 Act to 
manage the park did not 1neet until after 1900, was abolished in 1914, and did not meet 
regularly until after it was reconstituted in 1922. -
Park advocates and government agents were motivated to acquire the central North 
Island mountains for a national park by a mixture of ideas about what a national park 
was, or could be. The mountains were prized for the recreational opportunities they 
offered in the form of hiking, mountaineering and skiing, as well as the potential for 
these activities to be lucrative tourist attractions. The demand for public hot springs_ was 
a feature of Tongariro 's appeal as a national park; the Ketetahi Springs were often 
referred to in comments recommending reserving the area. The grandeur and wonder of 
the scenery were also frequently mentioned. There was an idea of the_ mountains, all 
active volcanoes, as a scientific learning ground, and the strong probability that New 
58 Fox to Vogel, 1 August 1874, AJHR, H26, 1874. 
59 Lake Rotomahana, near Rotorua, was then the centre· of tourist activity, but the eruption of Mt 
Tarawera on 10 June 1886 destroyed the pink and white terraces for which it was so popular. 
60 Queen Victoria's instructions to the first Governor of New Zealand, 5 December 1840, Repro 13 , No. 
43 , National Archives, cited in Robin Hodge, The Scenic Reserves .of the Whanganui River 1891-1986 , 
Wai 903 , #A34, (commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, 2002), 12. 
61 Brad Coombes, Tourism Development and Its Influence on ihe Establishment and Management of 
Tongariro National Park, Wai 1130, #Il , (commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 2007), 141. 
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Zealand politicians wished to keep up with the international Joneses - by 1885 the 
United States, Australia and Canada all had national parks. William Fox either felt or 
played into this competitive streak when he wrote that the Americans had, without 
hesitation, made a similar area into a national park. 62 
One of the main purposes of a national park today, as a place for native species to live 
and be protected, was conspicuously absent from the government's motivations for 
making the mountains a national park. Tongariro's first ranger, John Cullen, was in fact 
very eager to make the park a place for introduced species, particularly of the sort that 
were good sport for hunting. He introduced deer, grouse, and heather to provide a 
habitat for the grouse. His practices were not shut down by the National Park Board 
until 1926.63 Park management staff at Tongariro still struggle today to contain the 
heather and deer that Cullen lovingly introduced to the slopes more than a hundred 
years ago. 
A nascent movement towards protecting native species was occurring in some circles in 
New Zealand in the 1870s, but these ideas were not discernable in the debates around 
reserving Tongariro. Early environmentalis1n in New Zealand was focused on the 
protection of the 'wilderness,' especially rivers, forests and enda_1;_1gered species. It 
stemmed from concern, beginning in the mid 1800s, that some of New Zealand' s native 
forests and birds were in danger of er~dication. 64 Acclimatisation societies, established 
across the country to bring in and manage new populations of exotic plants and animals, 
mainly brought from -Britain, played a vital role in both the decline in native birds and 
plants, and the early efforts to protect them. 65 The first campaigners for protection 
measures over certain native plants and animals, (who were often primarily concerned 
with ensuring future ·supply of these species as resources), had to fight against a 
prevailing belief that the replaceme~t of ind~genous species by plants and animals from 
the Northern hemisphere was a natural evolutionary process. 66 The death of many Maori 
from European diseases was also seen as part of this trend. 67 
62 · Fox to Vogel, August 1 1874, inAJHR H26, 1874. 
63 Meeti~g of the Tongariro National Park Board, 7 June 1926, TO 1 52/59/1 part 1, National Archives. 
64 Ross Galbreath; "Displacement, Conservation and Customary Use of Native Plants and Animals in 
New Zealand," New Zealand Journal of History 36, no. 1 (2002): 37. 
65 See Paul Star, "New Zealand's Changing Natural History: Evidence from Dunedin, 1868-1875.," New 
Zealand Journal of History 32, no. 1 (1998); Ross Galbreath, Working for Wildlife: A History of the New 
Zealand Wildlife Service (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books Limited, 1993). · 
66 Galbreath, "DisplaGement, Conservation and Customary Use," 3 6-7. · 
67 Ibid. , 36. 
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Maori had been expressing concern about the disappearance of the forests and birds 
years before the alarm was raised by Pakeha observers. A Maori newspaper, Te ·Hokioi, 
entreated its readers in 1863 to stop burning the forests, or there would be no trees left 
for future generations. 68 Their concern was for their food resources, particularly the 
native birds, and criticism was also levelled at European practices of hunting for sport 
rather than food. 69 The idea of creating reserves, however, was a uniquely European 
response to the problem. 70 
During the 1890s, support for scenery protection was growing, both inside and outside 
parliament.. From 1888, Scenery Protection Societies began to be established in most of 
the main towns and cities in the country. These societies, composed largely of middle-
class professional men, had a reverence for nature, and encouraged others to experience 
it for themselves. They also advocated for the protection of breeding areas for native 
birds, and the setting aside of forest remnants, especially near urban areas. Their 
successes were largely dependent on such areas not being of major commercial value. 71 
The beginnings of Tongariro National Park 
The beauty of the Tongariro area received national attention when, in 1883, J.H Kerry-
Nicholls began his travels in the King Country. Instalments of his travel writing were 
published in the New Zealand Herald (a widely read newspaper based in Auckland), 
and the following year the ~ollated columns were published as a book. As part of his 
travels he climbed both Tongariro/Ngauruhoe and Ruapehu. Kerry-Nicholls' account 
contains the first written suggestion of reserving land in the Tongariro area, specifically 
the Te Pakaru plain, a stretch of land to the northwest of the mountains, as a "public 
domain": 
68 Ibid., 42. 
... a region designed, as it were, by the artistic hand of nature for a 
national recreation-ground, where countless generations of men might 
assemble to marvel at some of the grandest works of the creation. 
With the Te Pakaru Plain proclaimed as a public domain, New Zealand 
would possess the finest and most unique park in t~e world. For 
healthfulness of climate, variety of scenery, and volcanic and th~rmal 
wonders, there would be no place to equal it in the northern or southern 
69 Galbreath, "Displacement, Conservation, and Customary Use," 43. 
70 Geoff Park, Effective Exclusion? An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses · 
Concerning the Indigenous Flora and Fauna, 1912-1983 (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 2001), 318-9. 
71 Paul Star and Lynne Lochhead, "Children of the Burnt Bush: New Zealanders and the Indigenous 
Remnant, 1880-1930," in Environmental Histories of New Zealand, ed. Eric Pawson and Tom Brooking 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2002), 124-5. 
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hemisphere, no spot where within so small a radius could be seen natural 
phenomena so varied and so remarkable. It would embrace withip its 
boundaries the hot springs of Tongariro and those ofTokanu [sic], and 
would stretch from the waters of Lake Tau po to the shores of Rotoaira. 
The surrounding table-land, with its millions of acres of open plains 
covered with rich volcanic soil, should eventually become the granary of 
the North Island; while the Kaimanawa Mountains and the Tuhua should 
give forth their mineral treasures on either side.72 
In 1884 the question was raised in Parliament: would the government take steps to 
reserve the mountains of Tongariro, N gauruhoe and Ruapehu as a national park? 73 The 
Lands Minister, John Ballance,74 to whom the question had been addressed, replied that 
at present they could not, as the mountains were not within the purview of the Thermal 
Springs Act. He added, however, that the government would do all they could to prevent 
the mountains from falling into private ownership until some kind of reserve could be 
made. 75 
By 1886 the reservation of the mountains had become one of Ballance's four main 
priorities in the area, as recorded by Laurence Grace: 
1st the acquirement on behalf of the Crown of lands in the interior of the 
North Island, as near as possible to the Main Trunk Line of Railway now 
in the course of construction by the Government. 
2nd That the Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe, Tongariro mountains and the principal 
thermal springs in the Taupo country be made inalienable reserves. 
3rd That every endeavour should be made to settle the Native tribes of 
Taupo permanently on portions of their tribal lands which can only be 
· done by putting their lands through the Court and individualising their 
titles thereto as thoroughly as possible. 
. 4th That a land court be ordered to sit at Taupo to enable the Natives to 
give effect to these objects.76 
The last 0fthese objectives was in motion from October 1885, when Te Heuheu and 
"the Nativ.es of Taupo" made an application for the Tauponuiatia block to the Native 
Land Co-q.rt. A letter from Ballance to Laurence Grace at the time agreed that "the 
present time appears to offer special facility'' . for the acquisition of large amounts of 
unoccupied land in the Taupo area, and reiterated that: 
72 Kerry-Nicholls, The King Country, 302-3 . 
73 Raised by Alfred Newman, MP for Thorndon, 17 October 1884, NZPD, vol. 49, 1884, 532. 
74 Ballance also held the Native Affairs, Immigration and Defence portfolios. 
75 • 17 October 1884, NZPD, vol. 49, 1884, 532. 
76 As communic~ted.to Laurence Grace in a conversation at Parliament, and recalled by Grace in a letter 
to Ballance . Grace to Ballance~ 6 January 1886, in LS 1-29805, National Archives. 
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It is my intention that the Ruapehu, Ngauruhoe, and Tongariro mountains 
and the principal thermal springs should be made inalienable reserves 
absolutely inal_ienable except to the Crown.77 
The negotiations over the mountain lands were conducted with this potential gift in 
mind. In the Native Land Court hearings in early 1886, title to the Tongariro 1 and 
Ruapehu 1 blocks, which covered a land area within a two and three mile radii around 
the Tongariro and Ruapehu peaks, were each issued to seven chiefs. Further subdivision 
had to be negotiated in order for Horonuku Te Heuheu' s name to be vested alone in the 
peaks. Horonuku's immediate hapii was Ngati Tiirumakina, based at Waihi on the 
southern shores of Lake Taupe\ there were other hapii living closer to, sometimes even 
on, the mountains. Horonuku therefore had to seek the approval of the local chiefs in 
order to have his name placed alone on the title to the blocks containing the peaks of the 
mountains. These negotiations were successful; the peaks, or blocks Tongariro lA and 
Ruapehu lA, which were comprised of the land within one mile radii of the peaks, were 
vested solely in Horonuku Te Heuheu. On September 27th 1887, Horonuku signed the 
title over to Queen Victoria in a deed of conveyance. 
Five days before the signing, Horonuku had sent a letter to the Minister for Native 
Affairs, John Ballance. In it he informed Ballance that he and some of his people had 
just spent several days talking to the Under-secretary of Native Affairs, T.W. Lewis, 
about making the mountains a national park. He wrote that they regarded it as "a matter 
of great importance" 78 and that "the minds of some of my people were not clear on the 
subject." 79 Horonuku confirmed that he would make a gift of the peak blocks, as he had 
promised to Ballance at Rotorua. He made two· requests to Ballance in the letter: firstly 
for the bones of his father Mananui to be removed from the mountain and a tomb 
erected for him by the Government, and secondly that when he, Horonuku, died, his son 
Tureiti would inherit the position of Trustee of the national park. 80 
On the 26th of September that year there was a change of government, but Lewis 
received the letter, and wrote back to Horonuku saying that both Ballance and his 
successor, Edwin Mitchelson, had read his words. Lewis confirmed that both 
Horonuku's requests would be carried out by the government, and passed on 
77 Ballance to L M Grace, 7 January 1886 in LS 1-29805, National. Archives. 
78 rr • 11 e mea nuz rawa. 
79 Kihai ano nga whakaaro o etahi o nga tangata o taku iwi i tino marama ki tana mea. 
80 Te Heu Heu to Ballance, 23 September 1887, in MA-MLP 1 1903/118, part 1, National Archives. 
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Mitchelson's thanks "for the manner in which you have carried out your promise of a 
gift ... ,,81 
At the time there was some resistance to the alienation of the peaks, and the purchasing 
of the lands around them. These protests came from within Tiiwharetoa and from 
surrounding tribes. In May 1887 the Tiiwharetoa chief Te Huiatahi (one of the owners 
of Ruapehu land), on behalf of himself and 180 others, wrote to Ballance protesting at 
the notion that Horonuku alone should be allowed to give away the land as a public 
recreation ground. The letter called the relationship between Horonuku and 'Mr. Grace' 
(probably Laurence's brother William, a land agent), that of 'confederates' conducting 
secret dealings that excluded the rest of Tiiwharetoa. 82 Groups from Whanganui and 
Ngati Kahungunu, the iwi to the east of the mountains, both had grievances over the 
Tauponuiatia hearing. The Whanganui chief Te Keepa made a petition complaining that 
Whanganui mana over the mountains had not been acknowledged. 83 The large number 
of petitions against the Native Land Court's judgements on the Tauponuiatia block led 
to the Tauponuiatia Royal Commission in 1889, but the southern blocks, which 
included the mountain lands, were not reconsidered. 
The 'Gift' 
There is little evidence available about Horonuku's motivations for signing the deed of 
gift, or his understanding of the transaction. There is Cowan's account, probably from 
Laurence Grace, which describes Horonuku being afraid that the land would be 
subdivided and sold to Pakeha ifhe did not intervene. The previously mentioned letter 
from Horonuku to the Native Minister, Ballance, on the 23 rd of September 1887, 
suggests that there was dissent, or at least confusion, among N gati Tiiwharetoa about 
.. 
the conv~yance, which concerned him .. Forty-five years later, a conversation between 
• 
Tureiti Te Heuheu(Horonuku's son) and the Minister for Tourist and Health Resorts, 
through a translator, Captain Vercoe was transcribed by an unknown note-taker and 
indicates that Tureiti, and probably his father also, believe~ that the Te Heuheu family 
had retained shares in the title of the peak blocks: 
• 
. . . seeing the other Rangatiras my Father put into the other sub-division 
had consented. to sell, and the Government were acquiring that part of the 
-country, and also that the Prime Minister had agreed that the portion 
asked for by my Father be set aside for himself, and should be held 
81 Lewis to Te Heuheu, 13 October 1887, in MA-MLP f 1903/118, part 1, National Archives. 
82 Te-Huiatahi to Te :earanihi [Ballance], 9 May 1887, MA-MLP 1, 1903/118, National Archives. 
83 Harris, "Three Parks," 56-7; Anderson, Tongariro National.Park, 71. 
.. 
127 
sacred, he made a request at that time ... (that is, Mr Lewis made the 
request) that my Father should agree that the Queen be put into the Title 
along with himself, so that the Crown should be represented in the Title 
of that partition/ I was present, and my Father (I was his only son) asked 
me what I thought about that arrangement. I then said to my Father that I 
thought he should agree to the request made by Mr Lewis, as it would be 
a very great honour to him to have the name of the Queen as co-owner, as 
it were, in that partition. It was decided that that should be - and that 
Queen Victoria should be a life member. When the Board was set up the 
Queen's name was mentioned as being a life-member of the Board- my 
Father was to be a life member of the Board, and at his death I was to 
take his place, and be also appointed a life member of that Board during 
my life-time. Then he signed that agreement.84 
If translated and recorded accurately, this would imply that Horonuku believed himself 
to be retaining the title of the peak area, in conjunction with the British monarch. Tureiti 
would have been in his early twenties when the gift was being negotiated, and by the 
time of the gift was running his father's affairs, so it seems likely he had a good 
understanding of the events at the time. 85 
Some historians have speculated that the gift can perhaps be seen as a statement of 
mana on Horonuku's part, asserting his connection with the mountains above that of 
other chiefs or tribes. Judith Binney argues that the claims of Te Keepa Te 
Rangihiwinui, the Whanganui chieftain who had fought with the government at Te 
Porere, over his rights to the southern Tauponuiatia lands, including the mountains, was 
; 
a factor in Horonuku' s decision to gift the lands to the Crown. 86 David Young advances 
a similar argument, calling the gift "a delicate piece of democracy," in which Horonuku 
was attempting to patch up the rift with the government caused by his involvement with 
Te Kooti, and to re-assert his mana over the still-divided Nga.ti Tuwharetoa people. 87 
Neither Binney nor Young questioned whether the 1887 signing was_ intended as a gift. 
A hundred years on from the signing of the deed of conveyance, Horonuku' s actions 
had passed into tourism legend as a generous gift which had created "the first national 
park in New Zealand, and the fourth in the world, "88 and "the first national park in the 
world to be gifted by a country's indigenous people."89 A 1987 article in the Air New 
84 Notes from an interview between The Hon. Te Heuheu Tukino, M.L.C, and The Hon W. Nosworthy 
Minister of Tourist and Health Resorts, Wellington, 13 November 1922. TO 1 52/54 1920-1954, National 
Archives. 
85 Gartner, Ken Te Huingarau. 'Te Heuheu Tukino V, Tureiti 1865/1866? - 1921. ' Dictionary of New 
Zealand Biography, updated 22 June 2007, http ://www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
86 Binney, Redemption Songs, 506. 
87 Young, Woven by Water, 140. 
88 Department of Conservation website: http: //www.doc.govt.nz/parks-and-recreation/nationa1-
parks/tongariro/. 
89 Ruapehu District Council website: http ://www.visitruapehu.com/exec/ l 13221 /43 l 1/ .. 
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Zealand magazine Pacific Way celebrated the centenary of Tongariro, and called the gift 
"an act of great foresight" on the part of Horonuku Te Heuheu, safeguarding the 
mountains from encroaching settler interests, or dissection between tribes. 90 In the same 
year, Sir Hepi Te Heuheu, the great-grandson of Horonuku, wrote: 
The gift says these sacred mountains are owned by no-one and yet are for 
everyone. My Tuwharetoa people wish the gift to be remembered for all 
time. The mountains of the south wind have spoken to us for centuries. 
Now we wish them to speak to all who come in peace and in respect of 
their tapu. This land of Tongariro National Park is our mutual heritage. It 
is a gift given many times over. 91 
Richard Boast, in a special submission to the National Park inquiry, pointed out that as 
unique and interesting as the 'gift' of the peaks was, and notwithstanding the fact that a 
special Act of Parliament set the area aside as a national park, most of the lands of 
Tongariro National Park were acquired by the government using its ordinary means. 
These means were the investigation of title under the Native Land Court, the buying of 
undivided shares by the Crown, and the partition of the land into 'Crown' and 'non-
sellers' portions. 92 Laurence Grace and his brother William were instrumental in this 
process. 93 
Maori sales of the surrounding lands were reluctant and drawn-out. The final purchase 
made of the lands designated to be par:t of Tongariro National Park in the 1894 Act, was 
not made until 1903.94 During the seven years between the signing of the deed of 
conveyance in 18 87, and the National Park A·ct 1894, Alfred Newman, the Member of 
Parliament who first raised the sugg~stion of a national park in Parliament, continued to 
pester successive ~remiers and Ministers of Lands for updates on the progress of 
acquisition. Replies were that the locals were reluctant to sell, or charged prices the 
. . . 
governm~nt was unwilling to pay. A cl~use allowii:ig land to be compulsorily taken with 
compensation, under the Public Works Act 1882, was included in the third Tongariro 
National Park bill, and the act was passed in that form in 1894. The clause does not 
appear to .have ever been invoked, although the threat of confiscation may have been 
used as a tool in the purchase dealings. · 
90 Nigel Coventry; "Tongariro: The Gift of Fire," Pacific Way 3(1987): 65. 
91 Sir Hepi Te Heuheu, foreword to Potton, Tongariro: A Sacred Gift, 8. . . 
92 Richard Boast, Generic Submissions Relating to the .. 'Gift' of the Peaks and the establishment of 
Tongariro National Park, Wai 1130, #3.3.23, May 15, 2007, paragraphs 1.2-1.3 , 3. 
93 Bruce Stirling)_ Taupo-Kaingaroa 19th Century Overvzew Project vol. 2, Wai 1200, #A7I; (Crown 
Forestry Rental Trust, 2004), 819, 836, 841-2; Joel, The Origins of the Gift of the Peaks, 96-113. 
94 Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land, 352. 
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Hone Heke Ngapua, the Member of Parliament for Northern Maori,95 denounced the 
1894 Bill in the House: 
[H]e wished also to mention that, in regard to the interests which were 
held by some of the Natives at the present time, he did not at all like the 
idea of the Government obtaining those interests by force from the 
Natives by having a valuation made, and taking their land away 
altogether. When the Natives did not wish to dispose of their interests 
they should have the opportunity of making a bargain with the Native 
Minister or the Minister of Lands in reference to their interests. He 
believed the Natives who still had interests in the land about there were 
willing to dispose of them for a certain price. To provide for taking the 
land away from the Natives under the clauses set forth in the Bill was a 
-monstrous piece of legislation. He did not believe in taking Native land at 
a valuation, especially if the Natives did not agree to such valuation. 
Legislation of this nature was entirely inconsistent with the Treaty of 
W aitangi.96 
The Bill passed into law despite such protests. Te Herekiekie, an important Tuwharetoa 
chief, petitioned against the Act in 1895, but as it was already law, the Native Affairs 
Committee deemed his protest too late. 97 
The 1894 Act did not fully formalise the Tongariro National Park. The Act designated 
the area for future proclamation, once all the desired land belonged to the Crown. At 
1894 not all that land had been purchased. On the 29th of August, 1907, 'more or less' 
25,212 hectares ( of land surrounding the mountains, excluding the Ketetahi Springs 
which the Crown had not been able to buy, was declared to be vested in the British 
King. 98 According to the provisions of the 1894 Act the declaration should have 
followed as soon as all the land in the proposed park area had been purchased. There 
had been no purchases in the four years prior to 1907, and the actual impetus for 
declaration seems to have come from an inquiry by the head of the n~w Department of 
Tourist and Health Resorts into when the park had been declared, alerting the Under-
Secretary of Lands to the fact that it had not been declared at all. 99 
Richard Boast has observed that "[p ]erhaps the rather untidy reality of what actually 
happened from 1887 to 1903 is less significant than what the National Park has come to 
95 The Maori Representation Act 1867 gave Maori men universal suffrage and set up four Maori seats in 
parliament, covering the country in four large electoral blocks labelled the Northern, Eastern, Western 
and Southern Maori seats. 
96 NZPD, 11 October 1894, vol. 86, 679. 
97 Kingi Te Herekiekie petition, no. 653/ 1895, AJHR , 1895, I-3 , 2. 
98 New Zealand Gazette, August 29, 1907, 2677. 
99 General Manager of THR to Under-Secretary of Lands. 24 June 1907. L&S 4/362. box 0060 1502 
DOC, Wellington. 
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symbolise."100 What the gift has come to symbolise has been challenged in the course of 
the National Park inquiry. The second part of this chapter considers the ·way the 'gift' 
was debated in the hearings of the Waitangi Tribunal. 
The Inquiry and the 'Gift' 
Almost every aspect of the 'gift' was contested in the inquiry. Some claimants 
contended that Tuwharetoa had no right to claim exclusive ownership of the mountains, 
and that the government deliberately ignored the interests of other groups. Some groups 
within Tuwharetoa challenged the right of Te Heuheu to have been given the sole title 
of the mountain peaks, or to have given it away to the Crown. Others ofNgati 
Tuwharetoa questioned the fairness of the transaction and the negotiations before it. Did 
Te Heuheu understand the nature of the deed? Was he led to believe that his name 
would sit alongside Queen Victoria's as trustees of the future park? Was he coerced into 
signing in the first place under threat of further punishment for his involvement with Te 
Kooti in the wars? Did he understand what a national park would entail, particularly the 
idea of visitors using the mountains for recreation? Claimants questioned the 
government's motives in acquiring a national park and whether those motives were 
worthy. Was the park created for conservation or tourism? Did g_9vernment officials 
deliberately target Te Heuheu to the exclusion of other chiefs and other tribes with 
rights in the area in order to obtain the mountains more easily? 
The angles_ taken on these questions were voiced in statements of claim, at the 
beginning of the inquiry, in submissions and cross-examination during the inquiry, and 
in closing s:ubmissions at the end. The positions taken by various parties, and the way 
they have changed, provide a good example of the way that the Tribunal functions as a 
. . . 
'site of memory.' Over ,the course of the inquiry, positions were honed to fit more 
precisely into the format required to ·produce a favourable report. 
Early positions on these issues were heralded in the Statement of Issues, a document 
prepared by Tribunal members at the judicial ·conferences prior to the first hearings. The 
··Statement of Issues is supposed to assemble the relevant questions to be researched in 
' 
the inquiry process and the Crown response to the Statement of Issues is a_ place where 
the Crown can concede or deny points of claim. In theory this process isolates the points 
of contention to be focused on in the inquiry process. In practice the processes of 
100 Boast, Buying the Land, Selling the Land, 343. 
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research and submission usually raise further points and render others unimportant, but 
many issues identified do become major points of contention in the inquiry. The 
December 2005 Statement of Issues for the National Park inquiry laid out the claimants' 
contentions - that the Crown did not consult with all the right people or at proper length 
when formulating their plan for a national park. 101 Whanganui Maori claimed that the 
Crown "dismissed or wilfully ignored" their customary interests in the park, and several 
claims put it that Te Heuheu was negotiated with to the exclusion of other important 
chiefs. 102 They also claimed that the Crown "failed or refused to understand" their 
intentions regarding the transaction, and took advantage of them at a vulnerable point in 
their past. 103 
In response, the Crown team conceded some points, often relating to misunderstandings 
of Maori cultural traditions. They argued that the adequacy of consultation over the 
'gift' and the involvement or exclusion of Whanganui Maori were issues to be 
investigated in the claim, as were the " ... understandings of the parties, the 
circumstances and terms of the 'gift,' and how it was implemented ... " 104 Among other 
things the Crown denied that it isolated Te Heuheu for negotiations, and gave a 
preliminary view that most ofNgati Tuwharetoa had agreed to allow Te Heuheu to 
'gift' the peak blocks. 105 
Further research and the commencement of hearings emphasised these positions, and 
raised some new issues. One of the points of difference that appeared between the 
research reports of the Crown and claimant historians was the motivations of the Crown 
in establishing a national park. The main 'claimant historian' (funded by the Crown 
Forestry Rental Trust), 106 Robyn Anderson, emphasised the Crown's commercial 
interests in a national park - Anderson argued_ that the motivations to form a park were 
tied to the Crown's desire to open up the central North Island to settlement and 
tourism. 107 It should be noted, however, that Brad Coombes, another historian funded 
by the Crown Fores try Rental Trust, ·argued in his report on tourism in the national park 
101 Statement of Issues for the Tongariro National Park District Inquiry, Wai 1130, #1.4.2, 2005, 55. 
102 Ibid. , 57. 
103 Ibid. , 55 . 
104 Ibid. , 63. 
105 Ibid. , 63-4. 
106 The Crown Forestry Rental Trust is a trust fund that comes from Annual Rental Fees for licences on 
the use of Crown forest lands which have been identified as having potential for return to Maori 
ownership as part of Treaty settlement deals. Until the beneficial owners of the lands have been 
determined, the Trust invests the rental proceeds and spends the interest on helping Maori claimants 
prepare, present and negotiate claims that involve or could involve the lands held in trust. 
107 Anderson, Tongariro National Park, 41. 
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that "[tourism's] role in the establishment of the park was often indirect, subtle, and 
difficult to prove," and" ... cannot be disassociated from other motivations ... "108 
Andrew Joel, the Crown historian charged with writing a report specifically on the 
creation of the national park, argued that the Crown's prevailing motivation was to 
secure public ownership of the mountains to protect them from exploitation and make 
them available to the public. 109 
One claimant submission was also particularly influential in the development of debate 
around the 'gift' -that of Chris Winitana, a tutor of the Wananga o Tuwharetoa, a 
traditional learning institution. He argued that in the worldview of Horonuku Te 
Heuheu, it would not have been imaginable to completely cede his authority and 
connection to the mountains. 110 They were far too closely bound to his mana and 
identity, and in any case, the concept of a tukunga (the word used in the deed to 
designate 'gift') was not an unconditional transfer of property as in the Western legal 
sense of a gift. Winitana explained that in the customs of Tuwharetoa a tukunga implied 
ongoing obligations, and was used to establish or cement allegiances between groups. 111 
The closing submissions are the final and most finely-honed positions of each party. 
The claimant submissions were very respectful of each other. Th~ N gati Rangi 
submission referred to the gift as a matter best left to Tuwharetoa for interpretation. 
They emphasised that the important issue to them is that " ... the Crown did not, at any 
time before, during or immediately after entering into an agreement with Te Heuheu 
Tukino, give proper regard to the interests of other groups in the lands subject to 
inclusion in the Park." 11 ~ Their grievance was directly squared at the Crown -Te 
Heuheu's role in their exclusion, for example, was not a matter for claim. Three hapu of 
Tuwharetoa opposed the gift when it was made; these hapu, in their submissions, 
continue to voice their opposition, b~t are even more careful to emphasise that their 
grievance is against the Crown, rather than Te Heuheu. The closing submissions for 
N gati W aewae specify that: 
In making their claims the Claimants underscore that the prominence and 
rank of Te Heuheu line is unquesti~nable. The Claimants do not wish to 
108 Coombes, Tourism Development, 457-8. 
109 Joel, The Origins of the Gift, paragraphs 11-28, 8-14. 
110 Brief of Evidence of Chris Tamihana Winitana, Wai 1130, #G25, September 23 , 2006, paragraph 17, 
4, also paragraph 29 , 6. · · 
111 . Ibid., paragraphs 3_6-40, 8-10. 
11.2 Closing Submissions on Behalf of Nga.ti Rangi, Wai 1130, .#3.3.33, May 15, 2007, paragraph 6.5 , 37. 
133 
.. 
impugn the actions of their Ariki [paramount chiefJ in any way, but rather 
their claims are focused on the activities of the Crown. 113 
The point to be made here is that the closing submissions intend both to persuade the 
Tribunal to write a report favourable to their position, and to place themselves in a good 
starting position for negotiations. The role of Horonuku Te Heuheu escaped any 
interrogation in the closing submissions partly because there was no gain to be made 
from criticising him, because there were incentives in presenting a united claimant front 
to the Tribunal. 
The Crown submissions stated their belief that the 'gift' was the central and pivotal 
issue in the National Park inquiry, and devoted a chapter to discussing it. 114 They 
admitted culpability for failing to honour the specific terms laid out by Horonuku in his 
letter, and acknowledged the breach of the Treaty caused by their failure to consult with 
Whanganui Maori, saying that the Whanganui connection to the mountains " ... was, or 
ought to have been, known to the Crown ... " 115 They emphasised a beneficial agreement 
with Te Heuheu: " .. .it appears that Te Heuheu's desire to protect the tapu nature of the 
mountains coincided with the Crown's recognition that they were a special place that 
ought to be set aside for the benefit of the Nation." 116 The Crown lawyers argued that 
Horonuku entered into this agreement willingly, understanding that he was "releasing 
giving over or gifting the mountains into a new kind of protective arrangement, under 
the mana of the Crown or the Queen." 117 They emphasised the noble motivations behind 
the creation of the national park and elided the changes in park management over time, 
suggesting that the current purposes of national parks in New Zealand, as outlined in the 
National Parks Act 1980, "appear entirely consistent" with the motivations of Crown 
officials in the 1880s. 118 The following two chapters show that there-was in fact 
substantial change in the concept and purpose of national parks over the years. 
11 3 Closing Submissions of Counsel for Ngati Waewae, Wai 1130, #3.3.41 , May 28 , 2007, paragraph 186, 
62. Ngati Waewae are a group closely affiliated to Tuwharetoa, though they have been based in the 
Manawatu since the time of Mananui (i.e. since sometime before 184(5). · 
114 Closing submissions of the Crown, Wai 1130, "Chapter One: Introduction," paragraph 41 , 14; 
"Chapter Six: Nga Kahui Maunga: The Gift and Creation of the Park." 
115 Closing submissions of the Crown, Wai 1130, "Chapter Six," paragraph 5, 4; paragraph 13 , 6. 
116 lbid. , paragraph 3, 3-4. 
11 7 Ibid., paragraph 52, 18 . 
118 Ibid. , paragraphs 61-2, 20. The National Parks Act 1980 states that National Parks exist "for the 
purpose of preserving in perpetuity as national parks, for their intrinsic worth and for the benefit, use, and 
enjoyment of the public, areas of New Zealand that contain scenery of such distinctive quality, ecological 
systems, or natural features so beautiful, unique or scientifically important that their preservation is in the 
national interest" and " ... the public shall have freedom of entry and access to the parks, so that they may 
receive in full measure the inspiration, enjoyment, recreation, and other benefits that may be derived from 
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The closing submissions of N gati Tiiwharetoa also devote a chapter to the gift. It begins 
with this opening statement: 
The romantic tale of the 'Noble Gift' has ingrained itself into the history 
of this country, and indeed in Ngati Tuwharetoa's history, although 
privately Ngati Tuwharetoa have always acknowledged that the 'Gift' is a 
myth that obscures the real, more painful truth. This Tribunal inquiry is in 
itself making history as the first time that Ngati Tuwharetoa have decided 
to set aside the mythologizing and say publicly 'it was not a gift' .119 
The submissions go on to outline a transaction which could not be described as 
amounting to an agreement, given the cultural chasm between participants. 120 They 
argue the Crown intended to secure ownership of the park, and deny any motivation of 
"conservation-minded objectives," instead emphasising the Crown's tourism designs for 
the park. 121 The submissions argue that it is "plausible" that the Crown persuaded Te 
Heuheu to sign the deed by playing to his anxiety to protect the tapu of the mountains, 
and claim he was subject to "skilful manipulation."122 The Tiiwharetoa closing 
submissions represent the 'gift' as if it were itself a kind of Treaty, arguing that it set up 
conditions that the Government was required to uphold: an equal partnership between 
Te Heuheu and the Queen in the protection of the mountains; the pledge to "hold the 
mountains inviolate for the nation"; the removal and entombment of Horonuku's 
father's body; and the appointment of Horonuku's son as kaitiaki after Horonuku's 
death. 123 The closing submissions outline the ways in which these conditions were not 
honoured, and 1nake demands for compensation resulting from these breaches of 
contract. . 
The debates over t~e 'gift' illustrate the ways in which the Tribunal process encourages 
particular narratives of Crown-Maori relations, in which the two parties are in 
.. 
oppositiop.; the Crown is a strong, mal~volent and ~evious force, and -Maori are active, 
but ultimately victimised agents in their historical interaction. This characterisation of 
the relationship affected the portrayals of Crown and Maori agents' 1notivations in the 
lead-up and aftermath of the 'gift.' Horonuku's position as a victim of Crown 
manipulation is emphasised in claimant submissions, and his possible motivation to 
secure his mana over the mountains is barely acknowledged, even by claimant groups 
mountains, forests, sounds, seacoasts, lakes, rivers, and other natural features." S4(1)-(2)(e). It is clear, 
however, that "ecological systems" were certainly not protected by the Tongariro National Park Act 1894. 
119 Closing Submissions of.Ngati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 7.1, 100. 
120 Ibid., paragraph 7.16, 105. 
121 Ibid., paragraphs 7 :--17-7.24, 106-8. 
122 . Ibid., paragraphs 7_.102- 7.105, 132. 
123 Ibid., paragraphs 8.18.1-8.18.4, 168. 
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whose ancestors' claims were thus overridden. Crown submissions, on the other hand, 
emphasise the noble goals to conserve the mountains and their wildlife for the benefit of 
all New Zealand citizens, and gloss over the motivations to secure a valuable tourism 
asset. 
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Chapter Six: Building the National Park 'Island,' 1907-1970 
During the period 1907-1970 the national park concept grew into the form we recognise 
today, where native plants and animals are protected, exotic plants and animals are 
controlled or eliminated, infrastructural development is limited, and the use of the parks 
for recreation is encouraged. The settler government made its laws and policies without 
much reference, let alone deference, to Maori interests in these years. Although the 
Maori parliamentarians made their voices heard as conservation legislation came up for 
debate, it is clear from the archival sources that Maori issues and interests were not 
given serious consideration by most politicians and bureaucrats. Environmental and 
recreational groups, on the other hand, had a strong influence on the way the national 
park institution developed. The Pakeha 'island' was formed and reinforced in these 
years. 
By the tum of the century the upheavals of warfare and epidemic disease were largely 
over, and Maori were well outnumbered by Pakeha. The last area of real Maori self-
determination, the King Country, had been opened up to Pakeha-settlement. This is not 
to say that nothing was happening in Maori politics and affairs. Ranginui Walker argues 
that this period constituted a cultural revival, which was caused by demographic 
recovery, and went unnoticed by Pakeha due to the separateness of the two peoples for 
much of th1s period. 1 'The relative separateness of Maori -and Pakeha lives and politics in 
this period is something-other wri~ers have also noted. James Belich has labelled policy 
in the fir~t half of the twentieth century "benign segregation," pointing out that Maori 
had sepa~ate "militar·y, religious, spofti~g, welfare,_ land development, educational and 
cultural organisations."2 
The beginning of the twentieth century was an important time in the development of 
today's conservation estate. David Thom, author of the 1987 centennial publication on 
.. the histo!y of New Zealand's national parks, argued that: 
From ari historical perspective, the period 1901 to 1920 was truly . 
r~markable. A dawning consciousness of scenic values, the urging of the 
preservation societies, sadness, even revulsion at mindless forest 
1 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, Struggle without End, 186. 
2 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000 
(Auckland: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2001), 206. 
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destruction, and the imperious driving force of Harry Ell combined to 
invent the mechanism represented in the Scenery Preservation Board. 3 
This "dawning consciousness of scenic values," happened, for a handful of settlers, at 
least two decades earlier than for the rest of the public. These early conservationists set 
up Scenery Preservation Societies in several regions of New Zealand. The 
aforementioned Harry Ell was a forceful member of this early group, and was the key 
player behind the Scenery Preservation Act, passed in 1903 .4 This Act allowed for the 
compulsory acquisition of land deemed to be in the national interest and set up the 
Scenery Preservation Board - a five person commission to inspect lands ·and 
recommend places that 'should be permanently reserved as either scenic, thermal, or 
historic reserves.' Section 4 allowed land to be taken compulsorily under section 5 of 
the Public Works Act 1894. 
There were protests from Maori as these events unfolded. Several petitions were sent by 
Maori to Parliament, complaining that their resource rights were being taken away. 
-
Apirana N gata and other Maori Members of Parliament complained that Maori had not 
been sufficiently consulted in the matters of the Act. 5 These complaints did lead to 
change - the provision in the Scenic Reserves Act to compulsorily acquire Maori land 
was revoked, and in the first nine years of the Act's use, little Maori land was taken for 
. 6 
scenic reserves. 
By 1919 there were 516 scenic reserves, taking up 124,193 hectares of New Zealand 
land. National parks added another 669,446 hectares to the early conservation estate. 7 
This early network of national parks and scenic· reserves were, as Thom puts it, the 
'nuclei' of today's national park system. 8 At that stage the motivation for making 
reserves was mainly to preserve scenic values, but it was also becoming important to 
so1ne that these reserves were native forests and the habitat of native birds. David 
Young argues that 1914 marked a significant shift in attitudes to the environment, from 
3 David Thom, Heritage: The Parks of the People (Auckland: Lansdowne Press, 1987), 124. 
4 Ibid. , 114. 
. 
5 Park, Effective Exclusion? An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actio,ns and Maori Responses 
Concerning the Indigenous Flora and Fauna, 1912-1983, 155. 
6 Ibid. , 256-257, 259. 
7 Michael Roche, "The State as Conservationist, 1920-60: 'Wise Use ' of Forests, Lands and Water," in 
Environmental Histories of New Zealand, ed. Eric Pawson and Tom Brooking (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) , 185. 
8 Egmont National Park had been created in 1900, Arthur's Pass Reserves in 1901 , large reserves 'for 
national parks purposes" had been set aside •in Fiordland in 1905. A reserve in Routeburn Valley created 
in 1911 later became part of Mt Aspiring National Park, and reserves at Lakes Rotoiti and Rotoroa in 
1912 became the future Nelson Lakes National Park. Murchison Valley was added to Mt Cook reserves in 
1917 and the 100 hectare nucleus of Abel Tasman National Park was established in 1918. Thom, 
Heritage , 124. 
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scenery protection as the main objective of reservation, to a concern for protection of 
wildlife. 9 The first New Zealand Forest and Bird Protection Society was formed in that 
year, by Harry Ell. Two years later the New Zealand Forestry League was set up, an 
organisation more concerned with preserving the supply of timber into future 
generations, than with preserving the forest and the wildlife within it, but the two 
organisations had much in common and worked closely together in their early years. 
The Forestry League campaigned for the establishment of a Forest Service, which was 
established in 1919. The Forest and Bird Protection Society lasted only five years, but a 
new Native Bird Protection Society was established in 1923, with Thomas Mackenzie 
as president, and Ernest Valentine Sanderson as honorary secretary. 10 The Native Bird 
Protection Society was re-named the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society in 1935. 
The 1920s and 30s saw the first attempts to define the purpose of scenery protection 
reserves and to develop a philosophy for their management. The Public Reserves, 
Domains and National Parks Act was passed in 1928, and although the debate did not 
produce a precise definition for a national park, it showed a growing concern with the 
'depredations' of visitors, and some speakers mentioned the value of national parks as 
preservation areas for native birds and animals. 11 This reflected growing concerns in 
wider society. Cars were becoming more widely owned, and this brought mor~ visitors 
to reserves. Mountain sports such as skiing also became popular in these years, and in 
1931 the many mountain clubs linked to create the Federated Mountain Clubs, which 
became ari important lobby group. It was becoming obvious to the increasing numbers 
of park visitors that the condition of the parks was deteriorating. 12 In the years of the 
Depression. the little money being·spent on park management almost dried up 
altogether. Despite this, the amount of land being reserved for parks increased, creating 
greater and more visible management problems. The impact of deer on new forest 
growth wa.s becoming well-recognised, as were the links between forest degradation and 
flooding. 1_3 
The new advocacy groups worked together to publicise these issues through the 193 Os 
· and 40s and to propagate the idea that national parks were sanctuaries for native plants 
' 
and animals as well as recreation grounds for people. They had a friend and supporter in 
9 Young, Our Islands, Our Selves, 133. 
10 Ibid., 115-7. 
11 Ibid., 135-6. 
12 Park, Effective ·Exclusion?, 270. 
13 h -. T om, Heritage, 138-40. 
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the chief clerk of the Department of Lands and Survey, Ron Cooper. Cooper was the 
architect of the National Parks Act 1952, which was not only the first Act to co~ordinate 
the management of the national parks across the country, but was the first Act to define 
a purpose for national parks: 
... the provisions of this Act shall have effect for the purpose of 
preserving in perpetuity as National Parks, for the benefit and enjoyment 
of the public, areas of New Zealand that contain scenery of such 
distinctive quality or natural features so beautiful or unique that their 
preservation is in the national interest. 14 
The Act also stipulated that parks should be preserved, as far as possible, in their 
'natural state' as soil and water conservation areas, and that native plants and animals 
should be protected and introduced plants and animals exterminated. Public access, 
subject to the conditions necessary for the preservation of plants and animals, should be 
provided for, so that people could: 
... receive in full measure the inspiration, enjoyment, recreation, and other 
benefits that may be derived from mountains, forests, sounds, lakes, and 
· 15 nvers. 
There was a substantial degree of accord over the 1952 legislation; the parliamentary 
debates record nothing but praise for the Bill from both parties in Parliament. 16 The Act 
also set up a National Parks Authority to which the separate park boards had to report. 
The Royal Society, the Forest and Bird Protection Society and the Federated Mountain 
Clubs all gained a seat on this authority, alongside bureaucrats from the Lands, Internal 
Affairs, Forestry and Tourist and Health Resorts Departments. 17 Apart from reaffirming 
the statutory position of a Te Heuheu descendant on the Tongariro National Park board, 
the Act said nothing about Maori representation. The Act also stipul~ted that parks be 
preserved in their natural state, but this apparel).tly did not extend to infrastructure for 
recreational and electricity generation purposes, because the following years saw 
substantial development in these areas at Tongariro. 
The 1960s saw a significant change in wider public attitudes towards the environment. 
Environmental historian Michael Roche argues that it was · around this ~ime "when a 
belief in superabundant resources gave way to concerns about rates of exploitation and 
14 National Parks Act 1952, s3(1) . 
15 Ibid. , s3(2)(a)-( d). 
16 NZPD vol. 297, 1952, 712-25, 763-81. 
17 National Parks Act 1952, s4 (l)(a)-(i). 
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the possibility of resource exhaustion."18 There was a better understanding of erosion 
and soil and water conservation, and increasing emphasis on the importance of 
protecting native species. 19 David Young says that by the end of the 1960s conservation 
had become a major social force. These ideas were to burst forth in dramatic protests 
against environmental degradation in the 1970s. 
Another important theme of this period, alongside the development of the national park 
institution, and the growth of the conservation movement, was the attachment that 
Pakeha New Zealanders developed towards national parks in these years. The increasing 
number of people with cars meant increasing numbers of visitors to national parks, and 
mountain clubs built tracks to accommodate their journeys. Skiing became a popular 
sport and drew people to the mountains. The idea of these places as "parks for the 
people," areas accessible to everyone for rest and recreation, took hold in these years. 
"Parks for the people" became the key principle of the Federated Mountain Clubs.20 
Recreation enthusiasts and environmental lobbyists were influential groups in the 
development of national parks, in these years, where Maori were increasingly absent 
voices. 
Tongariro 1907-1970 
Tongariro was not a major site or subject of relationships during the period 1907-1970. 
Its race-relations history during these years was characterised by the near absence of 
Maori inv~lvement, with the exception of a few memorialising moments relating to the 
original 'gift,' and the government's· repeated attempts to purchase the Ketetahi Springs, 
which remqined in ·Tuwharetoa ownership. This period received less attention in the 
Tribunal process than the previous and subsequent periods, which involved more 
. . ' 
interaction between the government and Maori. 
The statutory provision for a Te Heuheu seat on the national park board provided only a 
very limifed level of representation, the board itself was disestablished for several years 
in the early twentieth century, and it was largely due to the advocacy of Tureiti Te 
· · Heuheu that a seat was provided for when the board was re-established. The level of 
' 
decision-making power this position offered was diluted over. the years by the addition 
18 Roche, "The State as Conservationist," 183. 
19 . · Young, Our Island.s_, Our Selves, 140. 
20 Thom, Heritage, 138, 142-3. 
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of new members to the park board, and it seems that the level of attendance by the Te 
Heuheu member was never very high. 
Although most of the land in the area designated for Tongariro National Park had been 
purchased when the park was declared in 1907, there were some important exceptions. 
The owners of the Tongariro lC block had refused to part with the Ketetahi Springs, so 
the Ketetahi block was sectioned out of the larger area and remained in Maori 
ownership, despite being completely surrounded by park land. Parts of the Okahukura 1 
and 8M no.2 blocks crossed into the northern park boundary but had not been purchased 
from Maori. A block on the southern side of Ruapehu, now known as the Rangipo 
North 8 block, was not only unsold, but had not passed through the Native Land Court, 
and still remained in customary title. 21 This issue was raised several times in the years 
after the park was declared, but nothing was done to address it until the l 950s. 
Until 1907, despite the existence of a Board of Trustees, there was almost no active 
management of the park. The four members of the Board of Trustees (The Minister of 
Lands, the Surveyor General, the Director of Geological Survey and Te Heuheu) did not 
meet in the thirteen years between the first Tongariro National Park Act and the park's 
declaration, and no staff appointments were made. 22 Three more members were added 
to the original four-man .Board in 1907: the Under-Secretary of Lands, the General 
Manager of the Tourist and Health Resorts Department, and the Commissioner for 
Crown Lands. 23 This board·met infrequently, and, it seems, did little. In 1908 the 
General Manager of Tourist and Health Resorts, Thomas Donne, wrote to the then 
chairman of the board that "[i]t seems to me that practically nothing is being done to 
develop this magnificent national asset."24 There were no meetings between 1908 and 
1912.25 
The one important undertaking in these early years was a survey ofTongariro. In 1907 
Leonard Cockayne, a botanist and lea,der of the early conservation movement in New 
Zealand, was commissioned with another scientist, Edward Phillips-Turner, to carry out 
a survey of the newly-declared national park. Phillips Turner was instructed to meet 
21 See Appendix D: Map of the Inquiry District. 
22 Coombes, Tourism Development, 133 . 
23 The original board, as outlined in section 4 of the Tongariro National Park Act 1894 consisted of the 
Minister of Lands, the Surveyor General, the Director of Geological Survey, " ... Te Heuheu Tukino the 
younger [Tureiti] .. . and such other persons as the Governor shall appoint." 
24 General Manager ofTHR to R. McNab, Chairman of the Tongariro National Park Board, 9 
Octoberl 908 , TO 1/70 1908/1909 part 1, National Archives. 
25 J Strauchon, Under-Secretary of Lands, to Minister of Lands, 27 August 1912, ABWN 7609 
w5021 /825 22922 part 1, National Archives. 
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with Tureiti Te Heuheu and explain the process to him at the time of this survey.26 He 
was also encouraged to involve local Maori in the project.27 They carried out the survey 
in 1908, and their report the same year recommended doubling the size of Tongariro to 
include forest lands, and emphasised the importance of native plants and anilnals as a 
key feature of a reserve, noting that at the time Tongariro was almost treeless. Cockayne 
and Phillips-Turner also noted of the Ketetahi Springs: 
We do not offer any suggestions, but merely refer to the matter of 
Ketetahi since, for obvious reasons: it may finally become a place of 
· · 28 pnme importance. 
The report was widely circulated and reported upon, and one of the historians involved 
in the National Park inquiry described it as serving as "a blueprint for future 
development. "29 
In 1914 the Board of Trustees was disestablished, and responsibility for the park 
transferred to the Department for Tourist and Health Resorts (THR). 30 In the discussion 
between ministers and bureaucrats from THR and the Lands Department, the then 
General Manager of Tourist and Health Resorts, G. M. Wilson, reminded his minister 
that " .. .legislation would be necessary, and there may be other difficulties in the way of 
removing the control from the present trustees, as the original reserve was ceded to the 
Crown by deed of gift made by the late Te Heuheu, Tukino."31 Despite this reminder, 
the board was disestablished in what was referred to as a "washing-up bill," in which 
many 'small' and disparate changes are made.at once. This bill was criticised by some 
speakers for passing measures without proper debate. 32 
At the time·there appears to have been no protest in or outside of Parliament House 
regarding the disestablishment of the board, and with it the position of Tureiti Te 
. . . 
Heuheu, Horonuku~ s son. The succession of Tureiti to this position was one of the two 
specific requests Horonuku made at the time of the conveyance. Six years later, 
26 Cecilia Edwards, Tongariro National Park: The Legtslative Regime -and Park Management 1894-19 52, 
Wai 1130 #A53 , (Wellington: commissioned by the Crown Law Office, 2005), 20-1. 27 Ibid. , 19. 
28 Leonard Cockayne and E. Phillips-Turner, Report on a Botanical Survey of Tongariro National Park, 
(Wellington: J. Mackay, Government Printer, 1908). 
29 Anders.on, Tongariro National Park, 124. 
30 The Reserves and Other Lands Disposal and Public Bodies Empowering Act,. in its brief 54th section, 
disestablished the park board and transferred control of the Park to the Department of Tourist and Health 
Resorts. In the same section of the act the Governor w3:s authorised to proclaim adjacent Crowri land as 
part of the park (before this time there had been no mechanism for enlarging the park). 
31 General Manager ofTHR to Minister ofTHR, 12 May· 1913; TO 1/70 1908/1909 part 2, National 
Archives. . 
32 -Coombes, Tourism Development, 150. 
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however, Tureiti Te Heuheu, by then a member of the Legislative Council,33 arrived at 
the office of the Minister of Tourist and Health Resorts, William Nosworthy. The 
translator Captain Vercoe mediated their conversation, and an unknown note-taker . 
recorded it. The remaining record raises a number of issues, among them the question of 
whether or not Tureiti understood that the original conveyance had transferred the 
ownership of the mountain peaks to the Crown: 
When I heard that [his "name had been struck off' the board], of course I 
felt very grieved over it / My reason for being so grieved about the matter 
was that I am the only one in the Title to the Land. It was the wish of the 
then Minister in power that the name of the Sovereign should be included 
along with my name in the Title to the land. This is what I want to get at. 
As you are the Minister-in-Charge of Tourist Resorts, I want you to have 
my name put back on - as one of the governing people in connection with 
that Park, and I want you to see that the Act of 1914 is either adjusted or 
struck out. 34 
It seems that Tureiti wanted to be informed about the happenings in the park, but not to 
have management responsibilities himself: 
Captain Vercoe: "His [Tureiti' s] point Sir is this: he does not in any way 
wish to take an active part in the conduct or control of the National Park. 
All he wants is the right of his Father, and his Father before him to that 
land - in his name". 
Hon Mr. Nosworthy: "He wants his name perpetuated alongside of the 
ruling Monarch of the Emprre, as Trustee in joint with the Sovereign? He 
wants to be honorary trustee of the National Park?" 
Captain V ercoe: "That is just it. He does not want the name of his father 
or his own name lost in connection with the thing." 
Hon Tukino: "If the governing body should at any time be operating in 
connection with the Reserve, I would like to know what is going on 
around there in the interests of myself and my people." 
Hon. Mr Nosworthy: "I will let him have a record of what is being done." 
Hon Tukino: "My reason for making this request is that I may be of 
considerable assistance to you, because if my people understand the 
position they would perhaps be of assistance to those. officers of your 
Department who would be operating there, instead of b~ing 
detrimental. "35 
33 The upper house of Parliament, which was abolished in 1951. Since then the New Zealand legislature 
has been unicameral. 
_ 
34 Notes from an interview between The Hon. Te Heuheu Tukino, M.L.C, and The Hon W. Nosworthy, 
Minister of Tourist and Health Resorts, Wellington, 13 November 1922. TO 1 52/54 1920-1954, National 
Archives. 
35 Ibid. 
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It is also clear that Nosworthy had very little idea of the history and even the 
contemporary administration of the park, as the following exchange with the translator 
shows: 
Hon. Mr Nosworthy [to Captain Vercoe]: "Does he just want to get back 
on to the Board of Trustees? Would he be satisfied with that?" 
Captain V ercoe: "Is there such a thing as a Board of Trustees in existence 
- was it not washed out by the Act of 1914 ?" I think you will find that 
that is so." 
Hon Mr Nosworthy: "I will look into it."36 
Tureiti made it clear to the Minister that he would pursue the matter if it was not 
followed up: 
Hon. Tukino: I want to tell you that I shall not cease being active in 
connection with this matter; if my name is not shown as one of the 
Trustees I shall certainly take steps and will continue to take steps to have 
my right asserted. I want you to understand that I would not consider 
money in any shape or form in connection with this matter. The prestige 
of my people depends upon our holding those Mountains for all time, or 
an interest in them; and money is nothing. If you gave me a million 
pounds tomorrow, I would not give the prestige which is contained in 
those Mountains. It is my mana. My grandfather's bones are resting on 
those places. That is all.37 
--
Tureiti died in 1921. In 1922 a new Tongariro National Park Act was passed, partly to 
enact the extensions recommended fourteen years before by Cockayne and Phillips-
Tumer, an~ partly to reinstate a national park-board. Calls for a board had been made 
throughout the later years of management by the Tourist.and Health Resorts 
Department, by interests ranging from mountain club members to the Auckland 
mayor. 38 lureiti' s complaints were also taken into account in the reestablishment of a 
Board, and a Te Heuheu seat was provided for in the legislation, which was taken up by 
Tureiti's son Hoani. Te Heuheu Tukipo VI (Hoani). 39 The new board was comprised of 
• 40 thirteen members. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ib.d 
. . 1 . 
38 Honorary Secretary of the Ruapehu Ski Club to Minister ofTHR, 2 November 1920, L&S 4/362, box 
0060 984, DOC, Wellington; J Gunson, Auckland Mayor, to Prime Minister, 7 November 1921 , TO 1 
152/45/2/ part 1, National Archives. 
39 General Manager THR to Minister for THR, 19 June 1922, TO 1/70 52/54, National Archives. 
40 The Minister of Lands, a descendent of Te Heuheu Tukino, the Mayor of Auckland, the Mayor of 
Wellington, the Warden of the Park, the Under-Secretary of Lands, the General Manager of the Tourism 
Department, Secretary of the Forest Service, President of the New Zealand Institute and "not more than 
four" others appo_inted-by the Governor-General in Counc il. The first of these were W. Field~ an MP, T. 
Blyth from the Ohakune Chamber of Commerce, W. Salt, an executive· member of the Ruapehu ski club, 
and A. Simpson from Hunterville. 
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An important figure in the early years (from 1914 until the mid 1920s) was John Cullen, 
who was appointed as Honorary Ranger while still serving as Police Commissioner, and 
continuing in this role after his retirement in 1916. 41 In the absence of strong 
management from the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts, Cullen set about 
fulfilling his own vision for Tongariro, as a game resort where hunters could come to 
shoot birds such as grouse, blackcock and ptarmigan.42 He was politically well-
connected and obtained permission, sometimes directly from the Prime Minister, to 
release various exotic plants and animals into the park. 
In 1920, Leonard Cockayne was asked to comment on one of Cullen's applications to 
establish an exotic plant in the park.43 Cockayne not only opposed the application but 
raised the issue with the New Zealand Institute, which became a lobbyist against further 
introductions at Tongariro.44 Other public submissions followed. The Tongariro 
National Park board debated the issue in 1924, and a vote was taken. It was voted seven 
to four that no more exotic introductions should be made to Tongariro National Park. 
Hoani was one of those who voted to ban further introductions. 45 
It is hard to know how much disruption there was to Maori use of the mountains in 
these years, or what they thought of the management of the park. In the very first years 
of the century there was -some exchange between S. Percy Smith, the Surveyor General, 
and Tureiti Te Heuheu about the establishment of huts on the mountains, and other 
service provision for tourists to the Ketetahi Springs, though nothing seems to have 
come. It's clear from these early letters that Tureiti's opinion was considered important 
in the decision making process. 46 
Maori involvement decreased over the years. -Researchers for the National Park inquiry 
chronicle the steady watering-down of the Maori position on the board, from the initial 
41 Cullen was the Police Commissioner between 1912 and 1916. He was a strict disciplinarian, and played 
a controversial role in the violence around industrial disputes during his time as Commissioner. He also 
led the 1916 charge into Maungapohatu to arrest the Tu.hoe prophet leader Rua Kenana, during which two 
Maori men were killed. See Richard S. Hill , "Cullen, John 1850? - 1939," Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography(updated 22 June 2007), http ://www.dnzb.govt.nz/. 
42 John Cullen to Minister of Justice, 18 May 1914, TO 1 52/15 part 1, National Archives. 
43 Leonard Cockayne to the General Manager ofTHR, 9 January 1920, TO 1 52/15 part 1, National 
Archives. 
44 The New Zealand Institute was established in 1867 tc:i coordinate and publish the works of regional 
science and research organisations. In 1933 its name was changed to the Royal Society of New Zealand. 
45 Report of a meeting of the Tongariro National Park Board held in Waimarino on 24 February 1925, TO 
1 52/59/1 part 1, National Archives. · 
46 For example 'Notes on the Waihohonu Hut ' TNP 16/4, Tongariro-Taupo Archives; Written notes on G 
T Murray to Surveyor General, 13 November 1900, TO 1/26 1901/196, National Archives; Surveyor 
General to GT Murray, 17 November 1900, TO 1/26 1901/196, National Archiv_es. · 
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discussions of joint ownership, to a place as one of three trustees, to one of four, to one 
of seven, alongside other 'interest groups' such as the mountain climbers and skiiers.47 
For some reason (and there has been a much speculation about possible reasons over the 
course of the claim), the attendance of the Te Heuheu board member over this period 
was never very high.48 It is likely that Maori continued to hunt and gather food on the 
mountains, as there was very little policing of the area during most of these years. 
The 1922 board marked the start of the active management of the park. Although the 
idea of a national park as a place in which native species should be protected and exotic 
species excluded was fairly well agreed upon by the mid 1920s, the idea of the park as a 
place in which man-made infrastructure should be limited was not. A large project in 
these years was the building of the large hotel known as the Chateau, at Whakapapa, on 
the slopes of Ruapehu. The board wanted to build a 'hostel' at Whakapapa, but lacked 
the funds to do so itself, so advertised for a private company to build it on leased land. 
The company that built the Chateau went into liquidation shortly after the foundation 
stone was laid in 1929. The Board took possession of the Chateau, but was unable to 
afford the extra costs and upkeep, so it was transferred to the Department of Tourist and 
Health Resorts in 1931. 49 
Aside from the Chateau, however, the board did not develop much infrastructure on the 
mountains during the 1920s and 1930s. Some roads and huts were built in and around 
the mount~ins, often using prison labour. Further huts were built by skiing, tramping, 
and mountain climbing clubs, under approval of the boarq. Skiing was becoming an 
increasingly popular activity, with the first ski tows built in the thirties. 
A key area of interaction between the members of the park board and Tuwharetoa 
. . . 
related to -moments at which the board remembered, or was reminded of, their overdue 
obligation to create a memorial to Mananui Te Heuheu, as specified in Horonuku Te 
Heuheu's _letter to the Minister of Native Affairs in 1887. The manager of the Chateau 
reminded the park board of this promise and ~hen the Chateau was opened in 1929 a 
plaque commemorating the 'gift' was als·o unveiled. Whether deliberate or accidental, 
however, the commemoration was an acknowledgement of the actions of Horonuku, not 
47 This process is described in two National Park inquiry research reports: Coombes, Tourism 
Development; Edwards, Tongariro National Park. 
48 Coombes suggests the fact the board was heavily dominated by Pakeha and/or the increasing frequency 
of board meetings in Wellington over the Depression years may have dissuaded Hoani from attending. 
Coombes, Tourism Dev elopment, 205. Edwards comments that"it can be assumed Hoani Te Heuheu was 
very busy. Edwards, Tongariro National Park, 256. 
49 Under section 19 of the Reserves and Other Lands Disposal Act 1931. 
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a tomb for Mananui as the letter requested. In 193 8 a deputation from Tuwharetoa, led 
by Hoani Te Heuheu, went to the park board to request that a memorial be made· to 
Mananui. The chairman of the board found references to this promise in James Cowan' s 
national park handbook, but could not locate the original documentation. 50 Despite this, _ 
the board made a commitment to organising the memorial, but action on the matter 
lapsed when war broke out in 1939. In the late 1940s the issue was raised again, the Te 
Heuheu board member (Hepi Te Heuheu Tukino VII, the son of Hoani, who took over 
as chief when Hoani died in 1944) was asked to liaise with his people, and it was 
decided that a bust of Horonuku Te Heuheu would be the most appropriate form of 
memorial. 5 i This was unveiled at a ceremony in 1953. A Tuwharetoa party was present 
and Hepi Te Heuheu gave a speech. 
A lull in development during the Second World War was more than compensated for in 
the years directly following. New ski tows were built on Ruapehu and the Board held 
discussions regarding the establishment of a chairlift. It was decided, again, that 
delegating this to private enterprise would be the most efficient way of proceeding. An 
entrepreneur named Walter Haensli was granted a twenty-one year licence to operate 
chairlifts on the Ruapehu. The chairlifts went up at Whakapapa in the mid 1950s, and 
Haensli set up a company, Ruapehu Alpine Lifts, to run them. Other leases to 
competing operators followed. Ski tows went up at Turoa, on the south-western slopes 
of Ruapehu, from the early 1960s. 52 
In all these developments, Maori were a lone or silent voice. Conservation and 
recreational groups, in contrast, were loud and active, and as a result national parks 
evolved as places where conservation and recreation interests were catered for, and 
conservation and recreation group representatives were well represented on decision-
making bodies. It is hard to know why the Te Heuheu representatives attended 
infrequently, but it is easy to see that one seat on a board increasingly dominated by 
Pakeha interest groups provided little chance to make changes even if the consecutive 
board members had regularly attended. The other members of the board made little use 
of Hepi Te Heuheu even on questions where he might naturally be expec_ted to have 
expertise, such as the Maori names for places in the park. 53 The interactions over the 
5° Chairman of the Tongariro National Park Board to the General Manager, Department of Industries and 
Commerce, Tourist and Publicity,10 June 1938, TO 1/70 52/54, National Archives. 
51 Coombes, Tourism Development, 273. Sir Hepi Te Heuheu was knighted in 1979. 52 · 
. Ibid. , 267-8. 
53 Ibid., 262. 
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long-neglected promise of a tomb/memorial, and the intermittent attempts to lease or 
buy the Ketetahi Springs are the exceptions that prove the rule that Maori voices were 
not considered relevant to park management by the officials in control of park 
management. The written promise of a tomb was enough, though only barely, to ensure 
some contact over that issue, and the hard fact of Maori ownership of the springs 
provided another anchor for involvement. Without written promises or land titles, 
however, Maori interests and opinions were not sought or considered in these years. The 
park had become a Pakeha institution, or in Dening's metaphor, an 'island,' defined and 
run according to Pakeha rules. 
The lack of interaction over park management is in contrast to the interactions over 
waterways between the government and Tiiwharetoa, and the government and 
Whanganui. The dealings over Lake Taupo were the main concern in the relationship 
between the government and N gati Tiiwharetoa, and the litigation over the Whanganui 
River was the defining issue in the government's relationship with the Whanganui 
tribes. The mountains, lake and river are all of great importance to the identity and 
culture of the local Maori, but the lake and river are critical to their lifestyle and 
livelihoods in a way the mountains are not. In another sense, although the mountains do 
not directly supply food and water in the way the lake and river ao, both water _bodies 
derive from the mountain waterways, and thus cannot be seen as entirely separate 
concerns. These ecological links were made very clear by the construction of the 
Tongariro ·Power Development (TPD) scheme in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The TPD is a large hydroelectric scheme drawing on waters from the eastern and 
western slopes of the mountains. It redirects the eastern waters first through two dams to 
the Rangipo Power Station·, then to the Poutii dam where it meets the western diversion 
waters, which have.also come through two dams. From the Poutii Dam the joined 
. . 
waters flow into the Tokaanu Power Station and out into Lake Taupo. 54 The level of the 
lake was raised when the TPD first began, which also increased the power generation of 
the preexisting hydroelectric power stations oh the Waikato River. It also flooded a 
··large amount of lakeside land, much of which was in Maori ownership. The levels of 
\ 
the smaller Lake Rotoaira, another lake of great importance to Tiiwharetoa, were also 
54 There is a simple diagram of the scheme on the Te Ara website (a government-funded onlme New 
Zealand encyclopedia), http: //www.teara.govt.nz/en/lakes/5/3. Some of the TPD's dams and lakes are 
marked on Appendix C: Map ofTongariro National Park. 
" 
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raised by the scheme, and the headwaters of the Whanganui River, were diverted, 
dropping the flow of the river downstream. 
Many individual claimant submissions addressed the effects of the TPD. The 
overwhelming narrative is one of loss, of the degradation of important waterways, the 
decline in wildlife, and the disappearance of special and sacred places. The large 
number of individual submissions on this issue reflects not only the relative recentness 
of the scheme's construction and the continuation of its effects, but the greater weight 
that has recently been attached to issues relating to waterways and living areas, in 
comparison to the issues of mountain lands. 55 
Tuwharetoa and the lake 
In his report on the TPD, Tony Walzl found evidence that Tuwharetoa believed they 
had a special relationship with the government, begun with the gift of the parklands and 
cemented by their contribution of young men during the first and second world wars. 56 
This idea of a special relationship is not widely noted among other writers, though some 
individual submissions expressed a sense of being owed by the government for the 
donations and uses of their resources over the years for public works such as the park, 
the deal regarding the lake, and the Tongariro Power Development scheme. 57 
The dealings over Lake Taupo were perhaps the most important in these years. Disputes 
over lake ownership in New Zealand have been complicated because of the convoluted 
British law relating to waterways. In the early colonial period there was no legislation to 
vest lake ownership in the Crown; however, as ·Ben White has argued in his report on 
lakes for the Waitangi Tribunal's Rangahaua Whanui project, the Crown nonetheless 
tended to assume ownership in its actions regarding the control of lakes. 58 Later, 
legislation was passed allowing the Crown to take ownership of lakes and other inland 
waters. 
55 National Park inquiry #E series submissions, Wai 1130. 
56 Tony Walzl, "Hydroelectricity Issues: The Tongariro Power Development Scheme," (Wai 1130, #A8 , 
commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, 2005), paras 417-21 , 157-8. 57 For example Brief of Evidence of George Te Waaka Eruera Asher, Wai 1130, #G52a, October 6, 2006. 58 Ben White, "Inland Waterways: Lakes," in Rangahaua Whanui National Theme Report Q (Wellington: 
Waitangi Tribunal, 1998), vii. The Rangahatia Whanui project was initiated by the Waitangi Tribunal in 
the mid-nineties, and consisted of 15 regional research reports, and several thematic research reports ( of 
which Ben White 's lakes report was one). It aimed to provide a broad overview of Crown actions and 
omissions that had affected Maori land ownership and other treaty issues, in order to assist the evaluation 
of specific claims. 
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The tenuousness of Crown rights, and public access rights, to lakes in New Zealand led 
to a series of negotiated agreements in the 1920s. A deal was signed with Tuwharetoa in 
1926. In the lead-up to this agreement the consistent position taken by the Tuwharetoa 
representatives was that the title to the bed of the lake was not on the negotiating table. 
The then Prime Minister, Gordon Coates, had publicly offered his guarantee that the 
government had no intentions of obtaining the title to the lakebed, and that any 
agreement would be restricted to access and use arrangements. When the final 
agreement was drawn up and signed, however, the leaders of Tuwharetoa ceded their 
rights to the bed of the lake and surrounding streams in exchange for an annual 
payment.59 
The loss of the lake bed was a grievance that the generations of N gati Tuwharetoa 
carried until the return of the title in 1992. The deal made in 1926, and the body created 
to administer funds accruing from it, were to provide some benefits to the iwi, however. 
The annual payment itself was arranged to be the sum of £3 000 until such time as the 
annual fees earned from the sale of fishing licences reached £6000, at which point the 
annual payment to Tuwharetoa would a sum equal to half the money earned from 
licence fees (as long as that amount remained above £3000). 60 The body established to 
administer these funds on behalf of Tuwharetoa was the Tuwharetoa Maori Trqst Board, 
chaired by Hoani Te Heuheu with Puataata Alfred Grace as secretary. The deal proved 
reasonably lucrative, and the board enduring. The founding families of the Tuwharetoa 
Maori Trus_t Board continue to be major forces in Tuwharetoa politics. 
Whanganui and the River 
At the time of British colonisation of New Zealand, English common law had it that the 
beds of n9n-tidal rivers, lakes and highways were owned by the owners of the adjoining 
land. In practice, however, this law was often ignored with respect to navigable rivers 
and highways as their high public value and use led to an assumption of Crown 
ownership. When cases reached the New Zealand courts, the legal opinion was that the 
English common law principle applied, but that it might be more easily laid aside in 
New Zeiland due to the special circumstances of colonisation. 61 In the litigation over 
the Whanganui River the Crown argued (among other defences) that the 1848 deed of 
sale of the surrounding lands included the bed of t4e Whanganui River. A succession of 
59 Ibid. , 181. 
60 Ibid. ._ 
61
· Waitangi Tribunal, Whanganui River Report, Wai 167, (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, 1999), 17. 
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laws in the nineteenth century cemented the assumption that the Crown had the right to 
control the use of the Whanganui River. 
The litigation brought forth by the confederation of Whanganui River tribes known 
collectively as Te Atihaunui a Paparangi, began in earnest with a Native Land Court 
hearing in 1938 (which decided that the bed of the river was Maori land held in 
customary title), and from there passed through the Native Appellate Court, the 
Supreme Court, a royal commission, the Court of Appeal, the Maori Appellate Court, 
and the Court of Appeal again, before a decision was reached in 1962. The Court of 
Appeal's 1962 decision held that the title to the river bed had passed to the Crown when 
the Native Land Court had transferred the title of the adjoining land from Maori to the 
Crown. 62 The Waitangi Tribunal held hearings in 1993 and 1994, and the report was 
published in 1999, but settlement was yet to be reached at the time of writing. The case 
has been the longest-running in New Zealand history. 63 
Characterisations of the period 1907-1970 in the inquiry 
This period, the long fonnative years of the national park institution, is of key 
importance to an understanding of the relationship as it stands today. This was not well-
recognised in the course of the claim, which focused on the actions and intentions of 
Crown and Maori agents, especially relating to the 'gift.' The research of ecologist and 
historian Geoff Park for the Flora and Fauna inquiry showed that the period constituted 
a kind of non-malicious neglect of Maori and their interests in wildlife 1nanagement. 64 
The term 'effective exclusion,' the title of Park's report, was picked up by the claimants 
in the National Park inquiry, but the nuance of his argument, that this exclusion was a 
kind of symptom of the times rather than a deliberate ploy to marginalise Maori, was 
not a part of their submissions. The narratives the Tribunal process encourages, 
especially the claimant practice of focusing on the deliberate actions of Crown agents, 
and both Crown and claimant reluctance to look at institutional factors, limits a full 
exploration of the ways in which the past has shaped present relationships. 
The race-relations of the early twentieth century have not been as studie~ as that of the 
nineteenth, and are much less a focus of attention in the work of the Tribunal. Richard 
Hill argues this is because the more dramatic conflict and the larger part of Maori land 
62 Ibid. , 195. 
63 David Young, "Nga Iwi O Whanganui - the 20th Century," Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, 
http: //www.teara.govt.nz/en/whanganui-tribes/3, updated March 4, 2009. 
64 Park, Effective Exclusion? , 667. 
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loss were already over by 1900, although the years between 1909 and 1920 were also a 
period of substantial land alienation. 65 Another historian, Angela W anhalla, points out 
that the writing on this period is dominated by the world wars and the first Labour 
government, while histories of race-relations focus on biographies of the Maori leaders 
of the time. 66 Legal academic Paul McHugh has described the lack of attention in 
historical literature as "effective exclusion," a non-deliberate but harmful omission of 
Maori presence in the writing about New Zealand history (Geoff Park borrowed the 
term to refer to the exclusion of Maori from -natural resource management in New 
Zealand's past). 67 
There are questions here about the reasons for the lack of attention to the broad sweep 
of race relations in this period. It is possible that the "effective exclusion" of Maori in 
historical literature (including Tribunal literature), is simply a result of the 
marginalisation of Maori in the processes of government in these years. The real, 
political neglect of Maori in this period has made them less 'visible' in the written 
records on which historians tend to rely. Another explanation might be that historians 
and those interested in history more generally are drawn to armed conflict and big 
personalities, and neglect less dramatic historical characters and events, as Wanhalla has 
argued. Paul McHugh argues that the writing-out of Maori in history is part of ':1 
'primeval need' for political societies to create a foundation narrative which explains 
and legitimises their existence and character. In New Zealand, he argues, this story is 
about the triumph of representative government, and the moves by which New Zealand 
became politically independent from· Britain. The Maori role in this narrative is as an 
initial obst3:cle to the progress of statehood that was "cleared away" during the late 
. h 68 n1neteent century. 
All of these factors have a part to play in the relative neglect of this historical period in 
Tribunal inquiries. ~ he powerful characters of Maori leadership in this era have 
attracted the focus of historians, as have the powerful events of the two world wars and 
intervening depression. The grand narratives of national identity and national 
65 Richaris. Hill, State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy: Crown-Maori Relations in New 
Zealand/Aotearoa 1900-1950 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004), 16; Tom Brooking, 
"'Busting_up' the Greatest Estate of All: Liberal Maori Land Policy 1891-1911 ," The New Zealand 
Journal of History 26, no. 1 (1992): 78. . 
66 Angela Wanhalla, "Review of State Authority, Indigenous Autonomy : C.rown-Maori Race.Relations in 
New Zealand/Aotearoa, 1900-1950," Canadian Journal of History 40, no. 3 (2005). 
67 Paul McHugh, "Australasian Narratives of Constituti~nal Foundation," in Quicksands: Foundational 
Histories in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand, ed. Kfaus Neumann, Nicholas Thomas, and Hilary 
Ericksen (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 1999), 103. 
68 · -
·Ibid., 98-103. 
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independence have served to elide Maori political presence in these years, particularly 
their continued campaigns for self-determination. In the Tribunal, this period has been 
neglected due to its relative lack of dramatic conflict and land alienation, and the 
parallel absence of deal-cutting and promise-making. It is, however, a fundamentally 
important period in the race relations history of New Zealand, and deserves more 
attention from both the academy and the Tribunal. 
Although all the parties in the inquiry have tended to disregard the period 1907-1970 
compared to the previous and subsequent periods, the research reports ,vhich do address 
these years_ present different interpretations of Maori exclusion from park management. 
The main Crown research reports portray national park reservation as a process 
resulting from increasingly enlightened attitudes towards the environment, which in its 
execution unintentionally caused limited and largely unavoidable harm to local Maori 
groups. 69 Claimant historians characterise it as a process of Crown acquisition of largely 
Maori land for the main purpose of commercial gain from the tourist industry, which in 
its execution deliberately and avoidably excluded and marginalised Maori to great 
detriment. 70 Whether the officials who encouraged and enabled the creation of scenic 
reserves were spurred more by the tourism dollar or the notion of 'preserving the 
wonders of nature for future generations,' took up large portions of inquiry time, with 
Crown researchers and lawyers arguing that 'public ownership' was the primary goal, 
and claimant researchers and lawyers countering that creating tourism revenue out of 
agriculturally unsuitable lands was a far greater motivation. Advocates for parks at the 
time used both arguments and evidently did not think that they were inconsistent, or that 
either was immoral. Immorality was seen to lie in the potential for these areas to be lost, 
desecrated or wasted rather than in making money from their use. 
The focus on the motivations of the Crown in establishing scenic reserves has obscured 
the main cause of Maori exclusion during the formative period of the national park 
institution. A national park, in these years, became a place where recreational interests 
ruled, where native species were to be left strictly alone, and the introduction of non-
native species eventually forbidden. Most importantly, the idea of a nati<?nal park as a 
play area for all citizens, an area open to anyone who had the means and inclination to 
visit, became embedded in these years. The idea of the mountains as a place which had 
69 For example Andrew Joel, The Origins of the Gift of the Peaks and the Establishment of the Tongariro 
National Park, (Commissioned by the Crown Law Office, 2005); Edwards, Tongariro National Park. 7° For example Coombes, Tourism Development; Anderson, Tongariro National Park. · 
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a particular significance for Maori, or a place where they should have influence, was 
lost to Pakeha during this time. The last thirty years has seen an effort to change the 
pattern of exclusion established in the first half of the twentieth century. 
• 
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Chapter Seven: Eroding the Island's Edges 1970-2006 
The late 1960s and early 1970s are widely seen as a turning point in New Zealand race-
relations, during which political issues relating to Maori became national news stories 
again, after a period of roughly seventy years of' effective exclusion.' This was a 
vibrant period for Maori, culturally and politically, in which they made their views and 
concerns heard across the country. Many writers mark this period as beginning a new 
kind of relationship between Maori and the government. 1 Since the seventies Maori 
have been more active in protesting against government actions, more politically 
organised, and more skilful at using the courts to force the government into action. 
Partly as a result of this protest, and partly due to changes in Pakeha attitudes in this era, 
the government made some effort to alter the way they dealt with Maori issues, largely 
by consulting with iwi representatives. 
There was a policy transition in these years from the language of 'assimilation' into 
'biculturalism' or 'partnership.' Whether this represented a paradigm shift or simply an 
improved version of the previous pattern of relationships has been the subject of 
academic debate. Paul McHugh has argued that, in the 1970s: 
[t]he relationship between governments and indigenous peoples was 
transformed from one which was fundamentally submissive to one which 
became antagonistic and disputatious. However, the underlying political 
dynamic remained the same, one of domination and counter-domination.2 
The period represented a radical increase in Maori political action on a national stage, 
accompanied by a limited increase in sympathy from (Labour) governments and liberal 
Pakeha. James Belich states that the key change in these years was "a huge increase in 
Maori activism, radicalism and political and cultural self assertion," but adds that th~re 
was also a shift in Pakeha attitudes in this period, making them "somewhat readier to 
listen."3 
These observations of greater antagonism and also greater.co-operation seem 
paradoxical, but the change could simply be characterised as being one of increased 
exchange. One of the patterns of the greater level of interaction was, as McHugh notes, 
1 For example, Richard Hill, Maori and the State: Crown-Maori Relations in New Zealand/Aotearoa, 
1950-2000 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2009), ix; Belich, Paradise Reforged, 475; McHugh, 
"Aboriginal Identity and Relations," 110. 
2 McHugh, "Aboriginal Identity and Relations," 110. 
3 Belich, Paradise Reforged, 475. 
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a pattern of dispute. The negotiations and legal decisions that resulted from these 
disputes, however, have led to more frequent and better organised interaction between 
government agencies and Maori. Among more liberal members of the government, 
bureaucracy, and the Pakeha public there was a real sympathy for Maori interests. New 
Zealanders were mobilising on various different political issues in the late sixties and 
seventies. This was a time of social ferment, with a set of overlapping protest groups 
advocating for a series of changes to New Zealand society, and the more conservative 
sections of the New Zealand public strongly resisting such changes. The anti-racist, 
feminist, peace, open government and environmental movements were all part of this 
mixture. The environmental and Maori protest movements, allied by their concern over 
pollution, worked closely together. 
The Treaty of Waitangi became an important symbol in the development of these 
relationships post-1970. After a century as a 'legal nullity,' the Treaty was reinstated as 
a legal and political force in these years by virtue of references made to it in new Acts 
of Parliament.4 The first was the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and its amendment in 
1985, which, respectively, established the Waitangi Tribunal and granted it powers to 
inquire into breaches of the Treaty dating back to 1840. In the mid-1980s references to 
'the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi' began to be inserted into a set of new laws, 
several of them relating to environmental management. These short references became 
leverage points for Maori to challenge the government in court, beginning with -the 
"Lands case" in 1987. 5 Since 1987 there has been fairly frequent litigation surrounding 
legislative references to the principles of the Treaty, in which Maori have won some 
significant yictories. Changes in the law, policy and organisation of relationships have 
often come in the wake of such victories. 
Relationships betw~en Maori and the government were also fundamentally changed by 
the new practice of consulting with community groups about governmental decisions 
thought to have an impact upon them. This change was also due to protest movements 
in the 1970s and 1980s for a more ~open government,' with transparent processes and 
·opportunities for the public to participate in decision making. Legislation in the 1980s, 
including conservation legislation, involved stipulations for government agencies to 
4 In an infamous case in 1877, Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington, Chief Justice James Prendergast 
declared the Treaty completely void in any legal sense. Though many of his conclusions were overturned 
in the early twentieth century, the Treaty had very little weight in domestic law from that time until the 
Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975. , · 
5 New .Zealand Maori . Council v Atta mey General [ 19 8 7]. The case is also sometimes referred to as the 
State Owned Enterprises case. 
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involve the public in the design and delivery of government services, through public 
meetings and liaison with 'stakeholders.' This policy leaves final decision-making 
power in the hands of government agencies, but the process of communication has 
created relationships between departmental staff and community groups. Maori, again 
particularly through iwi authorities, have been classified as stakeholders, and as a result 
have developed relationships with local agencies. This situation, while an improvement 
on the previous lack of contact, has not met the demands of Maori for partnership with 
the government. In court cases and Waitangi Tribunal hearings over this period it has 
been clear that Maori want to have a greater say in government decisions than merely 
that of one interest group among many. 
The Tribunal provided an outlet for Maori grievance, and there were fewer protest 
events in the late 1980s and 1990s, but they did not entirely stop. In 1995 the National 
Government, concerned at the amount of money being spent in settlements, proposed to 
cap the government funds available for settling Treaty claims at one billion dollars. The 
arbitrariness of the figure, · and the lack of consultation in the decision, caused great 
resentment among Maori. The debate became known as the 'fiscal envelope' 
controversy. Sir Hepi Te Heuheu convened a huge meeting of tribes at Hirangi marae in 
Turangi to discuss the issue. The Government eventually abandoned the proposal. In the 
same year there was a 79 day sit-in at Moutoa Gardens in Whanganui (then Wanganui), 
which the occupiers argued had been excluded from the original sale of Whanganui 
lands in 1848. The protest was partly in response to the lack of progress on the 
settlement of their claims over the Whanganui River. 6 
In the early twenty-first century there was a furore over tenure issues relating to the 
foreshore (the area of land between high and low tide marks) and seabed. In 2003, the 
Supreme Court made a decision that cases could be taken to the Maori Land Court to 
determine whether or not native title still applied over parcels of the foreshore and 
seabed. 7 The issue received a very large amount of media attention, raised Pakeha 
concern, and the then Government, led by Helen Clark, stepped in and created a bill to 
vest the foreshore and seabed in the Crown. In January the following ye~r, before the 
Foreshore and Seabed Bill had been made into law, the issue was further inflamed by a 
speech given by the then opposition leader, Don Brash, to the Rotary Club at Orewa, 
6 Diana Beaglehole, "Whanganui region - Maori and Pakeha," in Te Ara - the Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand, updated January 18, 2010, http ://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/whanganui-region/l 0. 
7 Ngati Apa and others v Attorney-General [2003] 3 New Zealand Law Reports 643. 
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north of Auckland. The Orewa Speech, as it came to be known, attacked all affirmative 
action measures targeting Maori, the references to the Treaty of W aitangi in legislation, 
and aspects of the Treaty settlement process, which Brash ref erred to as the 'grievance 
industry. ' 8 The speech gave the flagging National Party a twenty per cent boost in their 
support, and fuelled yet more controversy. A hikoi (march) was organised in protest, 
and on the 5th of May 2004 protesters flooded into parliament lawns. The hikoi was met 
by some ministers, but the Prime Minister refused to face the crowds. One of the 
Government's Maori MPs, Tariana Turia, resigned over the issue, and went on to co-
found the Maori Party with former Auckland University academic Pita Sharples. The 
Foreshore and Seabed Act was eventually passed in November 2004.9 
Conservation management 1970-2006 
Conservation management has been one of the areas where there has been a particularly 
high level of interaction between Maori and the government. Many key conservation 
and resource management statutes passed in the 1980s and 1990s included clauses , 
referencing the Treaty. Ranginui Walker raises the possibility that this was due to a 
perception among bureaucrats that the interests of conservation managers and the 
interests of Maori largely overlapped. He describes the way the T_reaty came to be 
elevated 'to the level of a constitutional instrument': 
This change vindicated Maori belief in the Treaty, their patience in 
. persisting with it, and the fortitude of contemporary ~activists who 
. continued t_he struggle against Pakeha domination. But the change would 
not have occurred without c\. responsive government and Pakeha 
supporters witp.in bureaucratic systems who could see advantages for 
~heir concern accruing from the incorporation of the Treaty in their 
. statutes. The Conservation and Environment Acts are cases in point. 10 
Walker alleges that bureaucrats, notably those going into the new environmental 
" 
departmen~s, welcomed the inclusion of Treaty clauses because they believed the 
• 
clauses would help them achieve their conservation goals . 
There was certainly cause for bureaucrats to believe that giving weight to Maori 
. . . 
· interests would bring benefit to conservation goals. The conservation movement and the 
\ 
Maori protest movement had a substantial number of shared goals, and a record of 
8 Don Brash, ''Nationhood," (Speech given to the Orewa Rotary Club, Jan~iary 27, 2004), accessed 30 
June 2011 , http:/ /www.national.org.nz/article.aspx?articleid= 1614. 
9 The Foreshore and Seabed Act was repealed in 2011 , outside the timeframe of this thesis , and replaced 
by the Marine and Coastal Areas (Takutai Moana) Act 2011. 
10 Walker, Kd Whawh~i Tonu Matou, 265-6. 
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working together over the 1970s and early 1980s. Massey University lecturer Peter 
Horsley has described this co-operation: through protests over power station proposals 
in the 1970s, to the Motunui-Waitara, Kaituna and Manukau inquiries of the Waitangi 
Tribunal in the early eighties. 11 By the late 1980s, however, the relationship had become 
uneasy. Legal academic Alexander Gillespie, writing in 1998, identified a "conservation 
backlash," manifested by "a growing body of literature [which] has openly questioned 
the alleged environmental values of indigenous groups."12 Former director of the 
Waitangi Tribunal, Morris Te Whiti Love, also described the rift, and his opinion of its 
source: 
... the Maori cause had been of great benefit to the conservation 
movement until it started to take a life of its own. This became very 
uncomfortable for the liberal non-Maori and provided for the parting of 
the ways. 13 
Both writers placed these changes in the eighties and nineties. The changing 
relationship between Maori and environmentalists can be seen in the record of 
submissions to the Waitangi Tribunal over these years. This alliance soured from the 
late eighties, as the establishment of DOC and the increasing empowerment of tribal 
authorities repositioned Maori and environmentalists into more problematic roles with 
respect to each other. 
In 1969, neither of the two major political parties in New Zealand had separate sections 
for the environment in their manifestos, 14 but public protest during the 1960s and 1970s 
over a proposal to set up a hydroelectric scheme at Lake Manapouri in the South Island, 
made environmental issues a major political concern. It also became clear that the 
incumbent Nature Conservation Council was an ineffective agency, as it failed to have 
any impact on the campaign. 15 One of the major concerns of the New Zealand 
environmental movement was the reform of government administration of the 
environment, which, until the 1980s, was divided between many different agencies, 
11 Peter Horsley, "Recent Resource Use Conflicts in New Zealand: :t-4aori Perceptions and the Evolving 
Environmental Ethic," in Environmental Politics in Australia and New Zealand, ed._Peter Hay, Robyn 
Eckersley, and Geoff Holloway (Board of Environmental Studies, University of Tasmania, 1989). 12 Alexander Gillespie, "Environmental Politics in New Zealand/Aotearoa: Clashes and Commonality 
between Maori and Environmentalists," New Zealand Geographer 54, no. 1 (1998): 21. 
13 Morris Te Whiti Love, "Aotearoa/New Zealand by the Year 2020: Maori and European 
Perspectives,"(c.1997), 
http: //www.iiinn.org/publications/ Articles%20Reports%20Papers/SelfU/o20Determination/Morrie _Our_ C 
ountry.pdf, accessed on 28 May, 2008 . · 
14 Ton Buhrs, Working within Limits: The Role of the Commission for the Environment in Environmental 
Policy Development in New Zealand (University Microfilms International, 1993), 105. 
15 Ibid. , 95. 
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many of which were primarily mandated to use and exploit environmental resources for 
. . 
econormc gam. 
Changes were made by successive governments in response to the environmental 
movement's demands for institutional reorganisation. A Minister for the Environment 
was appointed in 1972 but no changes were made in related departments to create a 
separate role for him. 16 The first effective body set up by the government to identify and 
advise on environmental concerns was the Commission for the Environment, also 
established in 1972. It was an 'arm's length' organisation that had some freedom from 
government strictures, but no power beyond that of recommendation. 
In 1980, the National Government passed a new National Parks Act. This Act replaced 
the National Parks Authority and National Park Boards with a National Parks and 
Reserves Authority (NPRA) and twelve district based National Parks and Reserve 
Boards, in charge of policy. Administration and operation of National Parks remained 
with the Department of Lands and Survey. When introducing the Bill, the then Minister 
of Lands, V.S. Young, assured Parliament that" ... the basic philosophies and spirit of 
the National Parks Act 1952 have been brought forward unchanged ... "17 Koro Wetere, 
the Member for Western Maori, asked if Maori,. in particular tho~~ connected to 
Tongariro, Egmont and Urewera National Parks, had made submissions to the special 
Government caucus committee which had investigated the previous system. He also 
queried whether there would be Maori representation on the NPRA. Young answered 
that there was special representation provided for Maori on the Tongariro and Egmont 
boards, that there were currently two Maori people on the Urewera board, and he did 
not see a necessity for representation on the NPRA. 18 Much of the debate on the bill was 
in regard to whether or not it was a necessary measure. 19 The key ambition of the 
National Government in passing the Act appeared to be the reform of the previous 
structure of multiple individual park boards and reserve boards, which was seen to be 
wasteful of resources. There was also greater provision for community consultation in 
the 1980 legislation. 
· Until 1987, however, there was no government department with responsibility to 
advocate for environmental conservation. The Maori rights and environmental 
16 Ibid., 108. The minister between 1972 and 1975 was Russell Marshall. 
17 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), Vol. 430, June 12-July 8, 1980, 1127-8. 
18 Ibid,, 1128. 
19
-Ibid., 1134: 
e 
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movement were both minority protest groups fighting against the political 
establishment, and there was substantial overlap in their interests and concerns? 0 Both 
groups sought to have their perspectives better represented in government decision-
making, and both groups had strong concerns about the degradation of the New Zealand 
environment. In the early 1980s, when the Tribunal was starting to become a real force, 
but before extension of its jurisdiction to address historical claims, the Tribunal became 
a venue where Maori brought forward their concerns over environmental degradation, 
and they were often supported by environmental interest groups, as well as the 
Commission for the Environment. 
This co-operation can be seen in the record of submissions to the inquiries. Three non-
governmental environmental interest groups were in attendance during the Motunui-
Waitara inquiry hearings: the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, the North 
Taranaki Environmental Protection Association (the members of which included some 
claimants) and Taranaki Clean Sea Action Inc. The Commission for the Environment 
was also present and played a very active part in the hearing. The Motunui-Waitara 
claim was brought forward by Aila Taylor on behalf of Te Atiawa iwi of Taranaki. They 
were concerned with the granting of the right for the Synfuels plant to discharge their 
waste out of a new pipeline at Motunui. This was complicated by the fact that there was 
already a pipeline out at Waitara that had polluted the surrounding reefs (kawa) and the 
kawa at Motunui were some of the few left unpolluted. This issue attracted widespread 
attention because the Synfuels plant was one of the contested 'Think Big' projects. The 
Co1nmission for the Environment's submission stated that "the environmental impact of 
a given level of pollution depends in part on the subjective reaction of individuals to 
that particular form of pollution," and also argued that the Treaty ofWaitangi should be 
used as a reference point "for any professional assessment of environmental impact in 
New Zealand."21 It is clear that there was much goodwill between Maori and 
environmentalists during the claim's _progression, and little time was spent dwelling on 
potentially contestable details; for instance, the claimants' request to have the size 
limitation on paua (abalone) lowered for the area was not debated at any length during 
h h · 22 t e eanngs. 
20 See Mills, "The Changing Relationship." 
21 Submission of Ken Piddington, the Commissioner for the Environment. Wai 6, second hearing, tape 1/1 
first side, held at Waitangi Tribunal. 
22 Conversation with Dr. Ben Gray, September 18, 2003. -
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The Kaituna and Manukau hearings in 1984 also saw the Commission for the 
Environment and various environmental NGOs give submissions in support of the 
claimants. At the Kai tuna hearings the Wildlife Service, part of the Department of 
Internal Affairs, presented a submission against the claimants, arguing that cultural 
concerns should not be allowed to override scientific findings over such matters as safe 
levels of pollution.23 It seems that the environmental body's status vis-a-vis the 
government had a strong effect on whether or not they would ( or could) come out in 
support of Maori at the Tribunal. The creation of a governmental conservation advocacy 
body, the Department of Conservation, in 1987, made the Maori-environmental alliance 
more complex, as did several other changes in the mid to late 1980s. 
In 1984 a young Labour Party, led by David Lange, swept into government on a 
platform of social change. The following year the Treaty of Waitangi Act was amended 
to allow the Tribunal to investigate claims stretching back to the signing of the Treaty in 
1840. This considerably changed the nature of claims brought to the Tribunal. Pollution 
and environmental issues were still part of claims, but these now shared inquiry time 
with the more lasting issues of land loss, economic and political marginalisation, dating 
back over a hundred years. This made claims less relevant to environmentalists and 
environmentalists less relevant to claims. 
The Muriwhenua fishing claim was one of the first cases where these broader Maori 
goals became clear. The Muriwhenua claimants, from Northland, cited the second 
article of the English version of the Treaty, which gave the Queen's confirmation and 
guarantee that Maori wo_uld have "the full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of 
their ... fisheries .. . so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their 
possession. "24 The claim arose from concern over the quota management system created 
in the 1986 Fisheries Amendment A~t. It was argued that the tradeable quotas were, by 
setting up an exclusive property right, contravening the Treaty because the Crown did 
not set aside any percentage of those property rights to Maori. The Muriwhenua Fishing 
claim was important because the claimants asserted their right to commercial fishing 
·under the Treaty. It also had a new dynamic, problematic for conservationists, in that 
the system had been set up as a conservation measure. The settlement of the 
Muriwhenua fishing claim, under the Treaty of W aitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement 
23 Submission of C.J.Richmond, New Zealand Wildlife Service, heard during the week 8 October 1984, 
Wai 4, #A4, Microficl;ie 0073 E09, Victoria University of Wellington. 
24 See Appendix A. 
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Act 1992, gave Maori a 50% share in Sealord Products, the largest fishing company in 
New Zealand, and a 20% share in each new species to be introduced into the Quota 
Management System. An earlier interim deal in 1989 established an organisation to 
promote Maori fishing interests, now known as Te Ohu Kaimoana. This was a 
groundbreaking settlement (though its implementation had some severe problems) that 
saw Maori achieve some real power in the fishing industry. 25 
Another important change in these years was the strengthening of tribal authority 
bodies. A 1986 report on social welfare for Maori, Puao-Te-Ata-Tu, identified the 
presence of 'institutional racism' in the social welfare department and across the 
bureaucratic board. 26 The report defined institutional racism as "a bias in our social and 
administrative institutions that automatically benefits the dominant race or culture, 
while penalizing minority or subordinate groups." The Advisory Committee that 
compiled the report travelled to marae all over the country, and at each marae heard 
demands from Maori for greater management over their own affairs. Puao-Te-Ata-Tu 
recommended "allocating an equitable share of resources, sharing power and authority 
over the use of resources."27 The fourth Labour Government set about a process of 
devolution, or 'transferral of resources,' to iwi authorities designed to fulfil these 
concerns. 
28 The construction and 'legal formalization' of iwi authorities, and the 
government policy to work with 'large natural groupings' in the Treaty settlement 
process has fostered the development of powerful iwi-based groups. 29 
The Department of Conservation was established in 1987. This was in response to the 
increasingly vehement demands from environmentalists for an agency solely 
responsible for protecting the environment. These demands can be seen as a 
continuation of the calls made by conservation advocates since at least the 1930s. In 
1982 representatives of some of the larger environmental groups compiled a strategy for 
environmental management. Key recommendations in their report were to create a 
"nature conservancy" and a separate Ministry for the Environment. 30 The then Labour 
Government took these recommendations on board in the design of the Conservation 
25 See Paul Moon, "The Creation of the "Sealord Deal"," The Journal of the Polynesian Society, 107, no.2 
(1998) for a discussion of some of the implementation problems. 
26 Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, 280. 
27 Sharp, Justice and the Maori, 209, 281. 
28 Ibid., 191. 
_ 
29 The term ' legal formalization' comes from ibid. , 191. 
30 The report was titled Environmental Management in New Zealand: A Strategy. Peter St. John Crabtree, 
"A Nature Conservancy for New Zealand : The Department of Conservation-- Its Genesis" (Post 
Graduate Diploma, University of Otago, 1989), 2-3. 
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Act; DOC was given an advocacy role for environmental protection in resource 
management decisions. The Conservation Act, however, also requires DOC to provide 
for recreational and tourism interests. 
The newly created Department was soon to be radically restructured. The Conservation 
Law Reform Act 1990 cut DOC's staff numbers by almost half, disestablished the 
National Parks and Reserves Authority and National Parks and Reserves Boards, and 
created the New Zealand Conservation Authority. The debates on the Bill show that the 
idea of public consultation was by then a major concern. Speakers emphasised both the 
consultation that had happened in the process of writing the Bill, and the consultation in 
conservation management decisions that would be guaranteed as a result of the Act. 31 
The power dynamics between conservationists and Maori, therefore, were quite 
different by the late 1980s than they had been in the early years of the decade. Both 
Maori and the staff of the Department of Conservation were in the position of having 
the opportunity to effect some real gains in their fields, and, perhaps naturally, neither 
was very enthusiastic about compromising on their visions. Their new power and 
independence also meant that the ideological issues which divided them did not get 
swept under the carpet as they had before. Conservation NGOs b~came in some cases 
active opponents of Maori development initiatives in the 1990s. 32 
There was a substantial degree of optimism in DOC about the potential of relationships 
with Maori. Their first director-general, Ken Piddington, was knowledgeable about 
Maori culture and emphasised the importance of a bicultural approach to conservation. 33 
There were _efforts in the· 1990s, at -national and conservancy levels, to establish 
relationships with Maori. In the early nineties Kaupapa Atawhai manager positions 
were created in conservancies. Their role was to "work with iwi and to ensure steady 
progress to:ward the.ideal of partnership."34 · 
In 1995 a legal case, Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-General of 
Conservation, sometimes referred to as the 'Whales Case,' · provided some further 
31 NZPD, vol. 505, Februaryl4 -March 15 , 1990, 501 , 506. 
32 Guy Sa)mon describes some of these conflicts in Guy Salmon, "Being a·New Zealander: Our 
Relationship with Nature," (He Minenga Whakatu Hua o te Ao, University of O_tago, 2000) , 
http://www.otago.ac.nz/titi/hui/Main/Talks2/Salmon.htm, accessed 12 J~e 2011. . 
33 David Irwin, "A Study of Co-Management ofNation~l Parks in Aotearoa/New Zealand" (Masters 
thesis, Lincoln University, 1996), 22. 
34 DOC, Greenprint Overview, The State of Conservation in New Zealand, Brief to the Incoming 
Government, Welling~on, 1993, 24, cited in Robert. McClean and Trecia Smith, The Crown and Flora 
and Fauna: Legislation, Policies, and Practices, 1983-98 (WeUington: Waitangi Tribunal, 2001), 369. 
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clarity on DOC's responsibilities under section four of the Conservation Act. Four 
South Island Maori groups, going under the collective title ofNgai Tahu, took the 
Department of Conservation to court over the process of granting concessions to 
tourism operators of the coast of Kaikoura. 35 The Ngai Tahu groups had permits to 
conduct commercial whale watching tours, and the Department was considering 
granting further concessions to non-Maori businesses. The Ngai Tahu Maori Trust 
Board alleged that this would contravene the Department's directive to "give effect to 
the principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi." The judge acknowledged that the Director-
General should have consulted with the Ngai Tahu groups but rejected their case for 
freedom from competition. Ngai Tahu appealed, and the Court of Appeal ruled that the 
Director-General was bound to "give effect to the Treaty of Waitangi" in the 
administration of the Marine Protection Act, and all other Acts listed in schedule 1 of 
the Conservation Act (which includes the National Parks Act 1980). Justice Cooke, who 
heard the Court of Appeal case, considered that the principles of the Treaty did not 
extend to a veto right for N gai Tahu over permit applications, but that " ... the Crown is 
not right in trying to limits those principles to consultation ... " as " .. .it has been 
established that principles require active protection of Maori interests."36 The Whales 
Case strengthened the Maori argument for greater involvement in conservation 
management. 
What 'active protection,' or 'partnership,' should entail was the point of issue in these 
years. Resource management specialist Peter Horsley argued at a conference in 2000 
that: 
Government agencies are reluctant to move away from the time-honoured 
consultation model. They cite a lack of capacity in the interested 
communities to engage in effective management. They highlight their 
statutory responsibilities to deliver environmental and conservation 
outcomes in an efficient manner. They are reluctant to commit their 
resources to long term ( and sometimes uncertain) community capacity 
building projects that go beyond yearly budget cycles.37 
35 Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v the Director-General of Conservation [1995] , 3 New Zealand Law 
Reports 534, 535 . Kaikoura is on the north-east coast of the South Island. 
36 Ibid. 
-
37 Peter Horsley, "Colaborative Management: Pre-Conditions and Prospects," (He Minenga Whakatu Hua 
o te Ao University of Otago, Dunedin, 2000), http: //www.otago.ac.nz/titi/hui/Main/Talks2/PHorsley.htm, 
accessed 12 June, 2011. 
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These practical and political concerns came to the fore in the 1990s and early twentieth 
century. Horsley also suggested that Maori have been slow to acknowledge the 
complexities of DOC's task, and the 'chronic underfunding' with which they struggle. 38 
Tongariro 
The history of the park in the years 1970-2006 reflects wider changes in New Zealand 
race-relations. After the long spell of very little Maori involvement in park processes, 
the combination of a growing awareness among senior park managers of the Maori 
history and culture of the area, and the political acumen of the tribal leaderships of the 
time, led to a slow re-engagement between park managers and Maori. The history of 
Tongariro's relationships fit a description given by one of the Director-Generals of 
Conservation in these years: 
... the development of any relationship is a dynamic process. Rarely is it 
the case that a relationship can be said to have deepened, broadened, 
strengthened, become closer, etc., in an even, smooth or straight-line 
process. It is much more likely that if the progress of a successful ' 
relationship is charted, it will be portrayed as having had a number of ups 
and downs or as having moved through different phases associated with 
the working through of difficulties.39 
The difficulties involved in the relationship usually involved MaoTi feeling that their 
interests had not been adequately taken into account. A tangata whenua description of 
the changes went as follows: 
· At my first meeting with the Department of Conservation ('DOC') they 
said 'we are the conservation group' I said 'hang on -we have been 
conservationists for centuries, you just got here yesterday'! DOC' s 
.attitude has changed a lot in the last 10 years, more so with this concept 
. of iwi consultation. Prior to that, not a lot of consultation went on at all 
or only to -a selected few. It took a long time to even get one of our own 
• as a Ranger or as a Maori liason [sic] officer. They didn't really want to 
know us.40 
Tribunal claims and court cases were used by Maori as ways to force DOC to further 
engage with them. Despite these conflicts, there was a sub~tantial amount of goodwill 
on all sides in the relationships between DOC and the two tribal groups with which they 
primarily consult. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Bill Mansfield, "Focusing on the Future," in Living Relationships, Kokiri Ngatahi: The Treaty of 
Waitangi in the New Millenium (Wellington: Victoria University Press 1998), 212. Mansfield was the 
Director-General of DOC between 1990 and 1997. 
40
-Brief of Evidence ofTuruhia (Jim) Edmonds, Wai 1130, #D?9, May 5, 2006, paragraph 14.1 , 21. 
• 
167 
These two groups have had quite different experiences with DOC. With Nga.ti 
Tuwharetoa in particular, the 'gift,' though contested, has been repeatedly referred to 
and celebrated in official statements, and has fostered a sense, among Pakeha at least, of 
a special relationship. The hundred-year centenary of the 'gift' in 1987 was treated by 
the Government as the centenary for national parks in New Zealand, and the 
Government's elaborate plans for commemoration helped to set this relationship in 
motion. Government engagement with the separate hapu of Nga.ti Tuwharetoa, and with 
Whanganui Maori, evolved slowly over the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first 
century. 
The centenary was a very important event in the relationship between the paramount 
chief, the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board and DOC. The main ceremony was held at 
Whakapapa on the 27th of September 1987, one hundred years since Horonuku Te 
Heuheu signed the Deed of Conveyance vesting the ownership of the mountain peaks in 
the Crown. The choice of this moment as the genesis moment of national parks in New 
Zealand was very significant for the local relationship with Maori. Not only did it 
commemorate, and further mythologise the 'gift,' .it also prompted the organisers of the 
celebrations to consult the descendants of the man who made the celebrated 'gift.' Sir 
Bepi Te Heuheu did not let this opportunity pass, and made sure that from this point on 
the park administrators were directly in touch with the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. 41 
It was not solely this event which began the process of creating a relationship with 
Maori in the management of the national park. Attitudes towards public participation in 
management, and towards the roles and rights of indigenous peoples were changing. 
Before 1987 there was very little consultation or attempt to involve Maori in park 
management and events.42 Maori opinion or contribution was occasionally sought by 
individual staff members, on their own initiative: 
Beforehand there was some_Maori involvement, more at an individual 
level, not because of policy. Somebody would think to themselves it was 
a good idea and do it. Ad hoc stuff.43 · 
Attitudes began to change in the 1970s, which was first manifested with gestures such 
as the inclusion of Maori legends and histories in park interpretation, attempts to 
41 Coombes, Tourism Developm ent, 420 . 
42 Bruce Jefferies, Paul Green and Mark Davies stated this in their interview with Bayley and Derby. 
Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, 22: 
43 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, March 4·, 2008. 
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pronounce names correctly and new emphasis the 'gift.' Attempts to seek the opinion of 
Maori in these matters were uncommon. 44 
In November 1979 the National Park Board (shortly to become the Tongariro National 
Parks and Reserves Board) began publishing a newsletter. The Chief Ranger at the time 
was Bruce Jefferies, who made a contribution in every issue. Tongariro National Park 
newsletters ( and journals, as they became from the fifth issue in December 1980) made 
little mention of Maori involvement in the park. A photo of a new carving going up at 
the Visitors' Centre in 1983 was accompanied by an article written by Horonuku Te 
Heuheu' s great granddaughter. The upcoming centennial celebrations were also noted. 
In the March 1986 Journal, Jefferies described an organised trip to the mountain: 
"People of the Land" - Relationships Renewed 
A small event on Sunday 16th February, was possibly the most 
significant experience in my mind at least, that we have had in the park 
for a long time. For some time now I have held discussions with Sir Hepi 
Te Heuheu, his son Tumu, Archie and Rakei Taiaroa and Steven Asher 
[sic], Secretary of the Tuwharetoa Trust Board, regarding organising a 
visit to the Park for members ofNgati Tuwharetoa. 
Things finally came together and about 30 people ranging from some 
of the Kaumatuas ( or elders of the tribe), to some of the young people 
shared a day with us. I used the word shared deliberately as Tuwharetoa 
people are definitely not visitors to Tongariro National Par}(, they are the 
, 45 Tangata Whenua or "People of the Land." 
. 
Jefferies went on in his note to reflect on the "unacceptable compromise" between 
balancing use requirements and preservation r~quirements in the Park, comparing "our 
[Pakeha] chase for tourist dollars," to "the intangible values of the Park" that he 
believed were the key co~cerns of Tuwharetoa. 46 
Such sentiments were common in this period. The 1980s was a time of optimism about 
the potential of cross-cultural learning, and closer relationships between Maori and 
Pakeha in~ ew Zealand. In December 1986, -after Jefferies had left the chief ranger role 
and Paul Green had stepped in, Ken Piddington, the Director-General of Conservation, 
wrote a piece in the Journal. In it he said " ... this is a time qf soul-searching about our 
bicultural commitment ... " and described' the Treaty principle of rangatiratanga as a 
44 Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, .20. _ _ 
45 This list of names constitutes some of the most powe~ful Maori leaders in the Taup6 and Whanganui 
districts over a period of twenty years. The Asher family are also descended from the Te Heuheu line. 
Archie Taiaroa was for many years the chairman of the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board· and his son, 
Rakei (Rakeipoho) is .the present Secretary of the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board. 
46
· Tongariro: ·Journal of the Tongariro National Park, No. 25, .March 1986, 2-3. 
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principle of stewardship.47 The same journal edition included a piece written by a 
Tuwharetoa elder, K. P. Mariu, explaining the Tuwharetoa connection to the mountain, 
and saying "[ w] e are proud that they are bequeathed to the nation who, as nature lovers, 
accord them their deep respect. "48 Such comments show the optimism of departmental . 
staff and Maori as to the potential of the relationship between them. 
The contact established between the local park staff and members of Tuwharetoa during 
the planning for the centennial was soon being sought on other related matters. In the 
lead-up to the centennial, Bruce Jefferies went to "Tuwharetoa" (probably the Trust 
Board) to talk to them about the renovation of the visitors' centre. Timi Te Heuheu ( one 
of Sir Hepi' s sons) found an architect, which, according to Paul Green, helped to make 
the project acceptable to the Trust Board: 
I was around for some of those meetings and you could see some of the 
older people weren't happy with the final design, because it was 
contemporary, not traditional, but in the end they accepted it. It was 
designed by someone they'd chosen, as well, which helped. It wasn't like 
we were imposing something. 49 
Park administrators got in touch with Sir Hepi and the Secretary of the Trust Board 
regarding the centennial in July 1984. Sir Hepi nominated Whakapapa as the 
appropriate plac·e for the celebrations to be heard, and requested that 'direct 
communication' continue between administrators and the Trust Board. From this point 
both DOC and the Centennial Committee consulted the Trust Board in the preparations 
for the Centennial. 50 
The centennial celebration itself was held at the bowling green at the Chateau. It was a 
big event; the Governor-General, Paul Reeves, and the Prime Minist.er, David Lange, 
both attended. Sir Hepi led, by all accounts, a spectacular haka, and delivered a short 
speech, which is available as a sound file online: 
Today is a momentous occasion. One hundred years ago my great 
grandfather Horonuku Te Heuheu Tukino, gifted on behalf of his people 
the peaks of these mountains, and they became the genesis of Tongariro 
National Park and the parks of New Zealand. 
As a leader Horonuku was afraid and concerned that his mana would be 
lost if the sacred mountains were taken. 
47 Tongariro: Journal of the Tongariro National Park, No. 26, December 1986, 5 
48 Ibid. , 15 
49 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, March 4, 2008. 
5° Coombes, Tourism Development, 420. 
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And so it was not given away, but handed over for the taonga to be 
looked after by all people. 
He found a way to do the right thing that would ensure that the people 
and their mana would be preserved. 51 
Sir Hepi's delivery of the line 'and so it was not given away,' was rushed and emphatic, 
which seems to corroborate the Tuwharetoa argument in the National Park inquiry, that 
there was controversy among members of Tuwharetoa at the time as to whether the 
'gift' was a gift in the sense that was being celebrated at the centenary. The arguments 
will be discussed in the following section, but it seems likely that Tuwharetoa were tom 
between a desire to take the opportunity to emphasise their connection with the 
mountains on a national stage, and an unwillingness to recognise the Crown's right to 
claim the mountains as fully ceded by the 1887 'gift.' 
DOC did not consult Whanganui groups in the run-up to the centennial. There were 
some rumours that there might be a protest at the celebrations, but this did not go 
ahead. 52 Despite the evidence of controversy at the time, among Tuwharetoa and 
Whanganui people, as to whether or not the centennial 'gift' was an event worthy of 
celebration, there was enough goodwill among all sides for the event itself to go 
smoothly. Sir Hepi wrote a foreword in Craig Patton's book Tongµriro: A Sacred Gift 
(1987), which had been commissioned for the centennial, and wrote of the ties between 
Maori, Pakeha and the land established by the 'gift,' which has since been much quoted 
in government documents, including the Crown submissions to the National Park 
inquiry. In a powerfully memorialising moment, the government's narrative largely won 
the day. It seems that Sir .Hepi, aware of dissent among the tribe, nevertheless went 
. . 
along witl). this narrative in order to promote the tribe as connected to the mountain and 
as willing to work with the government. This strategy was a success in that the 
Centennial was the beginning of a new, more involved, relationship between park 
. . 
. 
managers and the Tuwharetoa leadership . 
The Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy was ahead_ of its time in this regard. In the early 
' 
_ 1990s an eight-member liaison group was formed between the Tongariro/Taupo 
Conservancy and the Tuwharetoa Maori Trust Board, consi_sting of four members from 
each. This was the only board of its sort in the country. When, shortly afterwards, the 
51 Evidence of Stephen Asher, #G 3 8. Appendix 1, cited)n Closing Submissions of N gati Tuwharetoa, 
#3.3.43, paragraph 7.182, 154. Emphasis added in those submissions. The speech is available online at: 
http: //www.teara'.govt.nz/en/biographies/5t8/1/4, accessed 5 July 2010 (as at February 12, 2012 there 
seemed to be some fault with this audio). 
52 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, March 4, 200a. 
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Department of Conservation developed its nationwide Kaupapa Atawhai policy, which 
included establishing a position for a Maori advisor (Kaupapa Atawhai Manager) in 
each conservancy, there was some argu1nent in the Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy about 
how this should be accommodated. The Conservancy's position at that time was that 
there was not enough money to sustain both a Kaupapa Atawhai Manager, whose role 
was supposed to include a responsibility to liaise between DOC and local Maori groups, 
and the liaison committee. The Trust Board was initially unwilling to have the 
committee replaced by an individual, because the liaison committee represented a more 
direct form of interaction between DOC and N gati Tiiwharetoa. 53 The Trust Board 
wanted DOC to hire a Kaupapa Atawhai Manager, and also to continue to fund liaison 
committee meetings. Eventually a compromise was made, and Huri Maniapoto was 
hired as a Kaupapa Atawhai Manager on a part-time basis, although this later became a 
full-time position. The liaison committee was not disbanded. The records show regular 
meetings through 1993 and 1994, and while I could not find records from lat~r years the 
liaison committee has existed throughout. According to Paul Green there have been 
"hiccups" in the regularity of these meetings over the years. 54 During the claim hearings 
h 1 · 55 t ere was on y one meeting. 
A key event in the Conservancy's relationship with Maori, particularly with the Ngati 
Tiiwharetoa leadership was its, eventually successful, campaign to get Tongariro listed 
as a cultural World Heritage Site. In 1989 the New Zealand government applied to the 
World Heritage Committee for the World Heritage listing of Tongariro National Park. 
The application argued for both the natural and_ the cultural features of the site. The 
arguments for the Park's natural heritage met the criteria employed by the Committee, 
and Tongariro became a World Heritage site in 1990, but the Committee did not accept 
the argument that the Park's cultural features justified a World Heritage classification. 
This was due to the fact that the Maori connection with the mountains was not 
accompanied by tangible heritage such as buildings or archaeological sites. When the 
Cultural Landscape category was introduced to the World Heritage repertoire in 1992, 
allowing for "intangible heritage" to be included, the New Zealand go~ernment made 
another bid for cultural heritage listing. Tumu Te Heuheu went to Berlin to give a 
submission advocating for the listing of Tong~riro as a cultural landscape. DOC funded 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4. 1.12, 459. 
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the trip, and provided support to Tumu in the preparation of the presentation to the 
C · 56 omm1ttee. 
In 1993 Sarah Titchens, from the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(ICOMOS), came to assess the cultural values of Tongariro for its World Heritage 
nomination. While she was visiting the park, Huri Maniapoto, the Kaupapa Atawhai 
Manager at the time, passed away. The tangi (funeral ceremonies) absorbed the next 
few days. 57 The Conservator noted that: 
... she couldn't have really got a clearer picture of the importance of the 
· · · 58 mountains to 1w1. 
The nomination was accepted, and Tongariro became a World Heritage cultural site 
under the criteria of cultural landscape in 1993. 
Hemi Kingi replaced Huri Maniapoto as the conservancy's Kaupapa Atawhai Manager. 
Kingi was, by all accounts, superb in this role, a natural diplomat and equally effective 
in Maori and Pakeha cultural contexts. His skills were evident in the negotiations over 
the Wai 480 claim, brought to the Tribunal by Tiiwharetoa over DOC's Conservation 
Management Strategy (CMS), the main policy document for the conservancy. In 1995, 
soon after the release of the CMS, Sir Hepi filed a Waitangi Tribunal claim (Wai 480) 
in objection to the list of Treaty principles contained in the Strategy. Paul Green 
described his experience of this to the Tribunal researchers Nicholas Bayley and Mark 
Derby: 
The 1989 management plan was the first realistic attempt to incorporate a 
Maori p_erspective. By the Conservation Management Strategy in 1992 
·we'd learnt a lot. We went around to the Trust Board and to the 
individual hapu. Next week we got a Treaty claim against us. It was a 
wake-up call. So we got a W<?~king party formed with Joe Williams (as 
lawyer), me, a planner, the kaupapa atawhai manager, the Asher brothers, 
Richard Te Heuheu, and a Crown Law solicitor. As time went on, the 
person stopping progress was that solicitor. The person having the 
biggest influence was ~emi Kingi. 59 
The conservator's comment is reve_aling _in several ways. He noted that the involvement 
· of higher level bureaucracy, in this case Crown Law, had been a hindrance to the 
resolution of the conflict, something that has been argued by claimants in the National 
56 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, March 4, 2008. 
57 A tangi is a Maori funeral. The ceremonies can last for several days, and large numbers of people 
typically attend. . · · · 
58 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, March 4, 2008. 
59
· Paul Green, cited in Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, 23. 
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Park inquiry. Green's description of the claim as a 'wake-up call' is a clear indication of 
the learning process going on, as DOC, blithely thinking it had everyone in agreement, 
realised via an official accusation of a Treaty breach, that it did not. The 
acknowledgment of Hemi Kingi as the person of chief influence also indicates the role 
key individuals play in the development of new initiatives. 
DOC agreed to enter negotiations in response to Tuwharetoa concerns, and the claim 
did not go to the inquiry phase. 60 As a result of the negotiations the section of the 
Conservation Management Strategy dealing with the definition and application of 
Treaty Principles was co1npletely rewritten. A new strategy for the relationship, named 
He Kaupapa Rangatira was also drafted. 61 This framework document was intended as a 
practical guide to relationships between DOC and local Maori, and was to be developed 
co-operatively, agreed to by all parties, and its progress monitored regularly. Since 
Kingi's death in 2001, however, no progress has been made on the strategy that he was 
pivotal in developing. 
Although the extent to which the principles have _actually been applied is in question as 
part of the claim, it is a relatively sophisticated set of guidelines. Brad Coombes has 
noted of the Treaty Principles in the Tongariro/Taupo CMS that "[t]hey represent the 
most developed statement about co-management which this present author has 
witnessed in any DOC policy docu~ent or management plan. "62 The use of a claim was 
a relatively successful strategy in the development of the relationship. Another member 
of DOC involved at the time described it this way: 
-~ 
[The original Conservation Management Strategy] was worked at over a 
period of five years, and it failed - basically because there w~s nothing in 
it for anyone. So they lodged a treaty claim and that made everyone sit 
up. Suddenly everyone had something to lose. 
There were a few Crown lawyers and they rotated around each other, 
which tends to happen. One of them would ask a whole lot of questions 
and you'd just get it sorted out when a different lawyer would come in 
and you'd be back to the beginning. It brought DOC. and Maori together. 
And in the end it brought about He Kaupapa Rangatira - which hasn 't 
been taken up or delivered but was a way of DOC saying we are going to 
make a serious effort. 63 
60 The Wai 480 claim was included in the N-ational Park inquiry. 
61 
"Tongariro Taupo Conservation Management Strategy 2002-2012," (Turangi: Department of 
Conservation / Te Papa Atawhai, 2002), 104. 
62 Coombes, Tourism Development, 448. 
63 Interview with former DOC staff member, 18 May, 2007. 
174 
The same interviewee described Kingi as "fantastic" in the negotiations. The Wai 480 
claim, and the other claims and legal challenges brought by Maori against DOC ( and in 
general against the government) could very usefully be described as a way of giving 
DOC 'something to lose.' With the imposition of the Tribunal as an external authority 
on how relationships should be run, DOC took action itself to rework its approach. 
These were busy years for the leadership of N gati Tuwharetoa. In 1992 their 
negotiations with the government regarding the bed of Lake Taupo resulted in the lake 
being re-vested into tribal ownership. The negotiations for the return of the lake were 
not a part of the Treaty settlement process, but a separate process entered into directly 
with the government. Four years later, in 1996, the Taupo-nui-a-Tia Management Board 
was established, comprising four members of the Trust Board and four members 
appointed by the Minister of Conservation. The Board's mandate is to manage the 
waters as if they were a reserve for recreation under the Reserves Act 1977. 
Also in the early 1990s, the Tongariro-Taupo Conservancy began to meet with the 
Whanganui iwi of N gati Rangi, closest to Ruapehu, though there had been a N gati 
Rangi member on the Conservation Board prior to this, from the mid-1980s.64 The 
wider relationship began in conflict, when the tribe took out a CO!,!rt injunction against 
DOC over the use of 1080 poison to control possums in the Ngati Rangi tribal area. 65 
The Ngati Rangi Trust was set up to liaise with public agencies at around this time, and 
through d~bate on the 1080 issue, and other issues such as the upgrading of walking 
tracks to Lake Rotokura, a relationship was developed between DOC and N gati Rangi. 66 
From the mid 1990s the Ngati Rangi Trust began sub-committee meetings with DOC.67 
In 1995, DOC approached the Ngati Rangi Trust with a proposal to establish a 
. . . 
'mainland island' in the Rangataua for,est, on the south-western slopes of Ruapehu, just 
outside the.national park. Discussions over this project led to the establishment of a , 
" 
co1nmuni~ations protocol between the Trust and DOC. A Memorandum of Agreement 
(Memorandum) was signed in 1996, guiding the "joint management" of "Rangataua 
. ' . 
Mainland Island Project," which is now known as the Karioi Rahui. The Memorandum 
sets. out ten protoco_ls, for the relationship, including statements that the project will not 
64 Matiu Mareikura. Brief of Evidence of Paul Green, #H3, paragraph 5 .1,. 9. 
65 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator, March 4, 2008; Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, 
paragraph 52, 10-1. 
66 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 52: 10-L 
67 Toni Waho, at Nga.ti Rangi Trust meeting, 25 August 2004, cited in Bayley and Derby, Tongariro 
National Park Management, 24. 
., 
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be used as a vehicle for facilitating Crown or iwi political goals (i.e. the Crown's 
proposal to add the land to the national park, or any separate issues Ngati Rangi-might 
have with DOC). The Memorandum also established a joint committee, made up of 
three members ofNgati Rangi, and three members of DOC, to manage the forest. 68 The 
Karioi Rahui is another example of positive change resulting from negotiations that 
began in a conflict situation. In an interview Paul Green noted that "[ c ]ourt brings it to a 
head sometimes." This is not always the case, however. The centennial is one 
counterexainple of changes being made without any court process. The lahar planning 
negotiations are another example of important issues being dealt with outside the 
proceedings of a court. The lahar management issue provides insights into how 
consultation functioned over an eleven year period and will be reviewed at some length 
here. 
The Lahar 
Ruapehu erupted in 1995 and 1996, creating a wall of ash deposits, or a tephra dam, at 
the outlet of the Crater Lake. When a tephra dam is created, at some point after the lake 
has refilled, the dam will burst, and a cascade of water and debris, known as a lahar, 
will pour down the mountain. After the eruptions DOC and other agencies began 
assessing the risks and planning for their mitigation. The issue of lahars is particularly 
sensitive in New Zealand, as a Ruapehu lahar on Christmas Eve 1953 swept away a 
train bridge at Tangiwai, causing a crash that killed 151 people. The pending lahar was 
also an extremely complex management issue given the large number of stakeholders 
and response agencies involved - a big lahar on the mountain threatens not only the 
railway line and mountain users, but could reach State Highway One, damage the 
hydroelectricity infrastructure on the mountain, or harm the army base at Rangipo. The 
main, but by no means the only, agencies involved included DOC, the Police, the 
Ruapehu District Council, Geological and Nuclear Sciences (a Crown Research 
Institute), Horizons (the Regional Council), the Army, Transpower (the State Owned 
Enterprise that runs the national grid), Tranzrail (the company that ran the train services 
across New Zealand for most of the lahar-planning period), Transit NZ (until recently 
the Crown entity in charge of the road network), and Genesis Energy ( a State Owned 
Enterprise established in 1999 that operates the Tongariro Power Scheme). 
68 Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Conservation (Tongariroffaupo Conservancy) 
and the Nga.ti Rangi Trust, signed December 5, 1996, Wai 1130, #A78 . 
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From very early on, the planning process involved consultation with both Tiiwharetoa 
and N gati Rangi representatives. The issue was discussed first at the Conservation 
Board in 1996, with Tumu Te Heuheu and Matiu Mareikura (from Nga.ti Rangi), 
present. There were public meetings, and in 1997 at a media event for the release of the 
Scientific Stability Assessment, the then Minister for Conservation (the National Party's 
Nick Smith) was taken up the mountain to look at the crater lake, with Tumu Te Heuheu 
and Matiu Mareikura again present. The Minister met iwi representatives after the 
Crater Lake viewing, and handed them copies of the Assessment. One interviewee saw 
this as a symboiic statement that discussion was going to continue on the issue at a high 
level.69 
The positions of the -many agencies involved in discussions can be split into two broad 
categories. Some proposed intervention of some sort at the Crater Lake to try to avoid 
or reduce a lahar; others argued that it was better to allow the lahar to happen and to 
take other steps to mitigate risk. Of the forty-five submissions to the DOC-led 
Assessment of Environmental Effects, most were against interference, at the Crater 
" 
Lake. 70 The Ruapehu District Council, responsible for civil defence on the mountain, 
and legally accountable for both the lives that the lahar might clailn, and the costs of 
risk mitigation, was among those agencies that favoured intervenfion at the lak~. 
. 
The N gati Rangi Trust was the first to issue a position paper, describing the lahar as a 
natural process that should not be disturbed, stating their particular opposition to 
bulldozing at the Crater Lake, and noting that alarm syst~m technology existed to warn 
the public of an impendi:µg lahar. 71 Nga.ti Hikairo, the hapii of Nga.ti Tiiwharetoa based 
closest to the mountains, supported the N gati Rangi Trust's approach. The Tiiwharetoa 
Maori Trust Board, while advocating as little interference as possible, was worried 
. ' 
about the possible impacts of a large lahar on Lake Taupo and the Tongariro River. Due 
to this risk; they supported the construction of a bund protecting the river and lake. 72 
69 Intervi~w with DOC staff mymber, July 29, 2008. 
70 
"Mt Ruapehu Crater Lake Lahar Threat Response - Lahar risk assessment," _ 
http://www.doc.govt.nz/publications/about-doc/news/issues/mt-ruapehu-crater-lake-lahar-threat-
response/lahar-risk-assessment/ 
71 
"Mt Ruapehu Crater Lake Lahar Threat Response - Nga.ti Rangi position statement," 
http://www.doc.govt.nz/publications/about-doc/news/issues/mt:..ruapehu-crater-lake-lahar-thieat-
response/ngati-rangi-position-statement/ 
72 Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, +6. 
.. 
177 
DOC's own position was against intervention, based on their own policy to allow, as 
much as possible, natural processes to continue in national parks. 73 DOC's final ·report, 
taking stakeholder perspectives into account, recommended to the Minister that an 
alarm system and protective bund be installed on the mountain. 74 In May 2000 the new . 
Labour-Alliance coalition Government's Minister of Conservation, Sandra Lee, 
accepted DOC's recommendations. Another review of the options took place at the 
request of the Ruapehu District Council, and in 2004 the then Minister of Conservation, 
Chris Carter, reiterated the Government's policy not to intervene at the Crater Lake. 75 
Neither minister's media releases made significant mention of Maori submissions. Lee's 
2000 release noted the fact that the Ngati Rangi and Tuwharetoa trust boards had made 
submissions. The press release also included the executive summary of the 
environmental and risk assessment, which went into more detail about the Maori 
cultural values that had to be taken into account in deciding what to do about the risk of 
lahar. 76 Her 2001 release na1ned the key reason for her decision as being a concern for 
the safety of workers at the Crater Lake if engineering intervention was pursued. She 
added that intervention would have been against the National Parks Act, the Tongariro 
National Park Management Plan, and the World Heritage Convention. With regard to 
the Convention she 1nentioned only the "high natural values of the crater."77 Carter's 
2004 release argued that the alarm system was the best way to manage the risk to 
human life. 78 The Department of Conservation's website, on the other hand, listed 
cultural concerns as one of the most important factors in the decision to allow the lahar 
to run its course. 79 It is hard to know whether the omission of Maori cultural 
considerations from the ministers' releases was a measure of the relative lack of priority 
of these concerns in their decisions, or whether it indicated the Ministers' caution about 
73 Harry Keys and Paul Green, "The Crater Lake Issue - a Management Dilemma," Thepra: Earth 
Movements 19(2002), http: //www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/about-doc/news/issues/crater-lake-µigt-
dilemma. pdf. 
74 DOC, "Mt Ruapehu Crater Lake Lahar Threat Response: Lahar Risk Assessment, Mitigation, 
Recommendations and Alarm System," Nov~mber 2006, 
http ://www.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/about-doc/news/issues/Laharfactsheet2.pdf. 
75 Chris Carter, Minister of Conservation, "Government Reviews and Rejects Ruapehu Intervention," 
Media Release 9 March 2004, · . · 
http ://www. beehive. govt.nz/release/ government+reviews+and+rej ects+ruapehu+in tervention. 76 Sandra Lee, Minister of Conservation, "Conservation Minister Releases Report on Managing Hazards 
From Future Ruapehu Crater Lake Lahars," Media Release 8 May 2000, 
http: //www.beehive.govt.nz/node/738 l 
77 Sandra Lee, Minister of Conservation, "Lee satisfied with Ruapehu lahar risk response management," 
Media Release 18 December 
2001 ,.http :/ /www. beehive. govt.nz/release/le~+satisfied+ruapehu+ lahar+risk+response+management. 
78 Chris Carter, "Government Reviews and Rejects Ruapehu Intervention." 
79 DOC "Mt Ruapehu Crater Lake Lahar Threat Response: Whangaehu River Bund, Crater Rim 
Engineering, World Heritage Status," November 2006. http ://WWW.doc.govt.nz/upload/documents/about-
doc/news/ issues/Laharfactsheet3 . pdf. 
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communicating regard for Maori interests when addressing the general public. Many 
Pakeha are hostile to the idea that Maori interests have a greater sway than the interests 
of other New Zealanders, an issue that had been inflamed by the Orewa Speech in early 
2004. Government departments were then under particularly heavy political pressure 
not to be seen to be 'privileging' Maori interests. 
The Conservancy staff had to attend to these Pakeha sensitivities while also 
accommodating the prominent Maori political players at the local ( and, in the case of 
Ngati Tuwharetoa, national) level. DOC had received criticism in the media for 
allegedly kowtowing to Maori opinion on the issue, and had to refute the accusation 
they were ceding their decision-making authority to one particular 'stakeholder.' At the 
same DOC had to show that it respected Maori opinions and interests. 
The role of Tongariro's World Heritage status in park management was highlighted in 
the public records ofDOC's reasoning about how best to deal with the lahar threat. The 
award of World Heritage status had been based partly on the credibility of DOC's claim 
that its National Park Management Plan would preserve the Park from interference with 
natural processes. The objections of Maori to the use of bulldozers at the crater lake was 
congruent with DOC's commitment to limit interference in natur~l environmental 
processes in the park, but it is not clear how much of DOC's opposition to bulldozing at 
the crater was based on respect for Maori values. The possibility of bulldozing at the 
peak of th~ mountain, the area of highest spiritual significance to Maori, also raised 
questions about the significance of Tongariro' s World H~ritage listing for its intangible 
cultural values. DOC liaised with the World Heritage Centre on the issue. The then 
Director of World Heritage, Bernd von Droste, was taken up to the crater lake in 1998.80 
DOC was concerned ·about'the possibility that bulldozing at the crater lake might lead to 
. 
the declaration of Tongariro on the World Heritage in Danger list. This was one of the 
. . 
arguments bOC put to the Minister of Conservation. 81 
The tephra dam burst on the 18th of March, 2007; the alarm system was triggered and all 
agencies sprang into their prearrange_d action. State Highway One was closed, trains 
were stopped, text messages were sent to everyone who had subscribed for information, 
and warnings went out on the mountain. The bund held, and the lahar passed just under 
the level of the lifted and reinforced Tangiwai Bridge, although the memoriai to the 
80 Interview with DOC staff member, July 29, 2008. 
81
· Ibid. 
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1953 disaster was swept away. Helicopters filmed the flow down the mountain and the 
national news covered the 'clockwork' lahar. No-one was injured or killed. The·success 
of the alarm system and alert procedures vindicated the stances taken by both DOC and 
Maori. The continuous negotiations that went on throughout the years as plans and 
developments changed, and the general agreement between DOC and Maori groups as 
to the right course of action, is further evidence that these relationships often function 
well. 
The Ruapehu lahar planning process was an extremely complex and lengthy 
management issue involving many different stakeholders, and the threat of potential 
loss of life. It shows the level of difficulty DOC sometimes faces in juggling different 
interests and managing its own reputation while making decisions. DOC's relatively 
successful negotiations with Maori, vis-a-vis the other stakeholders in the issue, shows 
again that DOC and Maori can be effective allies in environmental management 
debates. 
Summary of the period 1970-2006 at Tongariro 
During the years 1970-2006 a genuine relationship was formed between DOC and the 
Tuwharetoa leadership, and slightly later with members ofNgati Rangi. The 
relationships were not always easy, and developed over time as the parties negotiated. 
There was a substantial measure of goodwill on all sides. There were limits to how well 
Maori interests could be accommodated in the management of the national park, given 
the many restrictions on the use and development of national park lands, and the 
management structure in which DOC makes final decisions over those lands. 
The period 1970-2006 in the inquiry 
The next section examines the submissions made by individuals and claimant groups in 
relation to the period 1970-2007. Nei~_her side in the Tribunal inquiry acknowledged this 
period as one of learning and transition in relationships, or the critically important role 
that institutional factors played in inhibiting change. This is largely because there is 
nothing to be gained on either side by describing it as such in the claim. Crown 
submissions tend to portray this period as one in which Maori were adequately engaged 
in park management decisions, and defend specific DOC actions and the wider policies 
behind them. The claimant submissions, on the other hand, criticise DOC's 
management of the issues and events of these years. 
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· There was a predominant focus on the actions and motivations of particular Crown and 
claimant actors, with little analysis of the contexts in which they were operating. The 
claimant focus is on Crown actors, despite the fact that many claimant parties, at points 
in their submissions, identified legislative and policy restrictions as being the key issue 
in the relationship during this period. As with Crown agents, the roles of Maori actors 
were required to conform to key narratives; the Crown portrayed Maori figures as 
informed and agreeable to Crown policies and actions, and claimants portrayed them as 
heroic resisters of government trickery, sometitnes forced by the Crown into taking 
positions against tribal interests. The behaviour of both Crown and Maori actors tended 
to lack context in the debate, and there was little acknowledgment of the political 
. pressures these actors faced at the time. 
The reason for this can be traced to the legislation under which the Tribunal operates. Its 
brief is to establish whether there have been Crown acts or omissions which have 
breached the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. The definition of those principles also 
adds incentive to focus on actors rather than institutions, particularly the principles of 
good faith and active protection (though the principle of partnership can be, and is, used 
to discuss institutional issues). The focus on acts and omissions is the key feature of 
Tribunal inquiries leading to the lack of attention on background -contextual fac~ors. 
This caused particular tensions in the inquiry, and the park relationship, in regard to this 
period of history. This was chiefly because the people who were involved in these 
events are often still involved in park management. Accusations of breaches of the 
Treaty of Waitangi were levelled at Crown agents who are still alive or still in living 
memory. 
There was little connhissioned research on this period, which is noteworthy in itself. 
. ~. . . 
The Tribunal co1nmissioned a scoping report into the period from 1980 to 2004, with 
. . 
the purpose of identifying if any Treaty breaches had occurred during these years and if 
so whether they were extensive enough to warrant further research. With the provisos 
that a) their report was not comprehensi'(e, and b) if claimant evidence seemed to 
· warrant further research this should be attended to, Nicholas Bayley and Mark Derby 
wrote that: 
' 
: .. it is felt that a further report is not necessary at this stage: Throughout 
the period, ¥aori and DoC in Tongariro National Park have confronted a 
number of broad issues which this report has identified and commented 
on, and~have put in place plans and stra'tegies to deal with them. Both · 
groups _would appear to be reasonably content that their concerns have 
., 
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been listened to, and that what has been arrived at is a fair attempt at 
workable solutions. 82 
The claimant evidence has not upheld this conclusion, but, despite this, a more 
extensive report was not commissioned. 
The debate in the inquiry regarding DOC's handling of the lahar threat is a good 
example of the ways in which both sides exaggerated events to fit into particular 
narratives of failure or success. The lahar planning was widely regarded as one of the 
more positive interactions, and this was acknowledged in the inquiry. The claimants 
tended to downplay this success, however, by arguing that the chief reason the 
negotiations went well was the coincidence of both Maori and DOC being in agreement 
about the best course of action. Claimants accused DOC of taking too much credit for 
the success of the consultation process. The Crown portrayed the lahar planning process 
as an unmitigated success, and provided a number of statements emphasising how 
influential Maori perspectives and input had been in their decision-making processes. 
Comments made in contexts outside the inquiry, however, stand in awkward contrast to 
these statements. 
In the Tuwharetoa closing submissions, the argument was made that the tribe's views 
would only be taken into account if DOC also held the same position of their own 
accord: 
In effect, in order to achieve effective outcomes Ngati Tuwharetoa are 
reliant on DoC to adopt the same position as them regarding particular 
issues of concern in the Park. Evidenc~ was given that demonstrated on 
particular issues (Crater Lake, extension of skifields in recent years) there 
has been agreement. However, the real point is that if DoC does not 
support Tuwharetoa' s views, then Tuwharetoa are unable to enforce their 
· · 83 position. 
In an individual submission, Tyronne Smith, who has worked closely with DOC, argued 
that although the lahar consultation was positive, the main reason the decision not to 
intervene was made was due to pressure against intervention from the World Heritage 
Committee, with the short term nature of intervention at t]J.e Crater Lake and potential 
danger to workers also being greater concerns to DOC than Maori opinion. 84 
82 Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, 4 7. 
83 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 8.104, 197. 
84 Brief of Evidence ofTyronne Smith, #G24, paragraph 32, IO. 
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In his submission to the inquiry, Paul Green elaborated that he also felt DOC had a 
responsibility to defend Maori, as well as DOC, from the allegation it was a Maori 
decision alone to allow the lahar to run its course: 
... Ngati Rangi made their position very clear, namely, that there should 
be no intervention at the Crater rim. Although a Ngati Tuwharetoa 
decision followed, they did not commit to a final position as early as 
Ngati Rangi because they wanted to understand the potential impact of a 
lahar on Turangi and the trout fishery. These views, and the special 
relationship between tangata whenua and the peaks ofRuapehu, were a 
very important part of decision making by the Department. The 
Department has however, been careful not to 'blame' iwi for decisions 
not to 'intervene' at the Crater as there were other concerns about such 
work within the National Park. 85 
. The comments made to Bayley and Derby suggested that the way DOC handled the 
lahar issue had been acceptable to local Maori. 
The decisions taken here, while not solely in response to Maori concerns, 
nevertheless gave consideration of those concerns, and the outcome was 
acceptable from the point of view of the tangata whenua, as evidenced 
hr h h · · 86 t oug t e 1nterv1ews. 
One of the interviewees quoted by Bayley and Derby was Paranapa Otimi, a member of 
the Trust Board, who made a comment that the lahar planning negotiations were 
positive: 
Napa Otimi stated: 'The lahar issue has gone well. Ngati Rangi and 
Tuwharetoa said the crater lake should not be touched. We regard it as a 
· traditional burial ground. Nature should be left to take its course. DoC 
· supported us and have maintained that position.' ~7 
In Ngati Rangi's closing-submissions they made a general comment that Ngati Rangi 
. . 
had tried to work with DOC on a number of issues, including lahar mitigation 
proposals, but "were never ·given full ~r.edit for their korero and their interests were put 
. ' 
to the side."88 Two Ngati Rangi individuals' .submissions mentioned the lahar, and bo~h 
were fairly positive~ Keith Wood noted that "significant DOC consultation was initiated 
right from the start which provided good background options for 1nitigation" but 
criticised DOC for an incident in which DOC allowed snowcats in the Crater Lake area 
for research purposes and then falsely claim~d that local iwi had consented to the 
85 Brief of Evidence of Paul Montague Green, Tongarir? Taupo Conservator, on behalf of th·e Department 
of Conservation, Wai 1130, #H3, November 10, 2006, paragraph 22.1, 32-3. 
86 Bayley and Derby, Tongariro National Park Management, 26. 
87 · . Ibid., 27. .. 
88
· Closing Submissions on Behalf of Nga.ti Rangi, #3.3.33, par<;1graph 7.39, 63. 
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procedure. 89 Another individual Ngati Rangi submission focused its criticism on the 
Ruapehu District Council (RDC) 
People were concerned about the impact of having another Tangiwai 
disaster. Destroying the ash wall wouldn't solve all the problems, but 
RDC chose to oppose our stance, even after a long process with 
Tuwharetoa and DOC supporting us. They continued to push their stance 
with the support of the media which caused concern for the community 
and undermined our collective stance with DOC and Tuwharetoa.90 
The same submission alleged that the Ruapehu District Council had made a deliberate 
attempt to persuade other tribes in the area to go against the N gati Rangi position. 91 This 
is due to another strange feature of Tribunal claims - the protagonist of a Treaty breach 
is ideally a department or individual associated with central, rather than local 
government. So although DOC and Maori were in many ways allies in the negotiations 
regarding the lahar, most of the focus in the inquiry was still on the faults of DOC, 
rather than the role of the Ruapehu District Council in actively opposing the position of 
most local Maori groups. 
Both claimant and Crown submissions regarding the lahar can be interestingly 
compared with comments on the lahar made in fora other than the Tribunal. The 
periodic report to the World Heritage Committee on Tongariro, written by the 
Conservator, stated that "[ c ]ultural perspectives were a key issue in the analysis of the 
Crater Lake issue."92 At a World Heritage Conference in 2003 the paramount chief of 
Ngati Tuwharetoa, Tumu Te Heuheu, praised DOC's handling of the lahar issue: 
.. . there is a very close relationship between the tribe and the 
Department, both as manager ofTongariro National Park and as the State 
Party representative to the World Heritage Convention. This relationship 
has been vital in the management of.risks to public safety from a 
predicted lahar (mudflow) from the cr?ter lake of an active volcano. 
Ruapehu, at the centre of the National Park. The state agency's 
preference is to address the public safety risks without interfering with 
natural processes, letting them occur when their time is due. 
This has not met with universal approval from those who favour a 
mechanistic solution, but the state agency's approach has the concurrence 
of Tuwharetoa.93 
89 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraphs 56-7, 11 -12. 90 Brief of Evidence of Che Philip Wilson, Wai 1130, #A61 , February 10, 2006, paragraph 104, 16-7. 91 Ibid., paragraph 106, 1 , . 
92 Paul Green, "Periodic Reporting on the Application of the World Heritage Convention: Tongariro 
National Park/ (Wellington: Department of Conservation, 2002), I 1. 93 Tumu Te Heuheu, "Role of the Maori in New Zealand 's World Heritage Management," World 
Heritage Series no.13 - Linldng Universal and Local Values: Managing a Sustainable Future for World 
Heritage(2004), http://whc.unesco.org/en/series/ 13/. 
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In this forum Tumu Te Heuheu described the decision not to intervene at the lake as 
DOC's but as having the agreement ofNgati Tuwharetoa. More importantly, he 
described it positively, as an example ofDOC's close relationship with the tribe. A 
Ngati Rangi interviewee also indicated DOC was running the show but, on the whole, 
doing it reasonably well: _ 
DOC came to us early and asked us our perspective .... There were one or 
two points where they didn't consult with us when they should have -
they knew we wouldn't approve and they went and did them anyway -
and full credit to [name of DOC staff member] who came and got a 
grilling from us, about the decision they made ... But that was probably 
the only blemish.94 
The lahar is an example of a complex negotiation process that was managed well. This 
has been acknowledged by members of both parties outside of the inquiry context. In 
the hearings, however, claimants were loath to acknowledge that the interaction had 
been positive, and the Crown went to great effort to emphasise the role of Maori in 
reaching the decision not to intervene, while underplaying it in other contexts. 
Another set of comments expressed the claimants' concern with the fact that in order to 
achieve positive developments in the relationship they had to threaten or proceed with 
legal intervention against DOC. Examples of this were comments over the 1080 drop on 
Ngati Rangi land which led to a closer relationship with DOC, and the Tribunal claim 
on the draft Conservation Management Strategy, which led to a new set of Treaty 
principles and a (yet to be implemented) strategy for interaction. In an interview, the 
1080 drop was identified by the Conservator, and by one of the Ngati Rangi claimants 
in a submission, as the beginning of the relationship with Ngati Rangi. 95 The same 
claimant argued that the process of negotiating through conflict should not be the way 
this pn:~gress is achieved·: 
My point here is that we· shouldn't have to go through this process to be 
involved in the management of our maunga and wider Ngati Rangi lands 
managed by DOC.96-
The N gati Tuwharetoa closing submissions· also made a similar remark about the 
Tribunal claim over the Conservation Management Strategy: 
I 
It was not until the National Park initially failed to obtain World Heritage 
status due to, inter alia, failure to give cultural values 'prominence' in the 
94 Interview with member of Nga.ti Rangi, July 30, 2008. 
95 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator, Maren 4, 2008; Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64 
paragraph 52, t0-11. Wahi taonga means, roughly, 'treasured place' 
-
96 Brief ofEvidenc~ of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 64, 1;3. 
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management of the National Park, and later the development of the 
Tongariro-Taupo Conservation Management Strategy (approved in 2002 
following the intervention of the Wai 480 Waitangi Tribunal claim, 
lodged by Sir Hepi Te Heuheu in 1995), that the first realistic attempt 
was made to incorporate Maori values and Treaty principles in the 
management of the National Park.97 
The comments here argue that it takes the intervention of an external agency, for 
example the courts, the Tribunal or the World Heritage Committee, for DOC to make 
substantial changes to the way it works with Maori. 
The submissions on the lahar management interactions, the court injunction over the 
1080 drop in the Ngati Rangi rohe, and the Wai 480 Tribunal claim, also show the 
degree to which the focus of historical accounts is the motivations of the actors, 
particularly the Crown actors, involved in these events. The fact that DOC supported the 
Maori position on the lahar was not enough - the reasons for which they supported the 
Maori position were also important. The comments on the 1080 drop and the Wai 480 
claim criticise DOC for not being motivated to improve relationship processes of their 
own accord, and acting only when they were forced to do so. The motivations of Maori 
in these events were also the subject of much discussion. The role of Sir Hepi Te 
Heuheu, the paramount chief ofNgati Tuwharetoa from 1944 until his death in 1997, 
was heavily debated. His role in the Centennial celebrations is an example of the ways 
in which both sides in the inquiry tried to use the records of Sir Hepi' s statements to 
argue their own cases to the Tribunal. 
The N gati Tuwharetoa closing submissions provide a transcript of Sir Hepi' s speech at 
the centennial, and offer the following analysis: 
"And so it was not given" - a plain English statement to the Crown that 
' Gift ' did not mean ' giving' anything away, but rather a handing over to 
be looked after by all people. The plain English meaning of "all people" 
including naturally Ngati Tuwharetoa, something that has been 
overlooked by the Crown in the years following 1887 .98 
Two of the individual Tuwharetoa submissions mention the Centennial. The person who 
wrote at the greatest length about the Centennial celebrations was the Trust Board 
secretary of the time, Stephen Asher. Asher recalled the debate among the Trust Board 
members, mainly elders, as to whether or not it was appropriate for Tuwharetoa to 
participate in the celebrations: 
97 Closing Submissions of Ngati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 8.135.2, 206. 
98 Closing Submissions of Ngati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 7.183, 154. 
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They were aware that celebration of the centennial of "the gift" was 
likely to be controversial and not understood or accepted by our_ people, 
and questions would be raised about Ngati Tuwharetoa's participation. I 
recall during their debate hearing the Board members expressing doubt in 
regard to "the gift" and I believe they knew it was a myth.99 
Asher also noted that at a meeting of the iwi convened by the Trust Board at Hirangi 
marae, some of the younger tribal members had questioned what and why they were 
celebrating. Asher described it as Sir Hepi's decision to allow and participate in the 
celebrations: 
However, Sir Hepi said that he wanted the centennial celebration to go 
ahead and for Ngati Tuwharetoa to participate, not to celebrate the "gift", 
but to demonstrate and highlight the fact that the mountains were still 
tapu and sacrosanct to us, and we still regarded them as belonging to us, 
our taonga. He wanted the celebration to show that the Maunga and N gati 
Tuwharetoa were indivisible and one. He said that we should participate 
to mark our continuing connection and close relationship with the 
mountains, to make sure that everyone including the Crown understood 
that Ngati Tuwharetoa was still very much a part of the mountains and 
· 100 were not going away. 
The view that participation in the ceremony was decided upon by Sir Hepi was 
corroborated by another of the Tuwharetoa submissions. 101 Stephen Asher's description 
reconciles the Ngati Tuwharetoa position that the 'gift' was never intended as such and 
that the Crown had tricked Horonuku into signing away his heritage, with the fact that 
Tuwharetoa had participated in the c·elebrations commemorating the event in 1987. 
There was little said about the Centennial oil the Crown side of the inquiry. The closing 
submissions do not mention the ceremony or the planning for it. Paul Green's 
submission noted only that Ngati Tuwharetoa had been invited to participate in the 
renovations of the Visitor Centre for the occasion, and a Maori architect was funded by 
DOC to_ undertake some of the work. _Green also _noted the involvement of Tuwharetoa 
in the celebration ·planning and event itself. 102 Sir Hepi' s words at the time of the , 
Centennial have been used by the Crown in the inquiry, however. The Crown closing 
submissions quote a passage from Sir Hepi's introduction in Craig Patton's book 
Tongariro: A Sacred Gift (which·was commissioned for the Centennial). A key part of 
the quoted passage is: 
This matter of tapu is important. We want to see people enjoy the 
mountain but we do not want it desecrated. Some of our people feel more 
99 Evidence of Stephen Asher, #G38, paragraphs 12--13, 5-6. 
100 Ibid. "Hui-a-Iwi", means "Meeting oflwi," in this c·ase a meeting ofNgati Tuwharetoa: 
101 . · Evidence of Geo_rge Asher, #G52, paragraph 11.7, 24. 
· 
102 Brief of Evidence of Paul Green, #H3, paragraph 18.1 , 29. 
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strongly than others on this. Some would have no commercialism on the 
mountains at all, to others it is no great matter because it is Pakeha 
anyway. And yes, the tapu is still there, but it is no longer the kind that ·· 
kills. Now the gift is a Maori-Pakeha thing, and we want it to stay that 
103 way. 
The Crown closing submissions go on to add that: 
A consistent theme in this statement ( and others made on behalf of 
Tuwharetoa) from the time of the gift is that the gift was inclusive. It is a 
"Maori-Pakeha" thing, or a three-way bond between land,. Maori and 
Pakeha. The tapu remains and the mountains must be respected, but it is a 
different kind of tapu. Access to the mountains was always contemplated, 
but there is ambivalence and opposition to commercial or intrusive 
development 104 
Here the Crown has used Sir Hepi' s words to argue their own case: that in the past 
Tuwharetoa have taken a 1nore inclusive stance. This is meant to undermine the 
Tuwharetoa arguments used in the inquiry that are more exclusive of Crown ( and 
Pakeha) interests in the mountains. There are themes of authenticity in relation to 
tradition here that are not fully drawn out by the Crown lawyers, but are implicit in their 
use of juxtaposing older comments, such as Sir Hepi' s, with the more recent comments 
in the group and individual submissions from Tuwharetoa claimants. The more direct 
point being pushed here by the Crown lawyers is that there has been historic 
Tuwharetoa acceptance of recreation on the mountains. 
The intended meaning of Sir Hepi's words, recorded on tape and paper, has been 
contested during the inquiry, with both sides trying to claim hitn as an historical ally. 
This caused tensions in the relationship during _the time of the inquiry. Sir Hepi was and 
remains an important figure to N gati Tuwharetoa and a close relation of several of the 
key claimants. So1ne of the tribal members became upset at the Crown use of Sir Hepi' s 
comments to support the government's case, feeling that the words of their former 
leader and relative were being used against them. In one incident the Conservator 
withdrew a sentence in his original s~bmission because it had caused such offence to 
the Tuwharetoa claimants. 105 This sentence stated "[i]n fact I recall Sir Hepi and Brian 
Jones being advocates for helicopter skiing from the Crater Lake area when this issue 
103 Patton, Tongariro : A Sacred Gift, 168, cited in Closing Submissions of the Crown, "Chapter Six," 
paragraph 106, 32. (In my copy of the Crown's closing submissions each chapter starts with a new 
paragraph 1, page 1). 
104 Closing Submissions of the Crown, "Chapter Six," paragraph 107, 33 . 
105 Draft Transcript of National Park District Inquiry Extra Evidential Day, Wai 1130, #4.1.13 , (Waitangi 
Tribunal Offices, Wellington, February 14, 2007), 3. 
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became a contentious one in 1977 ."106 Part of the reason for the consternation caused by 
the sentence was that an aspect of the N gati Tuwharetoa case was that development on 
the mountains, exemplified by commercial activities such as skiing, is contrary to 
Tuwharetoa values. 107 
After the 1960s interaction between Maori and Pakeha increased, due to the post-war 
movement of Maori to the cities. This led to greater closeness and greater conflict. 
Small adjustments to legislation have worked as footholds for Maori to take claims to 
court, often winning more substantial changes. In conservation matters, shared interests 
saw Maori and environmentalists working together in the 1970s and early 1980s. This 
relationship became more complicated from the late 1980s onwards as the Department 
of Conservation took over as the key voice in environmental advocacy, with interests in 
land and resources often opposed to Maori aspirations. The new policies to consult the 
public in the process of decision making, and to give effect to Treaty principles have 
required liaison between DOC and local Maori groups. This led to the development of 
personal relationships between DOC staff and Maori leaders, leading to much richer and 
more complex relationships. 
These were important changes, but they were limited by the di~ferent expectations 
Maori and DOC brought to this new relationship. DOC staff, encouraged by the co-
operation with Maori in the 1970s and early eighties, thought that Maori were going to 
be uncomplicated allies in the quest to save the natural environment. Maori hoped that 
the promises to uphold the Treaty of Waitangi would finally see their rights to own and 
manage their tribal resources recognised. The goodwill with which both parties entered 
the relatio'nship at Tongariro, and the skill with which Maori leaders have used the 
courts and the Tribunal, have stood the parties in good stead as they have negotiated 
. 
with each other, bµt the differences in expectations regarding their relationship have 
continued to cause difficulties in their attempts to work together. The claim has 
exacerbated this problem, but may help to address it in the longer term . 
106 Brief of Evidence of Paul Green, #H3, paragraph 5.2, 9. Green's evidence was then amended to 
remove the sentenc.e, and filed separately as document #H3(a). 
-
107 Closing -Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraphs 8.54-8.79, 181-189. 
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Chapter Eight: The Time of the Inquiry 
This chapter is about the period of the Tribunal inquiry itself, especially during the 
hearings, 2006-07, and my interview period of 2007-08. I look at the way the inquiry 
process shaped the debate over contemporary relationship issues. Tongariro' s 
legislation, policy and practice are likely to change as a result of the future settlement, 
and the submissions regarding these topics are consequently highly strat~gic. Claimant 
submissions both criticised the workings of the current relationship model, and posited 
new models. Crown submissions tended to defend the status quo. The inquiry process 
distorted these debates, making them combative, concerned with pinning the blame on 
Crown witnesses ( or exonerating Crown witnesses from blame), and ignoring the role of 
the wider public, interest groups and the media. 
I elaborate on my argument that the key problems in the DOC-Maori relationship are to 
do with the limitations of consultation as a means of satisfying Maori expectations 
about the relationship. The fact that claims focus on acts and omissions, rather than 
policies and structures, obscured this. If the participants see the roles played in the 
Tribunal as indicative of the relationship in all contexts, the claim's impact on park 
management will be negative. If they see it those roles as specific to the claim process 
then the claim's impact will be minimal. 
There were no research reports in the claim that looked at the contemporary relationship 
in policy or practice, so the main sources for this chapter are again the individual and 
group submissions to the inquiry. In this chapter I also draw from the submissions of 
those claimants who do not have an established relationship with DOC. Claimant 
individuals and groups differ in the ways that they depict the relationship between 
claimants and 'the Crown.' The sub1nissions from individuals, in particular those who 
are closely involved in liaison between DOC and Maori, bring back some complexity 
into these relationships and identities. Individual claimants who worked closely with 
DOC were generally more positive about the relationship, and more likely to blame 
DOC staff at headquarters, and the Crown Law Office, for difficulties in the 
relationship. Claimants from groups who did not have- an established relationship with 
DOC were more likely to blame local DOC staff, and o~het Maori groups for the 
problems they faced. The group submissions from Ngati Rangi and Tuwharetoa 
claimants, squared blame on the Crown. 
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Among N gati Rangi and Tuwharetoa claimants there was a substantial degree of 
agreement over the strengths of, and more predominantly, the problems with the 
contemporary state of affairs. The overarching narrative in the group closing 
submissions of claimants was of Crown failure to provide for Maori interests and 
cultural values. Policy and practice were criticised alike, although section four of the 
Conservation Act, specifying that the administration of the Act must give effect to the 
principles of the Treaty ofWaitangi, was held up as a good rule that is not fully 
followed. The group closing submissions tended not to distinguish separate interests 
among Crown agencies and agents, nor acknowledge the complexities in these 
relationships that were identified by some individual claimants. 
In the hearings 
Throughout the hearings, on most of the issues discussed, there was a clear difference of 
opinion between the Crown and Maori groups and individuals as to what constitutes an 
acceptable level of Maori involvement in departmental decision-making. Essentially, 
clai1nants argued that any involvement in which they do not have a veto over decisions 
is inadequate. Crown counsel and representatives, however, argued that DOC actions in 
treating Maori with respect, were enough to meet the Treaty obEgations in their policy 
and guiding legislation. This difference of perspective can be seen in the follo'wing 
exchange between Karen Feint (KF), counsel for Ngati Tuwharetoa, and Paul Green 
(PG). 
KF: ... the ethos of the gift was to create a relationship between 
Tuwharetoa and the Crown which would enable both to protect and look 
after and respect the mountains. That can't presently occur given the 
current state of the legislation can it? 
PG: I think it can. 
KF: Well how can it when ... DoC is charged with the responsibility for 
managing the National Park? 
PG: Yes DoC is delegated under the legislation in decision making but as 
I've outlined the views ofTuwharetoa and other iwi towards their cultural 
values etc are taken very seriously. 
• 
KF: But in effect Tuwharetoa are reliant on DoC adopting the same 
position with respect to particular issues of concern in the park and if 
DoC doesn't support Tuwharetoa's view, if you have a different view, 
then Tuwharetoa are not able to enforce their position are they? 
" 
191 
PG: That's true. 1 
The claimant debate around consultation involved both contesting the validity of 
consultation as an appropriate means of Maori involvement, and criticising the way 
consultation was carried out. 
One of the N gati Rangi claimants also stressed that the word 'partnership.' for them 
meant sharing control, and did not describe the relationship N gati Rangi had with DOC: 
Our DOC co-management partners may think these comments are harsh 
but in our opinion the relationship has only achieved about 30% of the 
journey ... I emphasise the concept of 'co-management' because this has 
also been a concept that has evolved recently to replace "partnership." 
Maybe "partnership" means sharing control whilst "co-management" 
only means sharing management of a resource with control kept absolute 
and some place else.2 
Another claimant, from a group that did not have an established relationship with DOC, 
argued that the relationship model should be one in which Maori had fuH ownership of 
the park, and employed DOC staff to manage it. 
We aren't saying that we don't want to have relationships with 
organizations like DoC. We recognize that they have gained valuable 
expertise mis-managing our whenua, fighting the fight against invading 
exotic species from foreign shores. We would employ them for this 
expertise. The relationship is clear. This way, they have to listen to us, or 
we sack them. 3 
Such issues of appropriate participation in decision-making are usually, in a Tribunal 
claim, frained in reference to the Treaty principles of "kawanatanga" (the right of the 
Crown to govern in the interests of all New Zealanders) and "tino rangatiratanga" ( the 
right of Maori to the full authority over their own affairs). 4 The question of how these 
principles can be balanced has taken up a lot of Tribunal discussion in successive report 
findings. 5 It is the same discussion that is happening in many settler societies, of how to 
provide for a measure of indigenous self-government within a wider nation state. 
1 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4.1 .12, 460. Karen Feint is the lawyer for Nga ti 
Tiiwharetoa. 
2 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 50, 10. 3 Brief of Evidence ofMatiu Haitana, Wai 1130, #D33 ,-May 5, 2006, paragraph 60, 17. The use of the 
word 'mismanaging ' appears sarcastic, probably intended to remind the Tribunal that although DOC staff 
have expertise, they have not always used it.wisely. 
4 See chapter four page 92. Tino rangatiratanga was defined more ·fully in the Manukau report as ' full 
authority status and prestige with regard to [Maori] possessions and interests,' see Hayward, "Appendix: 
Te Tirohanga 6 Kawa kite Tiriti o Waitangi," in ed. Alan Ward, Rangahaua Whanui. 5 Ibid.,, 489 . 
192 
There was more focus in claimant submissions on the specific issues regarding 
consultation, than there was about consultation as a relationship modeL Some of the key 
issues were about how DOC chooses which matters to consult on, how often they 
consult on those matters, and how much time is given to iwi and hapu to respond with 
their views. There was concern that, although DOC policy states that iwi will be 
consulted on all matters of 'high impact.' it is DOC that makes the decision whether a 
particular proposal will be of high or low impact to iwi.6 There was also particular 
mention of the last National Park Management Plan, which was the subject of 
submissions early in the planning process, but a year of further planning and writing 
ensued with no further consultation. 7 When the draft plan was completed submissions 
were again asked for, and there is some contention about the amount of time that was 
given to at least one hapu to prepare their final statement. 8 
Another concern with the way consultation functioned in the conservancy was whether 
or not DOC was consulting with all the right people, and no-one but the right people. 
This issue was most often raised by those claimant groups who had never been involved 
in consultation with staff from the Tongariro/Taupo Conservancy, or had become 
involved very recently. Their lawyers specifically challenged DOC's procedures for 
identifying iwi and hapu groups with traditional authority in the area. Richard. Boast, 
counsel for a Whanganui group who have not previously been involved in Tongariro 
National Park management, asked Paul Green how this process worked: 
RB: ... I get the impression from what you have said that this ... you 
developed this understanding kind of in an informal way as issues arise 
from time to. time rather than by any kind of sustained programme that 
your conservancy runs 'in terms of informing itself about other groups. I 
mean is that a fair comment? 
PG: No I don't think it is. It'-s easy for, after you become aware to 
comment but I mean if you are actually unaware that there's a group who 
has an expectation that they are involved it's quite hard sometimes for us 
,. 
to identify with that and that's even with having a couple of ... managers 
who are helping us do that so it's not always easy to find the interest of 
some groups that might have been quite quiet for _a few years and are 
reforming and quite appropriately so. But the point I would like to make 
is that once we are aware, we want to move on to a useful relationship. So 
that's one of the positives that's come out of the hearings. It gives us an 
opportunity.9 
6 Draft Transcript of Extra Evidential Day, #4.1.13 , 24. 
7 Ibid., 19. . 
8 Ibid. 
9 . -
· Ibid., 10. 
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The identification of Maori groups with traditional authority over lands in the 
conservancy is part of the responsibilities of the conservancy's Pou Kura Taiao:· 
Considering the number of groups that may be present in conservancy areas, 
particularly at the top of the North Island, and the complicated claims and cross-claims 
they may have in different territories, it is a formidable brief for only one or two staff to 
not only identify but also to visit and consult all these groups. Issues around the 
resourcing of the Kahui Kura Taiao system were scarcely raised in hearings, however. 
This will be discussed in the next section. 
Trust boards are usually a clear and easy place to go in order to glean Maori opinion. 
This can cause its own problems, however. The current Secretary of the Tuwharetoa 
Maori Trust Board expressed this in his evidence: 
To some extent, the Trust Board gets treated as a 'one stop shop' by the 
Crown and other agencies because it is easier from their point of view to 
only deal with one agency, but the Trust Board has no desire to usurp the 
mana of the hapu and for their part the hapu are very clear that they wish 
to be directly involved on issues that affect their mana whenua. 10 
Conservation Boards, another formal avenue for gathering Maori views, came under 
scrutiny in relation to how me1nbers are selected. Liana Poutu, the lawyer for N gati 
Rangi, questioned Paul Green on the system of Conservation Board appointments: 
LP: So if other iwi members [aside from Tumu Te Heuheu] are on the 
Conservation Board it's simply because they have got on through their 
own personal merits and got through the process of the Minister 
approving it? 
PG: Well I would put it a little bit differently to that because one of the 
key attributes they will have is their tangata whenua status and what they 
can contribute as a tangata whenua person given the values of the Park so 
in the last probably 15 years there has been no less than four tangata 
whenua representatives on the Board. I think it has been five on one 
occasion. 
LP: So being tangata whenua will be taken into account but it's not, it 
doesn't guarantee them a p~sition does it? 
PG: No that 's correct. 11 
This exchange again shows the concern for higher recognition, which would eliminate 
the need for Maori to rely on governmental generosity in following the 'good faith' 
guidelines that generally inform DOC's actions towards Maori. Even when ministerial 
and departmental commitment towards such policies is borne out in practice, as is the 
10 Evidence of Te Hokowhitu A Rakeipoho Taiaroa, Wai 1130, #G4S , October 4, 2006, paragraph 10, 2-
3. 
11 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4.1.12, 473-474. 
194 
case with Maori representation on Conservation Boards, Maori take issue with the fact 
that this representation is not formally guaranteed. 
An interesting aspect of Maori representation on Conservation Boards is the historically 
low rate of attendance of Maori members. Regarding the infrequent appearance of Sir 
Hepi Te Heuheu at Conservation Board meetings at the past, the Tuwharetoa lawyer put 
this suggestion to Paul Green: 
KF: ... You say that Sir Hepi Te Heuheu was the lone Tangata Whenua 
representative on the Conservation Board for many years and only 
attended meetings infrequently. Can you understand that it's not a very 
comfortable position for the Ariki to be in, to be the lone Tangata 
Whenua voice on a board where the other members may not ascribe to his 
values? 
PG: Absolutely. 
KF: And that could have been part of the reason that he didn't attend 
meetings frequently. 
PG: I believe it was the main reason. 
KF: Is that what he has told you? 
PG: No. 12 
Maori do not necessarily have the resources required to respondto all requests to give 
their perspectives. They receive requests not only from DOC, but also from numerous 
other governmental and non-governmental bodies in the area. Again, there is a major 
difference in perspective in operation, where the prevailing government philosophy sees 
consultation as an opportunity for community groups to have their views heard. Maori, 
on the oth~r hand; see the submissions they give to DOC as adding value to 
management by providing advice, and they believe that they should be resourced by 
.. 
govermnent in order t~ provide this. One claimant put it like this: 
· With any resource consent that involves DOC, they do not pay for 
consultation with tangata whenua (Ngati Rangi) as it is national policy 
not to pay for tangata· whenua consultation. My argument, that I put to 
them has been "what is the difference between engaging a consultant to 
provide expert ecological or ehgineering advice and tangata whenua 
providing expert cultural advice?"13 
DOC's position is difficult: legislation directs it to make sure Maori concerns are heard, 
so they are potentially in a legal bind if Maori do not have the resources to express those 
concerns. 
12 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4.1.12, 466. 
13 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 100, 2.1. 
195 
" 
The inquiry raised serious issues concerning current park management. The clear 
discussion of these concerns, however, is subverted and obstructed by the processes 
which have come to dominate Tribunal inquiries. The main problems in park 
management are twofold: firstly, 'consultation' as a model for Maori involvement, and . 
secondly the current status and security of that consultation being a privilege bestowed 
upon Maori (should they be lucky enough to encounter a generous conservator), rather 
than an established right. The following paragraph from the N gati Tuwharetoa closing 
submissions summarises this well: 
The 'Conservation General Policy' (2005) and 'General Policy for 
National Parks' (2005) both have policies on Treaty of Waitangi 
responsibilities, that amount to little more than encouraging 
conservancies to develop relationships with tangata whenua, consult them 
where appropriate, and encourage their participation and involvement in 
conservation. Official 'policy speak' like this tends to be toothless in 
practice, unless there are strong local relationships developed on the 
ground, but even if that is the case Maori remain vulnerable to the 
goodwill of DoC, able to make progress when their interests coincide, but 
left without the ability to influence decisions that detrimentally affect 
h . . h 14 t eir ng ts. 
These issues are to do with current legislation and policy, and decisions regarding them 
take place at national level. They are not decisions made by local operational staff. Most 
of the debate, however, has focused on the process of consultation itself, despite the 
clear identification that the root problem is more fundamental than this. The irony of the 
situation in the Tongariro-Taupo conservancy is that a local relationship with a good 
track record has been put in the firing line of a squad that is, in the most part, aiming 
behind it at national policy and practices. These points will be discussed further in the 
next section. 
14 Closing Submissions ofNgati Tuwharetoa, #3.3.43, paragraph 8.99, 196. 
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Figure 4: Sketch of Tumu Te Heuheu and the Waitangi Tribunal listening to submissions during the closing 
hearings of the National Park Inquiry at Ohakune School Hall, 12 July, 2007. 
The Tribunal process and its effect on this debate 
The 'relationship model' between DOC and tangata whenua in Tongariro National park, 
and more widely in the conservancy, is certain to change in the wake of a Treaty 
settlement. The level of Maori involvement will rise, and there will be new frameworks 
to guide interactions. With this certainty in mind, claimant submissions regarding the 
current state of affairs in park relationships strongly express the inadequacy of today's 
relationships in order to create greater pressure for change. Crown /submissions, on the 
other hand, emphasise the government's obligation to the wider public, and describe 
DOC's progress in terms of including Maori in decision-making over the last thirty 
years, iri order to soften the impact of claimant accusations. 
. 
Individual submissions express more complexity than group submissions, especially the 
statemeJ?.tS of individuals who are part of the DOC-Maori liaison process. Such 
individuals noted differing attitudes among different departments, at different levels 
within a single department, and between individual government workers. Interviews 
\ 
revealed more nuance again. The Conservator's submission,_ for example, was much 
more positive about the resourcing of the relationship than his expressed opinion in 
interviews. This is almost certainly due to pressure from higher levels in DOC and/or 
advice from Crown Law during the submission-writing process. Regardless of personal 
opinions,-positions must be staked out in the process of a claim. Decisions about what 
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ground to cede and what ground to fight over tend to be made at higher levels than 
individual claimants and witnesses. This is not a process to which I had access as a 
researcher. 
Two features of the Tribunal process are most relevant to the debate regarding today's 
management. Firstly, as described in previous chapters, the Crown-versus-Maori 
framework of claims treats both parties as if the individuals that constitute them all 
share the same opinions and act in the same ways. The immense variety in attitudes 
within 'Crown' and 'claimant' parties is elided in the claims process. Crown and 
claimant parties are also taken as mutually exclusive, making it very difficult to discuss 
the highly important role of Maori individuals employed by the government. Secondly, 
the tendency for claimant arguments to blame the Crown, the whole Crown and nothing 
but the Crown, ignores other key players and prevents a proper discussion of realistic 
alternative relationship structures. It also prevents acknowledgement of Crown agents 
who have fulfilled their roles with integrity, and distracts from the larger argument that 
the roles themselves are problematic. 
There are many problems that arise from the dichotomisation of Crown and Maori 
parties. The differing roles of Crown actors, and the variety of attitudes even among a 
single institution like DOC, are fascinating aspects of contemporary (and historical) 
relationships, which neither side emphasise in inquiries. It is in the interests of the 
government to present a unitary and positive characterisation of 'the Crown' in the 
inquiry, and in the interests of claimants to present a unitary and negative 
characterisation. In the claim, the Department of Conservation was almost invariably 
referred to as if it were a homogenous unit. Any particular identity DOC might have 
separately from 'the Crown' more generally was not acknowledged, and individuals 
were seldom mentioned. A claimant from the N gati Tuwharetoa sub group N gati 
Waewae made a typical quote in this vein: 
. . . the Crown has used every method in the book to take our land. 
They've taken it for defence, for a national park, for paying for those 
damn surveyors, for roads, for power, for prisons e\ren. 15 
The Crown is generally also referred to as if it had a personality, often scheming or 
malicious: 
Dad told me that the Crowri had wanted to get h9ld of Pihanga Maunga 
for a while for two reasons. The first reason was that they wanted to make 
15 Brief of evidence of Daniel Winiata Paranihi, Wai 1130, #G30, September 28, 2006, paragraph 39, 9. 
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Pihanga a reserve to add to their National Park and the second reason was 
that they wanted to prevent my dad and his family from milling the 
timber and accruing money so they couldn't prevent the Crown taking 
more land to add to the Trout hatchery at Kowhai Flat.16 
This bunching together of government staff and agencies into one personified entity 
happens despite the fact, that, as Paul N adasdy explains, this is not the way locals tend 
to experience "the state": 
Rather than viewing the state as a thing ... we do better to see it as an 
ideological project, one that confers legitimacy upon the complex 
constellation of government institutions and processes that have many 
different (and often contradictory) agendas and interests. As it turns out, 
this is consistent with how people actually experience state power, since 
they must deal every day with the competing - sometimes contradictory -
interests and agendas of various agents of the state.17 
This is illustrated in the submissions of those claim.ants who have worked closely with 
m.em.bers of DOC. They distinguish between DOC and other government agencies, 
between local and headquarters staff, and note the importance of individuals and 
individual relationships. 
... Local DOC management had difficulty meeting our desire to have full 
active management once outside the Karioi Rahui project parameters, and 
National DOC staff would always be evasive whenever we pushed for 
greater participation. Often we were told that the Crown Law Office 
would not accept our propo~als for greater participation. What we have 
with DOC at the moment is a relationship rather than a partnership, where 
DOC and the Crown still exercise absolute control. There is a willingnes-s 
to make things work on the ground and to come up with workable 
solutions_ between Ngati Rangi and local DOC staff. However, as soon as 
those solutions get back to the Crown in W ellirrgton, any 
proposal/sol~tion gets quashed for fear of creating a precedent.18 
The submission quoted above identifies three sub-groups of 'the Crown': local DOC 
staff, headquarters staff, ·and the Crown Law office, and attributes different attitudes to 
. . . 
each. Local DOC. staff have 'a willingness to make things work.' national DOC staff 
are 'evasive.' and the Crown Law Office is rumoured to be recalcitrant. Another 
submission described a healthy· relationship between local staff and tangata whenua, 
which is jeopardised by the policy restraints on their relationship: 
At a local level, there are a lot of dedicated and committed staff and the 
relationship between the Department and Tangata whenua is quite strong, 
but due to managers having to abide to national policies created by the 
16 Brief of evidence ofRangikamutua Henry Downs, Wai 1130, #G40, October 2, 2006, paragraph 26, 5. 
17 Paul Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the 
Southwest Yukon (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003), 4. 
18 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 55, 11.. 
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Crown, that relationship quite often becomes very stretched and 
. d 19 stra1ne . 
The blame for these constraints is attributed to the generalised Tribunal bogeyman, "the 
Crown," here distinguished from local government workers. The same claimant also 
drew a (slight) distinction between the attitudes of DOC and other government 
departments: 
I consider the differing interpretation of the legislation as being the single 
biggest stumbling block between Tangata Whenua and the Department 
and although we generally want to achieve the same result, it is ho_w the 
Act is applied which seems to be the dilemma. Although I acknowledge 
that the Department is the foremost Crown Agency in learning/teaching 
its staff Maori values and philosophy, the gap still exists.20 
The local conservancy staff did not always come out positively in the submissions that 
allowed for different attitudes from different government bodies. Among the groups that 
do not have an established relationship with the Turangi/Taupo staff, some claimants 
accused local DOC members of unwillingness to engage with them: 
It would be wrong however to categorize the meeting with Paul Green as 
a consultation. He never really wanted to meet with us. DoC never has . .. 
It's a shame that Brian Faucet [sic] had left by then. He was the only one 
in DoC who had ever shown an interest in talking to Uenuku.21 
That his conduct was distinguished from Paul Green's by this interviewee is another 
indication of the perceived importance of individuals and of the relationships between 
them. It also shows that the relationships between DOC staff and tangata whenua in the 
area have not been uniform. 
The perceived importance of individuals and relationships between individuals was 
further suggested when some claimant submissions identified staff turnover as 
inhibiting effective Maori involvement. The salience of individuals is not evident in 
some claims where the discussion centres upon group attitudes and actions. 
DOC is evolving, and after years of persistent k6rero with Ngati Rangi 
we are starting to develop a reasonable relationship. However, we are 
continually having to mentor and retrain new DOC staff that we work 
with until they reach a level of vision and understanding to be useful to 
our partnership.22 
The tendency to refer to the Crown as a single entity, especially in regard to current 
concerns, is also evident in submissions by Crown witnesses and counsel. As any 
19 Brief of Evidence ofTyronne Smith, #G24, paragraph 31 , 9. 
20 Ibid. , paragraph 2.0, 6. 
21 Brief of Evidence of Rangi Bristol, #D40, paragraph 12, 5, paragraph 17, 6. 
22 Brief of Evidence of Keith Wood, #A64, paragraph 63 , 13. 
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Crown agent's behaviour can be attributed to 'the Crown.' it makes sense for Crown 
submissions to describe those agents as working co-operatively together for a common 
good: 
There appears to be a relatively high degree of consensus between DOC 
and tangata whenua when it comes to conservation values and getting the 
work done on the ground. 23 
Maori groups also have much to gain from presenting a single face in the debate, 
despite the diversity between and within tribal groups. In practice it is seldom possible 
for claimants to work fully co-operatively, as rivalry over prospective settlement deals 
pre-existing tensions between groups by the high stakes involved in prospective 
settlement deals. In the National Park inquiry the Whanganui groups seem to have 
splintered into several competing groups of closely related people.24 Although the 
Tribunal process tends to produce splinter groups there is an increasing movement to 
work together, especially among the groups who already have government 
recognition.25 Lawyers have for many years worked as a team in the Tribunal process, 
co-ordinated by the head of claimant counsel (in this case Tom Bennion), and 
delegating amongst themselves specialist lines of argument. 26 As mentioned in chapter 
three, there seemed to be agreement among lawyers and claimants to blame the Crown 
for dealing with Horonuku Te Heuheu to the exclusion of other chiefs in the area, rather 
than pointing the finger at Te Heuheu himself. A similar feature of the discussion of 
current park issues is the near-absence of mention of topics which are controversial 
within claimant groups. The debate over the use of 1080 poison for the control of the 
possum pest, for example, has caused huge upheaval in the area covered by the National 
Park inquiry, with community protests and ongoing arguments. For farmers and forest 
owners ( of whom there are many among the claimants), however, 1080 is an essential 
23 Closing Submissions of the Crown, "Chapter 9: Park Management," paragraph 106, 30. 
24 Many ~ters have commented on this phenomenon more generally. See for example Carrie 
Wainwright, "Maori Representation Issues and the Courts, 11 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 25(2002). Jane Kelsey, "Treaty Justice in the _l980s" in Nga Take: Ethnic Relations in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand, ed. Paul Spoonley, David Pearson, and Cluny Macpherson (Palmerston North 
Dunmor~ Press, 1991). Tipene O'Regan, who was the chief negotiator in the Ngai Tahu claim, has 
commented on a phenomenon born from the incentive of settlement by which breakaway Maori groups 
shop through history for old tribal affiliations, which they then claim to be a continuous identity group 
entitling them to separate settlement. O'Regan gives these groups the disparaging title of ''Nga.ti Putea" -
money tribes. I do not know enough about the politics of the area to know the root cause for the 
splintering ofWhanganui groups in the National Park inquiry, but it seems on the face of it to be more 
related to debates about appropriate representation than to money-grabbing. O'Regan, "Old Myths and 
New Politics," 15. 
25 A good example of this is the 'Treelords' deal, signecl in 2008, where three large North Island iwi (one 
of which was Nga.ti Tuwharetoa) worked together to obtain a settlement worth over 400 million dollars. 
-
26 Boast, "Waitangi Tribunal Procedure," 60. 
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management tool for the health of their assets, as possums kill trees and can infect cows 
with tuberculosis. There is mention of opposition to 1080 in some of the individual 
submissions, particularly from the Whanganui groups who do not have a relationship 
with DOC, but the closing submissions slide over these internally controversial issues.27 
The tendency to characterise the Crown and Maori as distinct and opposed camps also 
obstructed a clear discussion of the current relationship situation in the conservancy. 
The way the claims system functions makes invisible the roles of people who represent 
both Crown and claimants. The most glaring example of this is the fact that the roles of 
Pou Kura Taiao, DOC's Maori advisors, were barely mentioned in the claim. The 
conservator's submission acknowledged the work of the three successive Pou Kura 
Taiao, and noted that he believed DOC's staff had had a good relationship with each of 
them. No claimant submissions mentioned the Pou Kura Taiao, and on only one 
occasion was the issue raised by a claimant lawyer. Yet the program has a problem, 
raised in interviews, namely that one or two people cannot liaise with all the Maori 
groups in often very large conservancies. The program also has a difficulty appointing 
appropriate people, as each will have their own particular affiliations within the area and 
yet must represent, and be perceived to represent, all the groups in the region. The 
omission of debate on such a key aspect of the established, funded DOC-Maori liaison 
system is a serious impediment to a frank discussion of how well relationships function 
in the conservancy. 
Neither the Pou Kura Taiao from the Whanganui conservancy (who was from Nga.ti 
Rangi, and also had a close relationship with the Tongariro/Taupo conservancy), nor the 
Tongariro/Taupo Pou Kura Taiao, from Nga.ti Tuwharetoa, made submissions. They 
would have been in a difficult position had they chosen to make comments, working 
fulltime for an institution against which they were presenting a case. Another claimant 
who works part-time for DOC did make a submission and, according to his co-workers, 
found it a very difficult process. 28 It is a perverse effect of the adversarial nature of the 
inquiry process that people in these roles are put in such a quandary. When these key 
brokers of relationships between Maori and DOC are unable to voice their perspectives, 
there cannot be a frank discussion of the issues at stake. 
27 The Lake Taup6 and Lake Rotoaira Forest Trusts, for example, put in a submission to the 2007 
Environmental Risk Management Authority review of the use of 1080 in New Zealand. They argued in 
favour of the conti.iiued use of 1080. 
28 Interview with Tongariro-Taup6 Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
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A second major problem with the debates regarding contemporary park management in 
the inquiry is the fact that there were only two Crown witnesses, and neither are sources 
of the key problem of inadequate Maori involvement in decision-making. The two 
people who took the stand on behalf of DOC: the policy manager, Doris Johnson and 
the local conservator, Paul Green, were appropriate representatives at least in the sense 
that they had both been in their roles for some time. 29 This is not always the case; if 
longstanding public servants leave their jobs before an inquiry gets underway it will be 
the new appointee who takes the stand. 30 Even with witnesses as knowledgeable as 
Johnson and Green, two is still a very small number of individuals to face questioning 
regarding the work of an entire government department. Johnston and Green were often 
unable to answer questions asked by claimant lawyers. At times claimant counsel asked 
questions which could only have been answered by a decision-maker at a higher level, 
as when Tom Bennion asked Johnston if a system of recognition of rights to cultural 
resources in national parks might follow the same lines as that which was already 
occurring under the then Foreshore and Seabed legislation. Johnston explained that she 
was not able to answer: 
You 're asking me to speculate on future policy options or future options 
and I'm not feeling very comfortable about doing that. Tb.at is not a 
decision necessarily for a public servant to take.31 
At other times Johnston simply was not the person in her team who had taken the action 
under criticism, as when Annette Sykes, the lawyer for U enuku, questioned the Maori 
language title of the Draft Partnerships Toolbox that was a new policy initiative aimed 
to create better guidelines for interaction. Sykes was concerned that "he kete taonga 
whakakotahi" (roughly "a treasure kit for unity") could be seen as having assimilationist 
implications. Johnston was not responsible for the Maori title, and does not speak 
Maori, and the questioning floundered on for several minutes without headway. 32 
29 Green had been in his role for twenty years at the time of the hearing. Johnston had been in a policy 
role at Head Office for ten years. 
30 This happened in the Whanganui Lands inquiry. The Conservator who took the stand in that inquiry 
had been in the job only a few years, and in his evidence declared himself open to discussing the idea of 
the Whanganui National Park being a "Maori national park," though he explained he still had to function 
within National Park legislation. (Laurel Stowell, ''Maori national park for region?" Whanganui 
Chronicle, May 27, 2009. 
http://www.wanganuichronicle.co.nz/local/news/maori-national-park-for-region/3798218/). His 
predecessor in the role of conservator, according to the Pou Kura Taiao who worked with him, had been 
very resistant to working with Maori. (Interview with Whanganui Pou Kura Taiao, October 23, 2007). 
That conservator will never have to face Tribunal lawyers and defend his attitude or actions. 
31 Draft Transcript of National Park Hearing 8, #4.1.12, 414. 
32 · . Ibid., 422-5. 
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When Paul Green took the stand similar situations occurred. Often the decisions he was 
asked to explain had been made at a higher level or were clearly explained as nbthing 
more than compliance with DOC' s legislation: 
KF: ... what the Trust Board was seeking [in their 2003 submission 
regarding the then draft National Park Management Plan] was the 
creation of a joint management board between DoC and tangata whenua 
so that the park could be jointly managed in "a manner consistent with 
the ethos of the gift of Te Heuheu Tukino IV." Where did that idea of a 
joint management board get to? 
PG: The joint management board was not adopted, the principle was not 
adopted I guess because of it being in conflict with the legislation ... 
In these discussions regarding the Treaty relationship between Maori and the 
Government, there is barely any mention of the wider public. This is despite the obvious 
influence of public opinion on DOC's work. DOC's current initiatives involving Maori 
in conservation management, seen as inadequate by most tangata whenua, are criticised 
by many Pakeha as overly generous and unnecessary. The Pukenga Atawhai programme 
for new DOC staff comes under regular attack from such commentators. 33 The public 
and media furore over DOC's decision to allow the lahar to run its natural course was 
peppered with accusations of pandering to Maori perspectives. 34 One Conservation 
Board member I interviewed accused unidentified DOC staff and other unidentified 
Conservation Board members as being "more Maori than the Maoris," and cited the 
lahar decision as an exa1nple. 35 The Crown submissions often emphasise the importance 
of catering for the interests of the wider public, but they say nothing of the pressure put 
on DOC by other interest groups. Paul Green's -submission did mention this, again in 
the context of the lahar. These issues of realpolitik are of fundamental importance to an 
understanding of, or improvement upon, DOC-Maori relationships, but the Tribunal 
process discourages discussion of the political dilemmas and strategies of both DOC 
and Maori. 
Conclusion 
The debate in the inquiry regarding the contemporary relat'ionship between DOC and 
Maori highlights some of the gaps in the narratives produced in the Tribunal process. 
The data available on the relationship between. 2006 and 2008 shows relationships 
33 Interview with Tongariro-Taupo Conservator and DOC Manager 2. 
34 The then Opposition Spokesperson for the Environment, Nick Smith, took particular advantage of this 
sentiment. See Television New Zealand news article "Anger at Ruapehu Safety Moves," June 7, 2001 , 
http ://tvnz.eo.nz/content/42952/423466/article.html?cfb3=3 for one example. 
35 Interview with Conservation Board Member 1, March 2007. 
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mainly characterised by goodwill (at least among the groups with longstanding 
relationships), struggling with constraints from above, and pressures from outside in the 
form of interest groups and the media. The debate in the Tribunal, however, lumped 
local DOC staff in with headquarters. The Crown labelled this relationship 'Treaty 
compliant,' and the claimants argued the opposite. Both parties largely ignored the 
important roles played by the media and other interest groups. The Conservator was the 
only local DOC staff member to give evidence, leaving out the voices and the roles of 
many key people involved in the liaison with Maori, including the Pou Kura Taiao. 
Some of these angles and omissions are required by the Tribunal process, and some 
seem to be a product of the adversarial style of operation. On the whole, the adversarial 
style of the inquiry did not reflect the nature of relationships on the ground (again, with 
the exception of those groups who have not been included in consultation in the past). 
The inquiry caused disruption in local relationships, as detailed in chapter four. These 
disruptions may well be overshadowed in the long term by the benefits that are likely to 
accrue from the Treaty settlement. However, some writers have argued for a move 
towards a more mediatory style of inquiry, which, if workable, might avoid some of the 
disruptions an adversarial system seems to cause. 36 
36 For example Carrie Wainwright, 11Maori Representation Issues and the Courts," Victoria University of 
Wellington Law. Review 25 (2002). Wainwright argues for the benefits of mediation in order to address 
Mao-ri repr~sentation issues, but it could as well be applied to assist those involved in local-government-
Maori relationships to continue working together while inquiries are in progress. 
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Figure 5: Sketches of Crown and claimant lawyers speaking at the closing hearings for the National Park 
Inquiry, 9-13 July, 2007. The backgrounds are invented. 
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Conclusion 
Tongariro National Park sits on the brink of change at my time of writing. The Waitangi 
Tribunal report is yet to be released, but whatever its precise findings it is certain to 
recommend major alterations to the way DOC and Maori work together in park 
management. For over a hundred years the park has been a Pakeha 'island,' all its 
management decisions authored by successive governments and government agencies, 
and after settlement it will become something more of a 'beach,' a place where two 
cultures meet and negotiate. 
Recently released Tribunal reports for other inquiries point in this direction. In July 
2011 the Waitangi Tribunal released its report on the Flora and Fauna claim, Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei. In it the Tribunal argued that though DOC generally did a good job in 
its practice of consulting with Maori, the model of consultation itself was due for 
replacement: 
We gathered from the evidence of conservators that the department 
valued and welcomed the Maori voice. We would not wish to diminish 
the willingness of the Government to integrate Maori vo-ices into its 
partnership structures, and nor would we wish to undervalue the 
contribution those voices have made. But in reality, the Maori voice is 
included only as one stakeholder amongst many on governance boards. 
Given that the department must interpret and administer the Act so as to 
give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and given that the 
law is clear that the Treaty signified a partnerslµp between the Crown and 
Maori, it must be time to move to a model which gives the Maori voice 
its own space.1 
As I have argued in this thesis the structural model for relationships has a strong effect 
. . ' 
on the ability of those involved in working relationships to successfully negotiate with 
each oth~r. A good model must provide both the security to allow both groups to share 
power, cµ1d the flexibility to allow them to innovate. The history of the relationship at 
Tongariro is an example of a relationship with plenty of potential being restricted by its 
formal institutional structure. 
The relationship between DOC and Maori had several strengths at the time of the claim. 
There was substantial agreement about the way the mountains should be managed, all 
parties agreeing that a national park model was the most appropriate, though the 
ownership of the-land and the rights to admin1ster park rules were contested. Another 
1 Waitangi Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei, Taumata tuaru.a, vol I. , 343. 
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strength in the relationship was the political skill of Maori, especially Ngati Tuwharetoa 
and N gati Rangi, and their willingness to pursue their interests through the courts and 
the Waitangi Tribunal. In each case the legal battles led to negotiated agreements 
between DOC and the groups in question. Maori persistence has been a strength in a 
poor situation, and the new structure of park relationships should ensure they will not, 
in future, have to go through the expensive and time-consuming process of legal action 
in order to achieve results. 
A third, and perhaps the most important, strength in the DOC-Maori relationship at 
Tongariro at the time of my research was the longevity and resilience of personal 
relationships. The Tongariro-Taupo conservancy was a small one, in which most locals 
knew each other, and several key DOC staff had held their roles for twenty years or 
more. There were also some highly competent people in other roles who acted as 
brokers between DOC and local Maori. The people in these roles helped to support the 
Pou Kura Taiao, the official DOC-sponsored brokerage role, which would be an 
impossible role to fulfil without extra assistance. 
The major, underlying problem in the relationship between DOC and Maori was the 
difference between their expectations of the nature and objectives of that relationship, 
and the fact that the government's expectations for the relationship were enshrined in 
the formal national park institution. Maori tended to use two main arguments to justify 
their involvement in, or control of the management of national parks. One was based 
around rights to the land and resources, derived from kinship connection and affirmed 
by the Treaty ofWaitangi. The other argument was that they have useful or 
indispensable expertise in managing lands and resources. Although national-level DOC 
policy consistently references Treaty rights at t~e centre of its policy regarding Maori, 
and although kaitiakitanga is noted as a way of enhancing conservation outcomes, it .is 
clear from the subsequent policy instructions that Maori are seen as a community group 
of slightly greater importance than others, but not a significant source of expertise, or a 
group carrying the status of owners. The arguments behind DOC policies are that the 
participation of co1mnunity groups is necessary for the success of the mo~em 
conservation project, and that as interested parties they have a right to be informed and 
consulted. 
Although significant, it is important to observe that these differing beliefs about the 
reasons for the relationship between DOC and Maori did not form an insurmountable 
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barrier to working together. They did, however, add another layer of complication to the 
ongoing negotiations between them. At the same time as they negotiated about park 
management issues, they were also continually negotiating the nature of their 
relationship. 
The Treaty settlement which will shortly be negotiated between claimants and the 
Crown provides an opportunity to openly discuss differences, and design a framework 
for future relationships. It is to be hoped that those people who have been closely 
involved in relationships over the last few decades will also be closely involved in the 
settlement process. Perhaps it is best to finish with a few of their observations and 
requests. 
Having a real relationship with the Crown must be more than taking sides 
at a Tribunal hearing. It's got to be real. 
Paranapa Rewi Otimi.2 
A first step would be for people on this side of the mountain [the west] to 
have a-partnership as equals in how the National Park is run and its 
management ... However, we don't want just consultation, we would like 
to see the mountain returned - we want our whenua back for us so we can 
return to our old way of life and manage the Park and utilise its resources 
according to the traditional Maori ways. --
Te Mataara Wati Tira Pehi.3 
Being resourced to engage is fundamental to a relationship working. 
Payment is also acknowledgement for the time it takes and recognition of 
skill. 
Nie Etheridge. 4 
I look forward to the day when Ngati Rangi' s Treaty relationship with the 
Crown is genuinely and meaningfully acknowledged, held and 
maintained by the Crow:q.. 
TonyWaho.5 
I am not of the opinio_n that we as a nation must toe to toe against each 
other. Rather I believe· we need to have an equal say in how we can work 
along side each other so that what we have left in the National park is 
preserved or improved so that those who follow may enjoy this special 
place as well. It is the place of those in power to change the attitude of 
Pakeha who see this process as a gravy train for Maori. 
2 Brief of Evidence of Paranapa Rewi Otimi, Wai 1130, #G6(a), April 27, 2005, paragraph 10, 3. 
3 Brief of Evidence of Te Mataara Wati Tira Pehi, Wai 1130, D46(a), May 11, 2006, paragraphs 11.1-
11.2, 18. _ ~ . 
4 Etheridge, Co-Management between Government Conservation Agencies and Indigenous People, 51. 
5 Brief of Evidence of Tony James Davis Waho, Wai 1130, #A66, February 10, 2006, paragraph 22, 5. 
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Turoa Karat ea. 6 
Kati ake i konei. 
6 Brief of Evidence ofTuroa Karatea, Wai 1130, #G26, September 28 , 2006, paragraph 65 , 17. 
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Appendix A: The Treaty of Waitangi / Te Tiriti o Waitangi 
The Treaty ofWaitangi: English Version: 
HER MAJESTY VICTORIA, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, regarding with Her Royal Favour the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand, 
and anxious to protect their just Rights and Property, and to secure to them the 
enjoyment of Peace and Good Order, had deemed it necessary, in consequence of the 
great number of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand, and 
the rapid extension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in 
progress, to constitute and appoint a functionary properly authorized to treat with the 
Aborigines of New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's Sovereign authority 
over the whole or any part of those islands. Her Majesty, therefore, being desirous to 
establish a settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences 
which must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the 
Native population and to Her subjects, has been graciously pleased to empower and 
authorize me, William Hobson, a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy, Consul and 
Lieutenant-Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be, or hereafter shall be, 
ceded to Her Majesty, to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New 
Zealand to concur in the following Articles and Conditions. 
Article the First 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United. Tribes of New Zealand and the separate 
and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation~ cede to 
Her Majesty the Queen of England, absolutely and without reservation, all the rights 
and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual chiefs 
respectively exercise or possess, or may be ~upposed to exercise or to possess, over 
their resp.ective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof. 
Article the Second 
Her Majesty, the Queen of England, confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes 
ofNew·Zealand, and to the respective families and individuals thereof, the full , 
exclusive, and undfaturhed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and 
other pr.operties which they may collectively or individually possess, so long as it is 
their wis~ and desire to retain the same in their possession, but the Chiefs of the United 
Tribes and the Individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Pre-emption 
over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate, at such prices as 
may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her 
Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. 
Article the Third 
In consideration thereof Her Majesty, the Queen of England, extends to the Natives of 
New Zealand· Her Royal Protection, and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of 
British subjects. 
WILLIAM HOB_SON 
Lieutenant-Gov.emor 
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Now, therefore, We, the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New 
Zealand being assembled in Congress at Victoria, in Waitangi, and We, the Sep~ate 
and Independent Chiefs of New Zealand, claiming authority over the Tribes and 
Territories which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to 
understand the Provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the 
full spirit and meaning thereof, in witness of which, we have attached our signatures or 
marks at the places and dates, respectively specified. 
Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord One thousand 
Eight hundred and forty. 
Department of Maori Studies Massey University 1995 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Maori Version: 
Ko Wikitoria, te Kuini o lngarani, i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me Nga Hapu 
o Nu Tirani, i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga, 1ne to ratou 
wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te ata noho hoki, kua wakaaro ia he 
mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira hei kai wakarite ki nga tangata Maori o Nu 
Tirani. Kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira Maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini,ki nga wahi 
katoa o te wenua nei me nga motu. Na te mea hoki he to komaha ke nga tangata o tona 
iwi kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei. 
Na, ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga, kia kaua ai nga kino e puta 
mai ki te tangata Maori ki te P akeha e noho ture kore ana. 
Na, kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau, a Wiremu Hopihona, he Kaptiana it e Roiara 
N awa, hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Nu Tirani, e tukua aianei amua atu ki te Kuini, 
e ,mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te W akaminenga o nga Hapu o Nu Tirani, me era 
Rangatira atu, enei ture ka korerotia nei. 
Ko Te Tuatahi 
Ko nga Rangatira o te W akaminenga, me nga Rangatira katoa hoki, kihai i uru ki taua 
Wakaininenga, ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu te Kawanatanga 
katoa o o ratou wenua. 
Ko Te Tuarua 
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka whakaae ki nga Rangatira, ki nga Hapu, ki nga 
tangata katoa o Nu Tirani, te tino Rangitiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o 
ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga, me nga Rangatira katoa 
atu, ka tuku kite Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ~i te ·tangata nona te wenua, 
kite ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei i_te Kuini hei kai 
hoko mona. 
Ko Te Tuatoru 
He wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te _wakaaetanga ki te Kawanatanga o te Kuini. Ka 
tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata Maori katoa o Nu Tirani. Ka tukua ki a ratou 
nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani. 
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Signed William Hobson, 
Consul and Lieutenant-Governor 
Na, ko matou, ko nga Rangatira o te W akaminenga o nga Hapu o Nu Tirani, ka huihui 
nei ki Waitangi. Ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani, ka kite nei i te ritenga o 
enei kupu, ka tangohia, ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou. Koia ka tohungia ai o matou 
ingoa o matou tohu. 
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi, i te ono o nga ra o Pepuere, i te tau kotahi mano, e waru 
rau, e wa tekau, o to tatou Ariki. 
Department of Maori Studies Massey University 1995 
English Translation of Maori Text: 
VICTORIA, the Queen of England, in her concern to protect the chiefs and sub-tribes of 
New Zealand and in her desire to preserve their chieftainship and their lands to them 
and to maintain peace and good order considers it just to appoint an administrator, one 
who will negotiate with the people of New Zealand to the end that their chiefs will agree 
to the Queen's Government being established over all parts of this land and (adjoining) 
islands and also because there are many of her subjects already living on this land and 
others yet to come. 
So the Queen desires to establish a government so that no evil will come to Maori and 
European living in a state of lawlessness. 
So the Queen has appointed me, William Hobson a captain in the Royal Navy, to be 
Governor for all parts of New Zeala11-d (both those) shortly to be received by the Queen 
and (those) to be received hereafter and presents to the chiefs of the Confederation 
chiefs of the sub-tribes of New Zealand and other chiefs these laws set out here. 
The first 
The Chiefs of the Confederation, and all the chiefs who have not joined the 
Confederation, give absolutely to the Queen of England forever the complete 
government over their land. 
The second 
The Queen of England agrees to protect the Chiefs, the sub-tribes and all the people of 
New Zealand in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages, 
and all their treasures. But on the other hand the Chiefs of the Confederation and all the 
Chiefs will sell land to the Queen at a price _agreed to by the person owning it and by the 
person buying it (the latter being) appointed by the Queen as her purchase agent. 
Thethird 
For this agreed arrangement therefore concerning the Government of the Queen, the 
Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and will give 
them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. 
Signed WILLIAM HOBSON, Consul & Lieutenant-Governor 
• 
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So we, the Chiefs of the Confederation and the sub-tribes of New Zealand meeting here 
at Waitangi having seen the shape of these words which we accept and agree to .record 
our names and marks thus. 
Was done at Waitangi on the sixth day of February in the year of our Lord 1840 
Royal Commission on Social Policy Vol 2, 1988. Translation by Prof Hugh Kawharu. 
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Appendix C: Map of Tongariro National Park 
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Appendix D: Map of the Inquiry District 
Source: National Park Inquiry Map Book, Wai 1130, #A48(a), 2005. 
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Glossary of Maori Words 
Note: many of these terms cannot be properly understood outside their cultural context. 
These definitions are intended only as a guide, not as full translations. 
Ariki - high chief, paramount chief. 
Hapu - a kinship unit made up of related whanau, a clan. 
Iwi - an alliance of related hapu. 
Kaitiaki - those who exercise kaitiakitanga. 
Kaitiakitanga - "the obligation, arising from the kin relationship, to nurture or care for a 
person or thing it has a spiritual aspect, encompassing not only an obligation to 
care for and nurture not only physical well-being but also mauri." - Waitangi 
Tribunal, Ko Aotearoa Tenei, Taumata Tuarua, vol. 1, 2011, 17. 
Kati ake i konei - a Maori phrase by way of conclusion. Can be translated as 'enough 
has been said, I will stop here.' 
Kawanatanga - governance or government. 
Mana - prestige, power, control. 
Matauranga Maori - "the unique Maori way of viewing the world, incorporating both 
Maori culture and Maori traditional knowledge" - Waitangi Tribunal, Ko 
Aotearoa Tenei, Taumata Tuarua, vol. 1, 2011, 1. 
Maunga - mountain. 
Mauri - a living essence or spirit. 
Moana - sea or large lake, harbour. 
Pepeha - proverb, quotation. 
Pou Kura Taiao - DOC's Maori advisors and liaison officers, translated on the DOC 
website as "Indigenous Conservation Ethics Manager/s." 
Pukenga Atawhai- DOC 's optional course on Maori issues for new staff. 
Rahui - moratorium, temporary ban on activities within an area, or use of a particular 
resource. 
Rangatiratanga - chieftainship. 
Rohe - area. 
Tangata - person (tangata = people). 
Tangata whenua - people of the land, local indigenous people. 
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Tangi - funeral ceremonies. 
Taonga - treasured things, things of value, both tangible and intangible. 
Tapu - sacred, sacrosanct. 
Te Puni Kokiri -The Ministry for Maori Development. 
Tikanga - literally, 'rightness.' Sometimes translated as rules, customs, ethics or 
protocol. 
Tino rangatiratanga - absolute chieftainship. 
W airua - spirit. 
Whakapapa- n. line of descent, v. to trace a line of descent to an ancestor, to descend 
from an ancestor. 
Whanau - extended family. 
Whenua - land. 
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